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ABSTRACT

International perceptions of Jordanian university students are compared with those of American, Egyptian, and Israeli students. The sample consisted of 50 students from each country; results concentrate on Jordanian perceptions. Assessments were based on the Associative Group Analysis (AGA) which reconstructs perceptions and attitudes characteristic of national/cultural groups from their free word associations. Jordanians tended to be conflict-ridden and laden with perceived threats and fears of aggressive, expansionist intentions. When compared to a 1977 assessment, an increase in their longing for peace, less concern with military threat, more concern with violence and security, and a deterioration in their image of the United States was evident. Egyptian and Israeli perceptions were similar to the Jordanian emphasis on group and family unity, while Americans valued individualism and autonomy. The document also discusses the role of psychological disposition in international relations and in shaping political events, needs and problems identified by public policy offices, and strategies for social science research on foreign populations. Appendices contain the U.S. and Jordanian response lists and a discussion of the AGA methodology. (KC)

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AMERICAN, JORDANIAN, AND OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN  
NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS

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February 1981

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OF INFERENCES



## SUMMARY

### OVERVIEW

Jordanian and American perceptions, psychological predispositions, and priorities were assessed through an indepth comparative analysis of their spontaneous reactions to a broad variety of topics. Some of the specific issues covered by the analysis are: the Jordanians' images of the super powers and other international actors, their perception of timely political and military issues (e.g., war, the arms race, detente), their views and attitudes on certain economic and social issues. The assessment shows the Jordanians to be conflict-ridden and laden with perceived threats and fears of aggressive, expansionist intentions. Domestic and international problems, economic, social, and political conditions, and individual and national existence are closely inter-related in the Jordanians' view of the world.

Data from a similar assessment in 1977 made it possible to trace some changes in Jordanian perceptions and attitudes regarding the world powers and timely issues since the Camp David peace initiative of the U.S. Government. The past three years have shown an increase in their longing for a peaceful settlement, less concern with military threat, more concern with violence and personal security, and a marked deterioration in their image of the United States.

To place the findings on Jordanian perceptions in broader perspective, two other samples of Americans and Jordanians were compared with matching samples of Egyptians and Israelis. The comparison encompassed, beyond the political dimension, several other dominant characteristics of their frames of reference. The results show that most of the main differences found between the Americans and Jordanians reflect broader trends also present in the other Middle Eastern groups as well. Egyptians were also found to have strong group affiliations and to place an even stronger emphasis on family. The Israelis' national/political awareness was just as strong as the Jordanians'. However, the Jordanians' concern with security and their level of fear and anxiety clearly outranked the others'. Many of the Jordanian views emerging here---like the extent to which they feel threatened by U.S. imperialism or by Israel's nuclear capabilities---are clearly a product of subjective perceptions which could not have been predicted on the basis of facts or so-called common sense.

These assessments were based on an unstructured, inferential method called Associative Group Analysis (AGA). AGA aims at reconstructing the perceptions and attitudes characteristic of national/cultural groups from their free word associations. Each national group (N-50) used in these studies was tested in its native language at universities in the capital cities of the countries compared. Major perceptual trends characteristic of each group were charted through a computer-assisted analysis of hundreds of thousands of spontaneous reactions.

In contrast to the traditional survey methods which ask for people's opinions and rational judgments, this method of inferential assessment charts perceptual trends and motivational dispositions of which people themselves are often unaware. From the angle of methodology the findings bear directly on the main problems which have surfaced in our inquiry with policy officials. The findings suggest that a combined use of the opinion survey and an inferential-representational method offers a flexible research capability with a wide potential application in the field of international relations.

#### HUMAN PREDISPOSITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE JORDANIAN CASE

In today's fast expanding network of complex and delicate international relations the dangers of confrontation are growing and military strength offers less security than if once did. This situation presents a particular challenge to U.S. foreign policy. There is a pressing need to learn more about the human dimensions of international affairs in order to communicate and cooperate effectively with foreign nations, despite often vast differences in backgrounds, world views, and ways of thinking.

As indicated by the results of our brief inquiry, U.S. policy officials are aware that people in other countries are predisposed to think and act differently from Americans. They also recognize the need to take into consideration the perceptual and motivational predispositions of both friends and adversaries. Yet the capability to take such differences into consideration is limited. Timely, reliable information on the psychological characteristics of foreign populations is scarce, and its use is hampered by methodological as well as conceptual problems.

This report presents extensive findings to illustrate some critical principles and research methods designed to improve our understanding of culturally shared psychological predispositions, those powerful but invisible forces operating in international relations. Middle Eastern national perceptions provide an interesting and relevant context to pursue this problem.

Jordanians and Americans take basically different approaches to life. As the findings show, the Jordanians tend to view problems of politics, military power, economics, social conditions as well as problems of their own personal existence in closely interdependent relationships. This predisposition is a clear contrast to the pragmatic "case particularism" of Americans, who tend to look at each issue individually, preferring to isolate problems and solve them one by one.

One major reason for the Jordanians' holistic approach to life comes from the psychological effects of living in an acute crisis situation. Their perceptions of international issues as well as of most of their domestic problems are influenced by their confrontation with Israel--- a preoccupation which is central and pervasive in their thinking. Based on the continuous reports of bombings, terrorism, and retaliations, such an intensive preoccupation is not surprising. The psychological mechanisms operating in crisis situations--such as selective attention, selective perceptions, exaggerated fears and hopes, suppressions and overreactions--- are extensively discussed in the professional literature. While the working of such mechanisms is well established, the actual effects of conflict and stress on people, their views, attitudes, and frame of reference, are frequently unpredictable. Did Camp David generate exaggerated hopes? Did the Afghanistan invasion induce exaggerated fears? Will they lead to overreactions or to suppressed feelings? Will rumors about the Israeli nuclear capabilities produce a paralyzing fear or will it be perceived as a danger to be encountered in a holy war?

This study shows how the Jordanians' way of looking at things differs from our own, and it also demonstrates the need for new research strategies which go beyond the traditional survey methods.

## Images of Important Countries

International relations, especially between the super powers, are viewed from a very different angle by Jordanians. Their major interest is not the competition between the super powers but rather the role of these and other countries in the political/military confrontation Jordanians feel they are facing in defense of their existence. In this respect the Jordanians see the roles of the United States and the Soviet Union as similarly questionable, although their feelings about the United States are particularly ambivalent.

What positively impresses the Jordanians about the United States are its economic and industrial development, its technological advancement, and its political ideals of freedom, justice, and democracy. However, they are strongly concerned about U.S. misuse of military power, violence and killings, its collaboration with Israel, and its immorality and betrayal. Their image of the United States is salient in their minds and conveys strong conflicting emotions. Some of the negative elements are apparently products of recent changes since the United States was found to have a predominantly positive image in 1977 in a similar testing.

The Jordanians' image of the Soviet Union is less salient but conveys similarly ambivalent feelings. Their main objections again relate to the misuse of power, to oppressive, colonialist policies implemented by a great power that is heavily armed and involved in war and killing. They consider communism to be the dominant characteristic of the Soviet Union, and they describe it as being against Islam and religion. On the positive side equality and other social values as well as technological advancement and economic development receive recognition.

Although the Jordanians have a rather unflattering image of the Soviet Union, the United States is still considered to be the leading "imperialist" country, probably because of its close affiliation with Israel in their minds. The Jordanians recognize Israel as their number one enemy and from their perspective Israel is only negative, characterized as an aggressive, racist, Zionist oppressor and colonizer of Palestine.

Despite all the negative undertones, a comparison of Jordanian reactions obtained in 1980 and 1977 indicates that over the last few years their image of the enemy became less salient and less negative. In 1977 they were extremely preoccupied with thoughts of the enemy, then associated exclusively with Israel; in 1980 their preoccupation with the enemy had decreased. The role of Israel became less salient, while the United States is now apparently being charged with an increasing amount of the blame.

### Dominant Political Perspectives

The analysis of dominant political issues reveals certain trends which characterize the Jordanians' general political views.

With regard to the very issue of politics the U.S. and Jordanian approaches are thoroughly different. Politics to Jordanians has little to do with what Americans think of as the practice of party politics--- campaigning, elections, voting. In the Jordanians' world view politics involves the pursuit of national objectives by all available means--- political, social, economic, educational. From this perspective political leadership and decision making are geared toward effectively serving and promoting the best interests of the people as well as defending them against hostile forces. In other words, it is much less a question of identifying and representing the views of the people---that is, of gauging and following majority opinions---than it is in this country.

The Jordanians' predisposition to evaluate international and domestic political events as they relate to Jordanian national interests indicates a strong nationalistic orientation. They see their fate as individuals as dependent on the fate of the nation, a view which generates strong feelings of national identification. Thus, they take a strong personal interest in issues considered to be of national importance and feel that personal success and welfare can be promoted through the achievement of national objectives.

By their repeated references to oppression, human rights, freedom, and terrorism the Jordanians seem strongly preoccupied with the misuse of political and military power and with domination by hostile forces. While three years ago there was a considerably stronger expression of active anger, the present reactions convey more fear and feelings of being threatened. It may be pointed out that the terrorist activities the Jordanians attribute to the enemy (torture, killings) are the same described as defensive measures or retaliatory actions by the other side.

From the angle of finding workable solutions to this conflict, it is desirable to recognize the intensity of the Jordanians' anxieties. If they had been asked directly it is not likely that they would have expressed their fears, but the Jordanians' reactions in the indirect assessment used in this study convey an exceptionally high level of anxiety.

The Jordanians' concern with political power and with the dangers and consequences of its abuse may be a natural result of repeated frustrations and losses suffered by Jordanians in recent wars. Or it may reflect negative experience with European colonization, big power politics, or humiliations imposed by alien forces. Although the exact source of their concern may be debated, the findings consistently reflect intense preoccupation with the misuse of power through oppression, domination, and colonization.

### The Military Threat

In a world alarmed by the spiraling arms race between the super powers and the dangers of a thermo-nuclear war, the Jordanians' concerns are not less intensive but of a different nature from the Americans'.

To the Jordanians the military issues examined here, from the arms race to disarmament, bear primarily on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The attention given to the super powers is largely in relation to how the foreign policies and actions of the United States and the Soviet Union will affect the future of Jordan or the situation in the Middle East.

Considering the intense confrontation and the Jordanians' negative image of Israel as the enemy, it would be natural to expect that the existence of nuclear weapons in Israel would generate a strong concern with nuclear threat among the Jordanians. Our data show with considerable consistency that this is not the case. They did not show any special concern with Israeli nuclear capabilities. This is even more remarkable since data in other areas have shown that Jordanians feel intensely threatened. They see dangers of domination and oppression in the context of practically all the political issues explored. Their lack of attention to nuclear weapons amidst intense feelings of political and military threat does not appear particularly rational, following the "common sense" of Western strategical thinking. The intensity of Jordanian preoccupation with Israeli military power in the conventional realm may have reached a point where additional nuclear threat makes little difference. Actually, their lack of concern with Israel's nuclear strength may indicate that they are dismissing the use of force as a solution.

The Jordanians show a clear and consistent pattern of choices. They reject and condemn the military alternatives---war, arms race, nuclear weapons, proliferation---and almost unanimously favor the peace oriented initiatives like disarmament, SALT II, and detente. The consistency of these preferences is particularly significant since it indicates a rejection of military force in favor of peaceful settlements.

Three years ago war was viewed as involving two main alternatives, defeat or victory; in 1980 the Jordanians made almost no references to victory and their overriding concern appears to be protection against power---safety, security. The intensity with which the Jordanians condemn the misuse of power and the passion with which peace is sought suggest the same anxious peace orientation observed in the context of timely political issues.

## Social and Economic Premises

The social domain apparently serves as the connecting link between the Jordanians' personal and national goals and interests. The convergence of individual and group perspectives was a consistent finding in our earlier, more extensive study of the Jordanian cultural frame of reference.\* Their self image, for instance, involves strong group identifications; the Jordanian tends to perceive himself as a member of his family, of the Arab race, or of his nation. Jordanian moral and religious beliefs underline the importance of such social values as equality, justice, brotherhood, love, and cooperation, which apply to both interpersonal and international relations.

Similarly, peace emerged as an important personal as well as national objective. In view of the Jordanians' general desire for peace, if their security needs could be met, their inclination toward a peaceful settlement could possibly be strengthened into a significant political force. Such a possibility deserves consideration in the present situation where Sadat's attempts to come to terms with Israel could get an important boost if Jordan were to follow his example.

The Jordanians also see a close relationship between the individual and nation in regard to economic interests. In their view of economy, the welfare of the individual is dependent on economic development, which is seen as a collective task for the entire nation. The Jordanians have a very strong economic orientation. Backwardness, lack of resources, and poverty are considered important national problems. In response to the issue of "world problems," economy was the most frequently mentioned one by the Jordanians. They see economic development as a massive change from a state of backwardness and poverty to a state of economic and social well being.

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\* L.B. Szalay, A. Hilal, J.P. Mason, R. Goodison, and J.B. Strohl, U.S.-Arabic Communication Lexicon of Cultural Meanings: Interpersonal and Social Relations (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Comparative Social and Cultural Studies, Inc., 1978).



That the Jordanians' perceptions are closely interrelated is once again conveyed by their view that peace is a prerequisite to economic development, a view which in turn is likely to reinforce their longing for peace.

#### JORDANIANS COMPARED TO EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS

The global comparison of four countries---U.S., Jordan, Egypt, and Israel---helps to place the previous findings in broader perspectives. The results show that in some ways the Jordanians are unique and in many others they are typically Arab and Middle Eastern.

In dealing with problems of international relations the Jordanians' tendency to view actors and events from a highly subjective angle is in no way exceptional. Together with Egypt and Israel they turn much more of their attention to the United States than to the Soviet Union and blame the U.S. for oppression, imperialism, immorality, and betrayal.

The Jordanian political frame of reference may not be less conflict-ridden than the Israeli but it is much more so than the Egyptian. However, the fundamental alternatives in which Jordanians and Israelis think are different. While the Israelis view peace or war as the main options, the Jordanians are intensely preoccupied with occupation, domination, oppression, tyranny, viewed as an intermediary state that is neither war nor peace.

The Jordanian frame of reference is highly politicized. This may be attributed to some situational as well as psychocultural factors. While the military confrontation is a situational factor, the Jordanians show strong national and ethnic identifications, which come close to the Israelis and certainly exceed the Egyptians. From the Jordanian perspective, more than from that of any of the other groups, the individual is seen as a subordinate part of the large social, ethnic/national collective.

Similarly, the Jordanians' views of economy and human conditions are more oriented toward national development and influenced by political priorities than the Israeli or Egyptian views. From the Jordanian perspective the fate of the individual, his economic welfare as well as his personal happiness, is more intimately dependent on the fate and future of the national/cultural collective than it appears in the eyes of the two other Middle Eastern groups.

Interestingly, this does not lead to a position of fatalism. Work and cooperation, apparently as individual efforts, are also emphasized by the Jordanians, while the Israelis and Egyptians, along with the Americans, emphasize the financial and business dimensions of economic life.

While the Israelis tend to note the inherently positive and negative characteristics of issues and events, the Jordanians stress high ideals such as justice, equality, and freedom. Laws and customs seem to regulate the behavior of the Israelis, whereas the Jordanians appear to be motivated by a sense of duty and obligation and stress loyalty and fidelity as personal values. The Egyptians express a general concern with problems and difficulties, while the Jordanians express intense feelings of fear and anxiety.

#### SYSTEMIC INFLUENCES ON PERCEPTIONS

The findings presented here offer many specifics about the similarities and differences between Jordanians and Americans in their perceptions of timely world problems. At the same time they show some of the important attributes of national perceptions and the subjective representational system they form, which go beyond the Jordanian case and beyond their implications for the Middle East.

Shared experiences set common perspectives which predispose people to view the world in certain ways. The Jordanians' system of perceptual representation is in many ways predetermined by their background, their nationalistic traditions, their religious beliefs, and other shared

elements of direct and vicarious experiences (fears, deprivations, sufferings). It has a high degree of internal organization in which issues, actors, and events are closely interrelated.

Some of the critical characteristics in the Jordanians' system of perceptual representation were nationalism, high level of politicization, strong fears and tensions resulting from a prolonged crisis situation, and strong personal interests in such national objectives as peace and economic development. These dimensions are evident in the salient components of the Jordanians' perceptions common to many issues, yet they become most apparent through comparison with American perceptions.

Although these culturally conditioned predispositions consistently influence perception, people do not realize that they are projecting their own sense of reality into situations based on their internal system of perceptual representation. When responding in this study the Jordanians could not have known how deeply their conflict-ridden nationalistic Arab perspective would influence their political and military views as well as their perceptions of issues in other domains (economic, social, moral, etc.). Their view of disarmament, for example, clearly tied in with their views of the super powers as aggressive and expansionistic. It also tied in with their view of Israel as the enemy and major external threat. This threat is apparently unrelated to Israel's nuclear capabilities but is based on a perceived intent to overtake others through the use of conventional forces.

The system of perceptions which develops in a particular nation provides their sense of reality and determines the way they relate issues. People are typically unaware of the extent to which their views reinforce each other and influence what they observe (e.g., negative acts Jordanians attribute to Israel), what they ignore (e.g., the Israelis' concerns with their own security), and how they organize these elements in an internally consistent way (attributing negative characteristics to the U.S., for example, because of its association with Israel).

Dominant priorities predispose what people are likely to do. Knowing the subjective dominance of issues is also of considerable practical importance. In the United States the issue of nuclear weapons commands a great deal of attention and can be the mainspring for extreme actions ranging from protest strikes to demands for unconditional surrender. As we found, this issue receives minimal attention from the Jordanians and does not provide a sufficient impetus for concerted political actions.

A familiarity with these priorities and relationships can offer the key for understanding the way other peoples think and behave. The influence that the perceptual representational system exerts on political behavior calls for more systematic recognition and careful assessment.

#### ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIONAL APPROACH

A meaningful and effective use of the perceptual information presented in this report requires a recognition of the characteristics which distinguish these data from those produced by traditional attitude and opinion surveys. It may help to see more clearly the advantages and limitations of this new approach and how the two strategies may be effectively combined.

In contrast to traditional public opinion surveys, the association-based representational approach does not call for the respondents to make rational decisions or judgments. Associations show merely what is uppermost in people's minds in the context of selected topics. Their spontaneous reactions are used to infer how ideas, issues, and events are represented and organized in their minds.

Traditional survey research relies predominantly on people's judgments and positions expressed by a choice between two or more alternatives offered. A survey may ask, for instance: "What economic system has the most promise to solve the most pressing economic problems? (a) free enterprise system, (b) economy subsidized and regulated by the state, or (c) do not know, undecided." Since the alternatives are clear, any

choice offers an apparently unambiguous piece of information. Free associations are usually less definite, more ambiguous.

Furthermore, survey questions can ask people about the past or future. They may ask people's opinions about contingencies, probabilities, hypothetical situations, etc. Free associations convey only people's subjective representation of reality as it exists for them here and now. They are not rationally chosen, "edited" statements of opinions.

The association-based method is not an appropriate instrument for assessing the objective facts of a given situation, such as the effects of a tax cut on the economy. The aim of the representational approach behind the AGA method is to assess how national/cultural background and shared experiences lead people to see the world in their own way, setting their priorities and perceptions, independent of logical reasoning, and setting their patterns of behavior.

While people's explicit statements of choices and preferences are usually more definite and unequivocal, the psychology of motivations leaves no doubt that human behavior tends to follow subjective priorities, ambiguous as they frequently are because of their changing constellations.

How these two main research strategies can complement each other and bear on the practical problems facing the policy official is elaborated briefly in the methodological conclusions of this report.

## INTRODUCTION

### PSYCHOCULTURAL DISPOSITIONS, THEIR ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND IN SHAPING POLITICAL EVENTS

Behind the extensive data presented on Jordanian national perceptions the fundamental question to be addressed here is how to improve our capability to understand how particular foreign populations interpret the world as they experience it in contexts relevant to U.S. foreign policy. How can we take into account such invisible psychological realities as priorities, images, value orientations, and ways of thinking? More specifically, how can we apply the methods and concepts of the social sciences to provide practical assistance in the complex and dangerous field of international relations?

Our discussion focuses on the shared perceptions which are accumulated over time and which form an invisible bond among members of a particular nation or culture. These shared perceptions constitute frames of reference which lead people of the same background to look at the world in particular ways and to bring similar information to bear on particular issues or situations. This is why knowledge of national patterns of perception is so critical for understanding and anticipating behavior relevant to foreign policy and international relations.

An extensive review of the technical literature on perception was performed previously to identify key variables affecting dominant perceptual tendencies and their significance in shaping national behavior patterns. The findings were presented in the Technical Report, entitled National Perceptions: Critical Dimensions, Policy Relevance, and Use (April 1980).

A subsequent inquiry conducted with policy officials indicated that the majority recognize systematic data on culturally shared psychological dispositions as potentially useful and valuable. The inquiry considered such things as the potential advantages of information on dominant national perceptions, the availability of such information, and the problems of using perceptual and motivational information in foreign policy planning.

The literature review and the subsequent inquiry with policy officials have similar implications. The general indication is that the United States has growing difficulty in coping with the intangible psychological dimensions of foreign affairs despite their influential role.

This situation contrasts with some significant experiences of the U.S. policy-making community in the 1940s and 1950s. In the second world war cultural expertise was applied to provide strategic guidance and to ameliorate the conditions of conflict in both the Asian and European theatres. A particularly innovative and useful set of studies on Japan was carried out by the Office of War Information. Later, during the Cold War, cultural and psychological analyses were applied in order to assist U.S. policy-makers in anticipating Soviet reactions, as an aid in negotiations and in reducing the chances for unnecessary misperception vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

This report isolates the critical psychocultural variables operating in international settings and identifies some false assumptions that are deeply rooted in our own experiences and cultural predispositions. The main body of the report presents policy relevant findings on national perceptions in Jordan and the Middle East. It pays special attention to the subjective selectivity of perceptions, to the illusion that perceptual representations reflect objective, universally shared views of reality, and to the close connections between perceptions, decisionmaking and behavior. It addresses five critical choices for obtaining foreign policy relevant data on national perceptions. The focus is here on new and insightful information which helps to overcome

expectations based on our own national perceptions and which enables U.S. foreign policy officials to understand and anticipate international developments and events in their human dimensions. The data presentation serves to introduce the problems at a practical working level supported by new methodological capabilities.



## THE POLICY PROBLEM

### HOW TO RECOGNIZE AND DEAL WITH THE CRITICAL HUMAN/CULTURAL FACTORS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

#### POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS - POWERFUL BUT HIDDEN PREDISPOSITIONS

In recent years such international events as the sudden collapse of the South Vietnamese military in 1975 and the crumbling of the Shah's government in Iran have taken U.S. foreign policy experts by surprise. The South Vietnamese forces caved in not just because the North Vietnamese were stronger in terms of weaponry, equipment, or trained manpower but because they lost faith in the belief that they had a fighting chance; they felt abandoned and so became disorganized. The Shah lost his throne, and the U.S. one of its most powerful allies in the Middle East, despite the fact that the Iranian military force was one of the largest and best equipped in the world. Within less than a year of President Carter's compliment to the Shah that Iran was an "island for progress and stability," opposition forces managed to dethrone the Shah and smash the monarchy. They did it by cashing in on the alienation and hatred of many people who saw Western economic, technical, and social modernization as threatening to their culture, religion, and personal identities. President Carter admitted that he was caught by surprise and as an explanation he complained that he did not receive information in time about the Iranian peoples' views and sentiments.

These are just two well known examples of recent political developments whose outcomes were vital to our national interest and which took lines dramatically different from our own expectations. U.S. foreign policy planning was based rather narrowly on such material factors as the GNP, standard of living indicators, and military strength

in manpower, weaponry, equipment, etc. It virtually ignored the human element, that is, the role of psychological factors.

These experiences and others have dramatically demonstrated the need to make U.S. foreign policy sensitive to such hidden but powerful psychological realities as national perceptions. The reason is not so much a matter of testing our perception of reality against others or of abandoning our own views in order to accommodate or appease others. The real value of such knowledge is that it can reveal those built-in trends and limitations that national/cultural dispositions set for people's actions, including ourselves, our allies, and our potential adversaries.

In examining how these information needs are actually translated into reality we find an immense gap between what is stated as desirable and what is actually being done. Analysts of recent U.S. foreign policy failures concur that U.S. policy makers have difficulty taking into consideration the psychological characteristics of people whose background, culture, and national identity differ from our own.

#### SIGNS OF DECLINING U.S. CAPABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In face of increasing need for deeper international understanding, as accentuated by recent world events, our efforts to take foreign psychocultural dispositions into account deserve special attention. The trends appear rather alarming in historical perspective. Such leading social scientists as Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, George Taylor, and Alexander George helped shape our policies toward Japan in the forties, and Kluckhohn, Inkeles, and Bauer provided an empirically-based foundation for our knowledge of Soviet society in the fifties.

During the last twenty years the scope of opinion surveys has expanded overseas, but social science input that could place the findings in the appropriate cultural context has shown little increase. This lag is hard to explain in the present historical period of broad international involvements, when power relations are shifting and challenges and frustrations are at a peak.

In our open democratic society foreign policy is shaped by the American public as well as by the federal government, and millions of American businessmen and tourists now travel extensively overseas. Thus, it is essential that both the people and government can improve their understanding of people overseas.

The dramatic consequences of not having an adequate understanding of foreign perceptions and behavior often effect foreign policy most directly. Blames for failures in the field of foreign policy are usually on the Department of State or on the various intelligence agencies. Yet it would be a dangerous simplification to conclude that information on the perceptions and frames of reference of foreign populations is a matter of concern only for the government.

## THE BLIND SPOT

In an article entitled "The Blind Spot of U.S. Foreign Intelligence,"\* Anthony Marc Lewis supports with several concrete examples his central thesis that lack of sensitivity to Vietnamese cultural predispositions was a source of repeated miscalculations in U.S. foreign policy:

"Vietnam case studies, based in part on newly declassified evidence, suggest that hidden cultural assumptions crippled the CIA's ability to perform its advisory function" (p. 44). Based on his long years of service in the CIA, Lewis concludes that there is a rather universal problem affecting policy relevant reports on foreign countries. "The writer's cultural biases tend especially to distort their presentations of the very kinds of local psychological factors which decision-makers and executers of policy need most urgently" (p. 45). Summarizing his experiences regarding our involvement in South Vietnam from President Diem's days up to the North Vietnamese victory, Lewis documents a general trend whereby administrative pressures, "group think," and narrow bureaucratic views interfered with and suppressed the insights of authentic cultural experts.

Based on Lewis's inside account, it becomes apparent that this substitution of domestic views for massive external realities is an unintentional but systematic process which proceeds without awareness or malicious intent.

To illustrate this problem in the context of Iran we may turn to a summary assessment presented in a Staff Report of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives (January 1979), entitled "Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978." The report was the result of an inquiry conducted following President Carter's dissatisfaction with

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\* A.M. Lewis, "The Blind Spot of U.S. Foreign Intelligence," Journal of Communication, 1976 (Winter), 26:1.

the quality of information available to him and after press reports began to refer to intelligence failure, concluding that "the inadequacy of intelligence had narrowed American policy choices." The report concludes:

The intelligence and policy making communities must each carry part of the blame for insensitivity to deep-rooted problems in Iran. More importantly, intelligence and policy failings were intertwined. (p. 1).

In the words of the Committee, "intelligence field reporting from Iran provided a narrow and cloudy window through which to observe the sweeping social and political changes underway....What was missing--- and is still weak---was insight into the goals and expectations of opposition elements, and popular attitudes toward them" (p. 2-3).

The report further states that neither the CIA nor the Embassy political section was very responsive to requests for information on the "less tangible influences:"

One problem is that information on social groups and trends tends to be considered overly academic by field personnel, since it is usually not fast-changing, and its relationship to policy issues and users' requirements is not readily apparent. Another is that collection on these intangible subjects is difficult and unrewarding to any but an "Iranophile," and in too many cases field personnel lack the background, language fluency, or inclination to pursue them effectively. (p. 3).

This example suggests that in effect the intelligence agencies have not given adequate priority to information on human psychocultural predispositions. The main reasons given are that this subject is less tangible, that it is academic, and that it is not fast-changing. These may appear to be sound bureaucratic reasons, but what is being rejected here is information vital in shaping U.S. international relations at both governmental and private levels.

The apparently erratic Iranian reactions are a case in point. They have caused bewilderment and raised emotions in the American public during the past two years. They have seriously affected U.S. foreign policy. The Carter administration has been repeatedly blamed for making

commitments to a situation which could amount to a deadly trap. Without knowing the basic framework of Iranian perceptions, U.S. foreign policy makers have no map which could provide orientation on the strange terrain of the Iranian psychocultural landscape. In searching for direction we use our domestic maps---i.e., our own experiences, our own views and priorities, our own rationale. These domestic maps offer little guidance in application to a population as different and distant as the Iranians. Yet as an Iranian expert, William Beeman, has observed, there is a remarkable reluctance to use authentic area expertise. Beeman, a well known cultural anthropologist, expressed his views in a recent New York Times article, "Devaluing Experts on Iran:"\*

Negotiations and dealing with Iran in the hostage crisis have been delicate and complex. Paradoxically, since the crisis began, in November, individuals best equipped to deal with its intricacies---American experts on Iran---have not been used effectively by our Government.... Consultation with specialists on Iran was severely reduced, and their few invited memorandums were largely ignored. This shift resulted in ongoing misinterpretations, misreadings and mistakes in day-to-day dealings with Iranian officials.... Thus, to look at the hostage crisis and the degree to which our experts are being under-used is to be saddened. We want to develop more experts to deal with crises, but we don't know how to use profitably the ones we have.

In his 1980 election debate with Governor Ronald Reagan President Carter referred to the dilemma he constantly was facing. As he put it, on some of the most critical questions experts are usually split right in the middle, 50/50, in camps of conflicting opinions. While this problem is not new, it now appears to be exceptionally critical.

The United States no longer enjoys the massive advantages in economic and military superiority which prevailed after World War II. The contemporary world situation makes it increasingly desirable that the United States promotes peace and international cooperation through policies backed by genuine cultural understanding. Under the conditions

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\*W. Beeman, "Devaluing Experts on Iran," New York Times, Friday, October 11, 1980.

of strategic balance and keen economic competition, world leadership and the preservation of peace require an increased capability in the human-psychological dimension to anticipate and influence events.

These are the abilities Strobe Talbott pleads for with special regard to the Middle East in Time (October 20, 1980):

Even before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis, the U.S. was widely perceived, both at home and abroad, to be losing its ability to anticipate and influence events that jeopardize Western interests and world peace. For the U.S. to find itself on the sidelines of the current trouble is particularly frustrating and ominous. This marks the first time in the long and variegated history of modern Middle Eastern warfare that the U.S. has neither diplomatic relations with, nor political leverage on, either of the combatants. Commented Saudi Arabia's Foreign Affairs Minister, Prince Saud al Faisal: "The almost total absence of any U.S. sway with the parties directly involved in such a dangerous situation is sobering to say the least."

## OBJECTIVE

### TO IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITIES IN ASSESSING FOREIGN PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND IN USING THE RELEVANT INFORMATION FOR POLICY PLANNING

The central objective of this study is to assist policy planning and decision-making in the field of international relations by facilitating a wider and more systematic use of behavioral science information, particularly data on national perceptions.

In support of this long-range objective, we have pursued some more specific interrelated aims:

First, as a point of departure we have undertaken a modest effort to identify how policy officials view the usefulness of perceptual/-motivational information in relation to their own information needs and requirements.

The second aim was to identify some of the main factors responsible for the limited use of perceptual information, ranging from skepticism and misconceptions to serious limitations and shortages of the information available.

A third related aim was to demonstrate that a partial solution to what we have identified as the "high need, low use paradox" may simply be to provide the policy official with more and better information on national perceptions.

Timely perceptual data obtained on Jordanians and other Middle Eastern samples are used to illustrate several characteristics of perceptual information that are of particular relevance and practical value to policy-related applications.



## GENERAL APPROACH

### A COORDINATED USE OF THREE SOURCES: POLICY OFFICIALS, TECHNICAL LITERATURE, AND RESEARCH ON NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS

To identify user needs and requirements we first conducted an inquiry with policy officials, including senior members of the Department of Defense and to a lesser extent the Department of State, in three general areas. First, we asked about their views on the role of human psychocultural factors in international relations and the value of perceptual information in understanding and predicting policy-relevant national behavior. Second, we asked them about the information available on national perceptions and about its quality and utility. Third, we asked for their opinions and recommendations on how foreign policy planning could be assisted through perceptual information.

We then examined the reactions obtained from policy officials in combination with the results of our previous survey of the literature. The problems raised by policy officials and the blind spots, misconceptions, and deficiencies identified in the literature review appeared to be interrelated. We were particularly interested in how the problems raised by the policy officials could be resolved based on findings in the scientific literature and on conclusions we drew from our selective review of the literature. In this context the critical parameters of perceptions identified in the previous technical report on national perceptions were found to have considerable relevance and explanatory value.

Finally, we used empirically based research findings to illustrate how some of the most fundamental shortcomings of perceptual assessments could be overcome. The focus here is the key factors responsible for the present state of disorientation and skepticism and the strikingly

low use of perceptual data---all of which stand in sharp contrast to a broadly recognized need for information on foreign perceptions. This last step is based on an analysis of Jordanian and American national perceptions. Also included are some additional data on Middle Eastern countries which were accumulated in the context of other studies undertaken recently by scholars of American and Arab background. We used these data because of their timeliness and their potential to illustrate some basic principles in the context of one of the world's contemporary trouble spots, characterized by high political tensions and widely divergent perceptions.

## PART I

### NEEDS AND PROBLEMS INDICATED BY POLICY OFFICIALS

#### REVIEW OF POLICY OFFICIALS' VIEWS OF NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS

As a point of departure it was desirable to establish how policy officials view the need to know the perceptual and motivational human factors underlying political events. In other words, is there a realization that knowledge of widely shared national/cultural perceptions could help U.S. policy officials avoid being taken by surprise? It could have helped, for instance, to develop less costly and less dangerous foreign policy alternatives in encountering the Iranian situation (e.g., if we had known earlier of the Iranian people's rejection of the Shah's monarchy in favor of a republican form of government).

We were also interested in assessing what type of information policy officials have available on the human dimension, especially on perceptual-motivational predispositions, in the context of their major areas of concern and their practical work assignments. This line of inquiry was taken to establish whether the limited attention given to foreign predispositions is due mainly to a lack of interest or lack of information. What are really the main reasons for the low and apparently declining use of information on the psychological characteristics of people in other nations?

Finally, we asked policy officials what are the major obstacles to the use of timely information on this human dimension in policy planning and decision making.

Although we had a clear set of questions in mind, our inquiry was kept unstructured and informal. Our research reports on national perceptions and on Iranian and Arab perceptions and frames of reference offered a natural context for eliciting comments. It was desirable to have a concrete framework so that policy officials did not feel that their opinions were being examined individually but rather that they were being called upon to evaluate some material and its underlying propositions along their area of expertise and interest. Policy officials might have been reluctant to respond if they had felt that they were the target of the assessment and had to articulate their opinions in an entirely open-ended situation. As it was they had specific information to read, and their task was mainly to review it critically.

While this framework did facilitate interaction, the documents we have offered as "context" may have influenced in a certain sense the responses elicited from the policy officials. Most of the policy people we included had previously expressed interest in this subject matter. As a result, the views of officials with specialized focus on technical (technological, economic, financial, military) factors may be underrepresented here.

#### Policy Relevance of Psychocultural Population Characteristics

Practically everyone agreed that we should pay attention to deeply ingrained psychological predispositions that are culturally shared among the people of a particular country.

While the policy officials and experts agreed about the general need for taking certain foreign population characteristics into consideration, they showed considerable diversity of opinions with regard to what these characteristics actually are, what constitutes

truly useful information, and how such information may be obtained. It became clear, for instance, that policy officials are little prepared to draw distinctions among such terms as attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and opinions. Some were more used to speaking of attitudes, others of perceptions and images, and many have used these concepts interchangeably. They were apparently bothered by the diversity of labels and definitions in the social and behavioral science literature. They prefer to leave the choice of terms to the professionals of the particular field. What is really essential is that the information on people in other nations provides a solid foundation for understanding and anticipating their policy relevant behavior.

Almost all the policy officials/experts with whom we discussed these questions had read the original report on "National Perception" or at least the Executive Summary of it. No one questioned the literature or our conclusions about the practical utility of perceptual data to bear on policy. We found, for example, a rather wide acceptance of the principle of subjective selectivity operating in people's perceptions. Policy officials generally agreed that shared experiences, backgrounds, and cultural assumptions predispose people to see things and events in the world in a particular way and that these shared perceptions will influence people's behavior.

The consensus, loud and clear at a verbal level, stands in vivid contrast to actual practices, in governmental as well as private spheres, which indicate that in effect such policy relevant factors are systematically ignored. Their acceptance of our premises does not automatically mean that they would follow through in concrete life situations. This problem area characteristically suffers from gaps which separate the acceptance of principles at a verbal/theoretical level from the actual practical implementation of these principles.

### Reasons for Low Use of Perceptual Information

The main thrust of our further inquiry was to identify the causes and reasons for the rather consistent neglect of foreign people's predispositions which actively interfere with their political choices and behavior.

There was a general consensus that decision makers are usually ill prepared to take the human element into consideration. They would not deny in the context of intellectual deliberations that foreign nations view and approach problems of international relations differently. Nor did anyone seriously question that these views influence their choices or that by knowing their perceptions we can better anticipate their behavior. Yet in actually dealing with foreign nations, whether Iranians, Russians, or Chinese, after a formal recognition of some important differences, our foreign policy decisions are likely to be based on the assumption that the foreign powers will follow our own common sense in a universal way. Even the highly experienced policy officials who have seen at first hand how Soviet leaders for over sixty years have subordinated economic interests to political objectives are tempted again and again to read into new policy statements that the Soviets now recognize that politics has to be subordinated to natural economic priorities, population needs, consumer demands.

The inclination to accept the idea of differences between various nations at an intellectual level and to ignore them at the practical working level is strong and universal. Since the contradiction is now frequently recognized, there is a chance for improvement. Yet the dominant practice of ignoring the reality of foreign population characteristics is supported by several related factors.

Most importantly, the decision makers usually have extensive information on the various material factors which bear on a particular policy decision. The economic, financial, military, technological data are not only available, they are also usually solidly founded in observable facts and sources of information the decision makers are familiar with as a matter of their professional training as businessmen, scientists, etc.

In contrast, information on the relevant psychological predispositions is usually meager. It is rarely based on verifiable facts and is frequently qualitative rather than quantitative. Frequently it involves expert opinions which are often conflicting. A resolution of the contradictions would require that the decision maker possess a familiarity and expertise superior to that of his own experts expressing the conflicting views. In reality, this is naturally seldom the case; it is more likely that the decision maker becomes frustrated and reverts to his good American common sense. That this common sense is not likely to be followed by Russians, Arabs, Koreans or others is usually ignored at this point.

With relatively solid data on tangible material factors and with little, or questionable, information on the human psychocultural factors, the decision maker is likely to rely on what he feels to have solidly in hand and give up ambitions to account for the intangible human dimensions which do not fit readily into the world he is familiar with. It is understandable that many people dismiss or avoid foreign psychological predispositions which fall outside their expertise and with which they have little familiarity.

## FIVE CRITICAL CHOICES IN THE USE OF POLICY RELEVANT SOCIAL SCIENCE INFORMATION

In the decision-making process one solution may appear attractive based on the foreign policy official's domestic experiences and common sense, while another may also seem appropriate but unconventional by domestic standards and would require more justification. Since the policy official cannot be expected to be an expert in all areas, he must often seek the advice of professionals who are specialists in their fields. Based on our discussions with policy officials, we have identified five fundamental decisions which appear to be particularly troublesome in considering information on psychocultural factors:

1. The proper variable: Which characteristics of the foreign population should receive primary attention as being most informative for understanding and predicting policy relevant behavior?
2. Proper information source: Which discipline or profession is best prepared to provide the information needed? Is it opinion research, psychology, anthropology, political science, area expertise, or some other field?
3. The proper expertise: How does one decide which expert is right when encountering contradictory, conflicting expert opinions?
4. The proper population to study: Which group or groups should serve as the primary basis for assessments (elite, professionals, general population)?
5. Distinguishing biased from valid information: In a situation where outdated and timely, valid and biased information about ourselves as well as other peoples coexist in excessive quantities, in various mixtures, how can one differentiate the valid information from that which is useless and misleading?

### What are the Variables Practically Most Useful?

What type of information helps us the most to understand other people? What do we have to know about others in order to anticipate



with reasonable accuracy what they will do? In many ways members of several professions (psychologists, opinion researchers, market researchers, etc.) do agree that people's attitudes and opinions that matter most. While in the context of our domestic experiences this seems to be a well founded conclusion, there are some reasons to believe that attitude and opinion data alone may not be sufficiently informative for understanding foreign nations and predicting their policy relevant behavior.

In our own environment we are generally familiar with people's world views and the attitudes which accompany them. If we know that a person is for the ratification of the SALT II agreement, for example, we can make certain assumptions about his general way of thinking since in our own environment we are familiar with the most widely held views on this subject. At the same time, knowing a specific attitude would not be sufficient information to draw conclusions about the accompanying views of a person with a foreign cultural background.

In the U.S. cultural environment people are more used to making choices and acting on separate matters independently of each other, and their behavior is likely to be consistent with their attitudes on specific issues. In traditional and especially in more controlled societies, people are more limited in their choices, and they make fewer independent choices in line with single isolated attitudes.

The shared backgrounds and experiences of people brought up in the same national/cultural environment set certain patterns of perception which determine how they view the world and react to it. They create some relatively stable predispositions which characterize the people of a particular nation. In contrast to those stable predispositions, the main focus of our domestic interest is more on changing attitudes, opinions, their variations depending on changing situations, fluctuating moods, events, etc.

To understand people from different cultural backgrounds we have to know what in their minds are the truly dominant concerns and issues. We then need to know what are the salient elements in their perceptions

of those concerns. By knowing their priorities and their perceptions we can gain insights into the factors which are most likely to influence their behavior.

The main thrust of our domestic interest is in the barometric changes of attitudes and opinions which bear closely on domestic politics, consumerism, social style, etc. When dealing with other nations, which live under different conditions, in cultural environments frequently vastly different from ours, it is essential to have at first a basic understanding of the main perceptual and motivational trends reflected by people's way of thinking. This provides the necessary backdrop against which to evaluate more specific information on particular attitudes and opinions.

#### Which Source Offers the Information Most Needed?

In domestic contexts attitude and opinion surveys are useful and informative. We are familiar with the main alternative views and opinions, for example, on SALT II or foreign aid. We know the general opinions of those, for instance, who are for or against foreign aid. What the surveys can tell us is the actual proportions of those who opt for one or the other alternative position or how these proportions change.

When used overseas, however, survey research encounters several difficult problems. In discussing the methodological problems associated with international survey research, Buchanan and Cantril\* in their seminal work place at the top of the list the biases resulting from differences in meaning. These problems are discussed extensively by leading international relations and communications experts who explore various ways to overcome differences in meanings and problems in translation.\*\*

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\* W. Buchanan and H. Cantril, How Nations See Each Other (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953).

\*\* L. Radvanyi, "Problems of International Opinion Surveys," International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research, 1947, 1, 43-51; D. Wallace, et al., "Experience in the Time International Survey," Public Opinion Quarterly, 1949, 7, 708-721; D. Bobrow, "Transfer of Meaning Across National Boundaries," in R. Merritt (ed.), Communication in International Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1972); R.W. Brislin, "Back-Translation for Cross-cultural Research," Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 1970, 1, 185-216.

According to Cantril the major objective of international survey research would require "to get an overall picture of the reality worlds in which people live," which requires that they have the freedom to express themselves using their own terms.\* As he observes: "Clearly, an accurate appraisal of an individual's reality world can never be obtained if he is forced to make choices or selections between categories, alternatives, symbols or situations as these are posed in the usual type of questionnaire."

The applicability of survey methods in various societies represents another problem. Direct approaches, such as used in attitude and opinion surveys, have almost unlimited applicability in open, democratic societies where people are used to social science research free of government control. However, the utility of these direct approaches is limited in societies where the political systems are controlled, where people with oppositional views are politically persecuted, or where people have little experience or desire to state freely their own candid opinions.

While our domestic assessments of people's views and attitudes show a strong natural reliance on opinion surveys, in international contexts such surveys may be unavailable, unreliable, or both. Here the conventional methods have to be adapted and complemented by other sources of information like those offered by the fields of cultural anthropology and social psychology.

Particularly relevant and useful in this context are the experiences and methods accumulated and developed by anthropologists who are specially trained to recognize and assess psychocultural dispositions as characteristic of people of different background and culture. The anthropological approach is characterized by Bennet and Thaiss\*\* as "intensive" as opposed to "extensive" approaches such as the highly structured

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\* W. Buchanan and H. Cantril, How Nations See Each Other (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953).

\*\* J. Bennet and G. Thaiss, "Sociocultural Anthropology and Survey Research," in G. Y. Glock (ed.), Survey Research in the Social Sciences (New York: Sage Foundation, 1967).

survey methods that focus on single specific issues. As anthropologists argue, the structured, narrowly-focused questions typically used in "extensive" survey approaches take only a single element into consideration and therefore cannot offer sufficient cultural insights and understanding.

### Who Are the Authentic, Reliable Experts?

In the field of international relations or foreign policy, decision makers have to consider a number of diverse factors---economic, military, social, psychological. Since no one person has the necessary knowledge of all these diverse elements, decision makers usually call on experts in the various fields.

The identification and use of expertise in the "psychocultural" field require separate consideration. Expertise on human predispositions, attitudes, perceptions, and motivations of people of different cultural background presents some special problems:

- Expert opinions are frequently contradictory, with few ways of checking which position is right.
- Cultural expertise on a particular foreign group is usually contaminated with the experts' own underlying cultural perspectives and predispositions.
- A consensus among experts from the same cultural background (e.g., U.S.) who make observations and pass judgments on a particular foreign group (e.g., Iranians) is no proof of validity. Their consensus can well be the result of their similar perspectives rather than the product of genuine, independent observations.

Area experts who have extensive first-hand experiences with people of a given country and who have the flexibility to shift to foreign cultural perspectives often find themselves at odds with the views of the majority. To select truly competent experts is hardly possible for policy officials or anyone else unless there are some independent data available on the perceptions and motivations of

members of the particular population which can be used in validation, documentation, and elaboration of authentic expert opinions.

The various problems associated with the selection and use of authentic expert opinions have been elaborated in our previous report on National Perceptions.\*

#### Whose Views, Perceptions, Motivations Should be Assessed?

A question frequently posed by policy officials is what particular group or social strata should be given primary attention. This question acquires special importance because the approach we are inclined to take based on our national experience would lead naturally to the representative polling of entire nations. The application of such a broad approach is hampered in international contexts, however, both because of the limited access to people and because of the prohibitive costs involved. As is discussed later, it is widely argued that in controlled societies the only group worthwhile to study is the elite, the national leadership. In contrast to the U.S. experience where the public opinion is an extremely powerful force, in many developing countries and in countries under authoritarian rule or totalitarian control, the opinions of the general population have negligible effects.

These two lines of reasoning have created two distinct research trends, one stressing public opinion research, the other stressing leadership studies. These are generally considered to be either-or alternatives, and occasionally both options are ignored, as was the case with Iran. The unexpected Iranian developments illustrate the serious consequences of allowing this fallacious dichotomy to paralyze research efforts.

As elaborated in our previous report on national perceptions,\*\* an assessment of broadly shared perceptual trends is

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\* L.B. Szalay and J.B. Strohl, National Perceptions-Critical Dimensions, Policy Relevance and Use. (Washington, D.C.: ICS, 1980).

\*\* L.B. Szalay and J.B. Strohl, National Perceptions. (see above) Appendix VI.

feasible without relying on large samples of national representation. A contrasting scientific approach comes from cultural anthropology, which draws conclusions from studying relatively small numbers of cultural representatives in depth. Furthermore, there are indications that by using strategically selected native representatives---e.g., students---it is possible to chart the critical psychocultural predispositions which are generally characteristic of the people living in that country. As illustrated by a recent comparative study of American and Iranian student samples,\* in the process of assessing psychological predispositions this strategy simultaneously captures timely political attitudes as well. The Jordanian political perceptions explored in the present study are expected to shed additional light on this problem.

#### How Does One Differentiate the Biased and Misleading from the Valid and Useful Information?

The information available to policy officials on a particular foreign population is usually extensive but often of questionable value. There are several reasons for this, but the most crucial one is that the inescapable influence of one's native culture interferes subconsciously with the capability to analyze other people's perceptions and motivations.

Almost everyone who has spent at least a few days in a foreign country is inclined to draw some general conclusions about the people there, and there is the well known phenomenon of the "instant expert"---the tendency to present one's personal impressions as statements of fact, uninhibited by the potential harm that could result from biased misleading conclusions. In contrast to such instant expertise, professional, clinical, and personal experience tells us what a demanding and time-serving task it can be to try to understand just one particular individual. To draw conclusions which can be generalized with reasonable accuracy to thousands, even millions, of people is hardly possible without special training and carefully developed methods.

Because everyone has his ideas and impressions about how others think and feel, misconceptions abound. Much of the information available on the psychocultural characteristics of foreign peoples is based on superficial impressions, much of it is unintentionally biased and

\*L.B. Szalay, E. Mir-Djalali, H. Moftakhar, and J. Bryson Strohl, Iranian and American Perceptions and Cultural Frames of Reference (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Comparative Social & Cultural Studies, 1979).

distorted by the writer's cultural viewpoint, and an unknown portion of the material is outdated, no longer of timely relevance.

The extensive works produced by competent anthropologists and cultural experts on foreign populations could fill libraries. One major problem with the literature, however, is that we are in an age of rapid societal change where people's perceptions, attitudes, and values change as well. Frequently just how much of prior observations has contemporary applicability remains unanswered. Or the answers produced by different authorities contradict each other.

This field is plagued not only by frequent disagreement among authorities but also by expert consensus resulting from similar biases and culturally based assumptions.

While the validity of information is readily testable in the natural sciences, there are no fully standardized tests or procedures for validating information on the psychological characteristics of people in other nations of the world.

To reproduce other people's perceptions and motivations is not a question of intelligence or professional competence; it is largely a matter of combining rich and close personal experiences with the ability to shift from one's own cultural perspective to the perspective characteristic of the nation in question. For those of us living in a pluralistic society with its open competition, free enterprise system, and democratic institutions, it is very hard to sort out in what ways members of other societies---Soviet, Chinese, Iranian---look at the world differently from ourselves.

While we cannot see the world through their eyes, if we can accumulate data which allow to reconstruct how the world appears to them and compare this with how it appears to us, eventually an objective way can be found to make the transition from our subjective world into theirs and vice versa.

## PART II

### STRATEGIES FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON FOREIGN POPULATIONS

The strategy used in overseas research is primarily determined by the choice of population sample as well as by the social and political constraints to social science research in the country under consideration.

#### STUDIES AIMING AT A BROAD REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLING OF OPINIONS

The most popular approach is the public opinion survey. It is deeply rooted in democratic values and procedures built around the majority principle. This approach relies on sophisticated, scientific sampling methods, takes advantage of modern computer technology, and effectively serves numerous domestic political and business interests. Public opinion polls have become very much a part of the contemporary American cultural scene, an integral part of our way of thinking, our world view. If we want to know how the people are thinking, or how their views have changed, we consult the polls. These domestic experiences create a strong and natural predisposition to follow the same procedures to learn about people's views abroad.

Since national/cultural groups often encompass tens, even hundreds, of millions of people with some obvious differences within them, it is natural to ask how to select representative samples so that the assessment will produce valid results generalizable for the entire population. This question is the same encountered in domestic survey research---



for instance, how to sample voters so that the responses of a few thousand people will faithfully represent the actual proportion of preferences held by many millions of voters. Even those who recognize that there are some views which are particularly characteristic of Americans feel that a systematic, statistical sampling of the American population is necessary in order to draw any valid conclusions.

This rationale is solidly founded on our experiences with the diversity of opinions existing in our open democratic society. It is further supported by the flourishing practice of public opinion surveys and polls. Since in the history of polling, wrong predictions could be frequently traced back to a biased, nonrepresentative sampling of the population, it is understandable that a representative sampling of entire nations appears to be a fundamental prerequisite to policy officials trained in the tradition of domestic public opinion surveys and communication research.

Several problems are encountered in attempts to implement this domestic rationale in research overseas.

- In most developing countries statistics on demographic and other population characteristics as well as the organizational resources necessary for representative sampling and surveying of opinions are lacking.
- Foreign populations are generally not familiar with the practice of public opinion surveys. They have little experience with social science research pursued independently of government interests.
- There is generally less freedom of thought, less tolerance for diversity of opinions. The people are more afraid or reluctant to express opinions particularly when they disagree with or are critical of the central authority, political leadership, government, etc. The interference and control of a centralized government is naturally a prohibitive factor in the conduct of opinion surveys in countries under absolutist monarchies and totalitarian governments.

Additional problems hampering the use of public opinion surveys in most countries overseas are discussed in our previous report.\* These sampling and testing problems are bound to produce biased opinion survey results in many foreign countries and prevent opinion research altogether in some.

As annoying or prohibitive as these problems may be, there is a dangerous tendency to assume that opinion surveys constitute the only solid, scientific way to obtain timely information needed for international understanding. Such a reasoning anchored in the rationale of our domestic opinion surveys is leaning toward the view that large-scale representative sampling is an indispensable prerequisite for obtaining valid, generalizable information. That reasoning excludes a very large portion of the world which we badly need to know about and understand. It leads to a dangerous pessimism and inertia with regard to searching for alternative ways of arriving at psychocultural assessments and behavioral predictions.

#### STUDIES FOCUSING ON POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The limitations of testing and sampling in the public opinion strategy have contributed to the development of a contrasting strategy with interest focused specifically on the elites and political leaders. It is applied primarily in research on countries under tight political control. Under these conditions there is a tendency to ignore the views of broad population strata and to focus attention on the national leadership. A narrow concern with the leaders is justified by the reasoning that in controlled societies the broad population has little or no influence and is not easily accessible; so the only thing that matters is what the leaders think and want. This narrow elitist pragmatism, which tends to be insensitive to the needs and dispositions of the general population, has directed interest to such generally untestable factors as the leaders'

\* L.B. Szalay and J.B. Strohl, National Perceptions - Critical Dimensions, Policy Relevance and Use (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Comparative Social and Cultural Studies, Inc., 1980).

personality traits and to psychoanalytic interpretations of their character and motives. The result is a mixture of speculations, gossip, and confidential information about the individual members and the dynamics of decision making in the top leadership circles. Most of our attention to the Soviet Union, for instance, is absorbed in second-guessing the Soviet leaders in the Kremlin, developing elaborate attempts to reconstruct power relations, dominant patterns of decision making in the Kremlin, a field loosely labelled as "Kremlinology." While the perceptions and motivations of the national leadership certainly deserve close attention, this approach has several weaknesses:

- The political leadership is usually a small select group of political activists who are rarely accessible to objective systematic assessment.

- Although the policy statements of officials do reflect on perceptions and motivations, it would be impossible to differentiate between their genuine perceptions and statements produced for propaganda and other manipulative purposes (e.g., Do Brezhnev's statements on Afghanistan represent his own perceptions or are they products prepared for public consumption?).

- There is an even greater danger in attempting to infer national perceptions (e.g., of the Soviet or Iranian people) from the statements of the national leaders (Brezhnev, the Shah, Khomeini).

- By ignoring the views of the population and dismissing the opposition this approach does not facilitate anticipation of political developments such as uprisings which may be critical to U.S. foreign policy planning.

Thus, energy and talents spent in the often speculative endeavor of studying elites draws attention away from the shared psychological characteristics of the broad population which are likely to be much more stable determinants of policy relevant outcomes than contemporary leadership or existing patterns of political affiliations. People who do not live in modern democratic systems are by far the majority of the

world's population. They represent growing political forces in our time and yet are not reached effectively by either of our most popular methods: public opinion surveys and political leadership analysis.

#### THE INFORMATION GAP RESULTING FROM BYPASSING LINES OF INQUIRY

The relationship of the two main information sources deserves attention since it explains a great deal about the critical shortage of relevant data on foreign perceptions. Each approach is firmly anchored in our cultural experiences and assumptions, leaving little chance for recognizing the need for an approach that considers the actual characteristics and requirements of the international setting.

The empirically based, scientifically oriented public opinion research offers reasonably reliable information when it is performed within democratic Western societies whose populations are used to polling practices. Even here the information shows primarily how the population is divided in its attitudes on topics that are important to the pollster but not necessarily to those being polled. Polls frequently fail to concentrate on what is truly important to the people or what salient perceptions in their subjective view of their world are likely to motivate their behavior.

The public opinion philosophy is frequently used to reject "on scientific grounds" assessment strategies that do not follow the sampling and procedural requirements derived from the distributional characteristics of attitudes and their free expression in a democratic environment.

The focus on national leadership by experts of controlled political systems usually involves some vague assumptions about the people but attention to their actual views and way of thinking is frequently minimal. This approach is based on a narrow political pragmatism which asserts that the political decisions depend on the leaders and the party bosses rather than the people.

The leadership analysis strategy is quite reconcilable with the public opinion approach. Public opinion researchers more or less

willingly limit their interest to accessible, democratic societies, and the leadership experts (Soviet, Chinese, etc.) have no interest in generalizing their conclusions to entire countries and nations.

Actually, the two contrasting approaches are so far apart that they do not even interfere with each other. The gap separating them is broad enough to encompass the majority of the peoples of the world--- from Eastern Europe to Asia, from Latin America to Africa---people who cannot be reached by our surveys and who fall outside the interest of leadership studies. While little attention is usually given to the perceptions and motivations of these people, their influence on the future of the world is hardly questionable.

The contemporary social and political conditions of the world are given facts which set clear limitations for the use of the opinion survey method. In view of their successful and widespread use in this country, these limitations for other settings are poorly recognized: In overseas application generally more is expected from public opinion research than it can actually deliver. Furthermore, the principles and procedures of domestic public opinion research have come to be taken as universal criteria and standards. These misplaced criteria frequently hamper the use of other research methods in social and cultural settings which call for the adaptation of our methods and procedures.

This is probably a main reason that anthropology, the discipline most competent to provide an understanding of our own and other cultures, has such a small and declining impact on the thinking and training of policy officials and experts dealing with international relations.

Margaret Mead identified international relations as a major responsibility of cultural anthropology:

A primary task of mid-twentieth century is the increasing of understanding, understanding of our own culture and of that of other countries. On our capacity to develop new forms of such understanding may well depend the survival of our civilization, which has placed its faith in science and reason but has not yet succeeded in developing a science of human behavior which gives men a decent measure of control over their own fate.\*

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\* Margaret Mead, Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951), p. 1.

She was a leading advocate of "interdisciplinary research within an anthropological framework as a principal exploratory method of increasing our understanding of the world we live in, including the extreme dangers to which we are exposed, so that we may the better learn to live in the world we have made."\*

#### THE NEED FOR PRIMARY DATA

Previously we argued that in order to anticipate policy-relevant developments overseas and to plan on a realistic solid foundation what a particular foreign population will or will not do in dealing with contemporary issues such as peace, war, alliances, and other matters involving international relations, it is necessary to know their national perceptions and motivations. Furthermore, we have argued that acquiring such knowledge is hampered by:

- an extensive amount of biased and misleading information that is contaminated by our own priorities and cultural perspectives
- an accumulation of information which has become outdated to various extents
- an adherence to information-categories which meet our domestic research interests but offer limited opportunities for understanding people with backgrounds different from ours
- frequently conflicting views of experts who appear to be equally authentic by their formal credentials
- the lack of criteria for separating the valid from the biased information and for distinguishing the competent experts from the less authentic ones

All the ambiguities inherent in this situation call for systematic reliance on primary data. Only information obtained directly from the

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\*Margaret Mead, Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951).

perceivers will enable us to reconstruct with the necessary certainty what they see and how they see it. If available even to a limited extent, it could make a big difference. Primary data could be used to determine which expert is more insightful. They could provide the criteria necessary for separating the valid, timely information from the biased and outdated. And the characteristic psychocultural dispositions they reveal could help knowledgeable cultural experts to interpret and explain specific events and likely actions. Most importantly, basic psychocultural knowledge of other peoples could bolster U.S. capabilities to influence international relations toward the development of a more stable and secure world.

In the following we present some findings on Jordanian and other Middle Eastern perceptions. The data were obtained by using a research strategy designed to minimize the influence of the investigator and to maximize each respondent's spontaneous expression of his views in regard to a number of specific issues.

## PART III

### JORDANIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS: AN ILLUSTRATION OF POLICY RELEVANT INSIGHTS AND RESEARCH PRINCIPLES

The following empirical findings come primarily from a recent comparative study of U.S. and Jordanian student samples (N=50) tested in Washington, D.C., and in Amman, Jordan in the summer of 1980. To provide a broader perspective the presentation will be supplemented with results from similar studies involving Egyptian and Israeli student samples.

Broadening the presentation is desirable for several reasons. First of all, while the U.S.-Jordanian comparison was focused on "contemporary world problems," the other studies were less politically oriented and involved an indepth analysis of a broad number of domains of life. Through this extension it was possible to examine how the timely policy relevant specifics tie in with the overall Jordanian way of thinking.

Second, the broadened scope also allows to explore how these various Middle Eastern groups compare in their global frames of reference with each other and with the American.

Third, in light of the theoretical and practical questions raised earlier, it helps to examine how factors like geographic region (Middle East), and alliances (U.S.-Israeli) influence the similarities or differences between these groups.



The data collection was based on the Associative Group Analysis (AGA) method. A description of the AGA method is offered in Appendix II. Briefly, in contrast to the conventional survey techniques which rely on interviews and questionnaires, AGA does not require the respondent to express his opinions or judgments. To allow the respondent rather than the researcher to define the limits of the topic, no specific questions or multiple-choice answers are provided. The respondents are presented with a topic and asked to write down in their native language whatever thoughts it brings to mind. It is an entirely open-ended, unstructured task in which free word associations are elicited to selected timely issues from members of selected sample groups.

The sample of themes to which the U.S. and Jordanian groups gave reactions is shown in Figure 1. From the distribution of their many responses, the analysis (described in Appendix II) reconstructs the main perceptual components by grouping related responses together. The scores accumulated by each response cluster indicates how much attention they received from each group. The perceptual components on which the U.S. and Jordanian groups differ most are presented in the following bar graphs as a percentage of the total response score. The reader interested in the underlying data is encouraged to refer to Appendix I for the actual responses given by each group.

The findings on Jordanian and other Middle Eastern national perceptions simultaneously help to demonstrate some of the principles previously discussed.

• world problems	enemy	free enterprise	poverty
super powers	war	economic planning	unemployment
United States	disarmament	inflation	hunger
Soviet Union	arms race	energy shortage	disease
imperialism	nuclear weapons	social problems	overpopulation
politics	SALT II	justice	abortion
capitalism	detente	equality	mandatory sterilization
communism	proliferation	peace	birth control
socialism	economy	education	environment
human rights	exploitation	illiteracy	pollution
oppression	underdevelopment	understanding	crime
freedom	foreign aid	conflict	violence
terrorism			

Figure 1. Issues, World Problems Used in the Test Administered in 1980.

## JORDANIAN NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS

The following analysis encompasses American and Jordanian views of particular nations, including their own, and a comparison of how the U.S. and Jordanian respondents perceive a number of contemporary political, military, and economic issues.

### THE POLITICAL ACTORS: IMAGES OF SUPERPOWERS, NATIONS FRIENDLY AND HOSTILE

International relations have a strong human component. They depend a great deal on how various nations, including leaders and the people, view each other and how they feel about each other. Our study was done to learn about these views and feelings from the images and perceptions held by Jordanians and Americans. While the official positions and foreign policy of Jordan are a matter of historical record, how well they reflect the perceptions and attitudes of the Jordanian people at large is often left to an educated guess.

In a world characterized by stiff competition between two super powers, it is of particular interest how others---in this case, the Jordanians---perceive the United States and the Soviet Union. How do they view their competition? What characteristics and motives do they attribute to the United States and the Soviet Union? How do they view these giants in relationship to their own national security and interests?

Political realities and historical alliances and hostilities in the explosive atmosphere in the Middle East make it similarly relevant

to explore how the Jordanians view some of their important neighbors, such as Israel and Egypt, and how they perceive the problem of Palestine.

While these questions make good common sense based on one of our previous studies involving Middle Eastern countries, we can expect additional questions to emerge which are more closely related to problems as they exist in the Jordanians' representative view of international relations.

### The Super Powers---Who They Are, What They Do

Of the nations of the world the Jordanians focus on the two giants: the United States and the Soviet Union. While their attention is about equally split between these two nations, Americans have more emphatically their own country in mind. Furthermore, Americans perceive China as a world power almost equal with the Soviet Union, while the Jordanians give little attention to China. In the eyes of the Jordanians England and France count more, while they are not mentioned at all by Americans. In thinking of super powers the Jordanians also include the spiritual world (God, Islam), actually giving it more attention than the United States or the Soviet Union. Their interest in supernatural forces does not seem to detract from their practical concern with certain very worldly characteristics attributed to super powers. They are most concerned with the potential misuse of power resulting in exploitation and injustice, particularly through domination and colonization. Yet the Jordanians are also quite articulate in relating super powers with positive objectives. In the more tangible material realm the super powers are viewed as sources of development, industry, and technology. In the context of the less tangible ideals, the Jordanian expectations are focused on justice and law.

Americans in their perception of super powers are more pre-occupied with confrontation and war, particularly in regard to the arms

race and nuclear weapons. The Jordanians do not ignore the military and do mention weapons, but they do not show any explicit concern with a global confrontation or with unconventional weapons and nuclear war.




Figure 2.

There is naturally a major difference in perspectives here. While Americans are primarily concerned with how the super powers relate to each other in a competitive context of military power and power balance, what really matters to the Jordanians is how the super powers may promote or frustrate the national interests of Jordan.

While the above perceptions reflect our respondents' view of the super powers in general, their images of two specific super powers, the United States and the U.S.S.R., will be explored next.

#### The United States---Our National Image

The United States represents one of the most dominant topics of concern to the Jordanians. In fact the Jordanians have more to say about the United States than the Americans thinking of their own country.




Figure 3

The Jordanians are strongly impressed by the political/military and industrial/technological might of the United States. Beyond general references to the strength, power, and influence of the U.S., the Jordanians' references to war, weapons and killing are less weighty but still significant. The Jordanians express some negative feelings about U.S. influence and misuse of political power. They are particularly concerned about possible U.S. oppression and colonization. Their association of the U.S. with Israel and Zionism could account for a sizable part of their negative feelings toward the United States. Still, other reactions suggesting critical attitudes toward the U.S. carry social and moral connotations. The dominant characterizations of the U.S. include "bad morals," "betrayal," "taking advantage," "racism," etc.

Freedom, justice, democracy, and several other world acclaimed features of the United States get relatively little attention from the Jordanians. Capitalism is considered a salient characteristic, but, as will be shown later, this has both positive and negative connotations for Jordanians.

In a later section we present some comparative data which will show that over the past three years the Jordanians have become more negative and critical of the United States. This may be at least partially due to an active role assumed by the U.S. to engineer a Middle Eastern settlement, as introduced at Camp David. This U.S. role has been repeatedly questioned and criticized by the Jordanian government.

#### The Soviet Union---Images of the Red Giant

Both Americans and Jordanians describe the Soviet Union as being Communist or "red," but beyond this their images of the Soviet Union are quite different. American attention is captured by geographic areas with strong historical undertones (e.g., Russia, Siberia, Moscow, Leningrad), details by and large ignored by the Jordanians. 7

The Jordanians' image of the Soviet Union is more contemporary and political. Interestingly, there is more Jordanian concern with Soviet military power, weapons, and killing, whereas the Americans stress the danger of war and specifically mention Afghanistan. The Jordanians see the Soviet Union as a strong country and great power interested in domination and also express strong concerns with the oppressive colonialist nature of Soviet power. Yet they also speak of equality and unity, which indicate some positive evaluations. Also on the positive side, Jordanians view the Soviet Union as a highly advanced country and seem to be impressed by its scientific achievements, organization, and self sufficiency:

Compared to the rather apolitical view of the Soviet Union held by the American students, the Jordanians' view reflects more pre-occupation with the oppressive use of military and organizational power.




Figure 4

Since the comparative perceptions of the United States and Soviet Union represent a particularly interesting question, in the following we explore a topic which may facilitate understanding and clarification.

Imperialism---Who is the Villian?

Expansion of power and influence through colonialism and military and economic means represents a set of attributes frequently identified as imperialism. Since the Jordanian images of super powers and specifically of the United States are strongly endowed with these attributes, it is interesting to explore how Jordanians perceive imperialism in relation to the two leading world powers.

The countries Americans identify as imperialistic are the same they identified as super powers. The only exception is Japan, which

ranks ahead of the Soviet Union. It would come as a surprise in many parts of the world that Americans would place the United States at the top of their list of super powers as well as of imperialists. It is similarly unexpected to see that the Jordanians perceive the United States as much more imperialistic than the Soviet Union and that Israel ranks above the Soviet Union on their list of imperialistic powers.




Figure 5

As can be seen in the detailed table of results in Appendix I (p. 5), imperialism is most closely related to capitalism for both Americans and Jordanians; communism takes a comfortable second place in the eyes of the Americans but is not even mentioned by the Jordanians. In the Jordanian rank list of imperialistic isms Zionism takes the lead, followed closely by colonialism.

As we will see later, the Jordanians' negative evaluation of the United States appears to be a relatively recent development. It could be a consequence of the U.S. support to Israel. Such an impression is reinforced by the observation that the three main clusters of negative



attributes and activities had no direct relationship to the U.S. in the 1977 testing: (1) war, violence, hostility (enmity), killing, destruction; (2) oppression and taking advantage, along the idea of exploitation; and (3) inhumanity, injustice, betrayal, greed, etc.

These Jordanian views also have little in common with the American. Imperialism has generally a more limited meaning for Americans than for Jordanians. Ignoring the timely ideological undertones, Americans associate imperialism more with the rule of traditional monarchs, kings, queens.

### Israel---Image of the Arch-Enemy

Americans identify Israel as the country of Jews and show a strong awareness of the conflict between the Jews and Arabs. For Americans Israel is associated with other Middle Eastern countries, with Palestine, and the Holy Land. Israel also has a strong religious connotation, involving elements of Christianity. Americans generally view Israel as a small but strong nation striving for independence.

In contrast to the benevolent friendly posture of the Americans, the Jordanians display extremely negative, hostile attitudes toward Israel. They think of Israel in terms of war and aggression, the displacement of Palestinians from their homeland, and as the initiator of four wars. They describe Israel as the enemy, an assailant, an aggressor and racist characterized by such negative qualities and practices as unfairness, discrimination, and deceit.

Whether we look at their image of Israel or their general image of the enemy, we find that the Jordanians stress similar characteristics: exploitation, imperialism, colonization, Zionism, and occupation of their land. For those familiar with the tone of statements made by the Jordanian government and in the press, the negativeness of their image of Israel does not come as a surprise.

There is a strong feeling of threat. From the angle of searching for constructive solutions, these psychological predispositions deserve more attention.




Figure 6

Palestine---The Center Point of Disagreement

War, guerillas, terrorists, and fighting come most immediately to mind for the Americans in thinking of Palestine. They associate Arabs and Jews with Palestine but the Jordanians think only of Arabs. Ancient history and religion, particularly Christianity, are important elements of the Americans' perception of Palestine. The contemporary situation is of more immediate importance to the Jordanians. The Jordanians emphasize that Palestine is a country, a nation, and that it is their country, suggesting that many of the respondents were Palestinians. Both the Jordanians and Americans closely associate Palestine with Israel, but from different perspectives. For Americans

Palestine has predominantly historical, religious significance; in contemporary context they think rather of Israel.




Figure 7

To the Jordanians Palestine is an occupied land, deprived of its national independence and transformed into a Jewish/Zionist state. In their view military occupation resulted in forcible displacement of thousands of people into refugee camps. Jordanians see this as colonization and condemn it as unjust. They emphasize rights, liberation, and independence. Despite the fear and threat the Jordanians experience they seem to have hope for peace and detente.

Egypt---Image of Another Arab Nation

After considering the image of the super powers and such important neighbors as Israel or Palestine, which involve emotion-laden relationships, it is interesting to explore the image of another Arab country with which relations are more neutral, less emotional. As an example

we may consider Egypt, based on data collected prior to the Camp David agreement. The introduction of this new reference point may help to show, for instance, how important ethnic, political, or economic dimensions are for the Jordanians in shaping their relationships to other Arab countries.




Figure 8

In the Americans' image of Egypt, the historical and cultural details are particularly vivid and salient: the pharaohs, pyramids, sphynx, mummies. The climatic, geographical elements of the scenery also appeal to the American imagination: hot, dry, desert, sand. Jordanians pay negligible attention to these detailed aspects, but the Nile, the Suez Canal, the Sinai, and other items of geopolitical relevance are more salient in their image of Egypt.

The most salient attribute of Egypt from the Jordanian viewpoint is that it is an Arab country. They identify the people as brothers and also show a strong interest in Egypt's past and present national

leaders (Nasser, Sadat). While Jordanians see Egypt as a sister country, a nation with the same origin, Americans identify it as both an African and Middle Eastern country. The main context of U.S. interest in Egypt is in relation to Israel. To Jordanians the relationship of Egypt to Jordan and other Arab countries like Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia is the main context of their interest.

Compared to these ethnically oriented political identifications, the more tangible social, economic, or scientific dimensions attract relatively little interest. However, progress, industry, science as well as the arts are recognized as Egyptian contributions on the positive side. On the negative side economic and moral problems---poverty, crowding, corruption, theft---are of some concern. While the prevalence of ethnic-nationalistic considerations is explicitly clear, there are relatively few direct references to Islam and religion. However, since Arab nationalism and Islamic religious identification are intimately intertwined, it would be a mistake to conclude that religious identifications do not play an important role here.

The Jordanians' commitment to Arab/Palestinian solidarity, founded on their own ethnic/racial or religious/ethical identifications, calls for a closer look at how their views are influenced by their nationalistic perspective.

#### Nation---Nationalism as a Dynamic Source of Cohesion and Confrontation

Nation is a particularly central and popular subject for Jordanians. It is an emotion-laden topic involving strong feelings of personal identification. In general, Americans prefer to think of country rather than the more emotive, romantic idea of nation. Americans think not only of their own nation but also of a number of other countries, in vivid contrast to the Jordanians who think exclusively of Arab nations.




Figure 9

In contrast to the American perspective in which the nation is represented by government and involves political organization and political power, Jordanians view nation primarily as people and secondarily as their land. To Jordanians nation is not so much an aggregate of independent individuals but a national collective of people unified by common ancestry and by close personal ties with relatives, friends, family. The image emerging here is that of a large extended family---something like the anthropological notion of tribe. This nation/people/family link partially explains the strong emotional attachment to nation, which inspires patriotic feelings of love, loyalty, and duty.

In what ways does this notion impact on everyday life and influence the political choices and behavior of Jordanians? An indication that it does have an immediate impact may be found in their

references to sacrifices and defense of their nation. While some of the Jordanians spoke more specifically of military defense, the fundamental thrust was security and protection of the nation. The Jordanians also mentioned freedom, liberation, and progress apparently as dominant national objectives. That nation is a central idea involving personal commitment and identification for Jordanians will become even more apparent in a later section on the main parameters of the Jordanian political frame of reference.

### The Balance of the Competitors---From Jordanian Perspectives

What emerges here are some highly subjective national images as seen from the Jordanians' perspectives and world view. To bring these images into a clearer relief, we have contrasted them with the Americans' images, which are naturally also based on their experiences and perspectives.

In general, the Jordanians show little concern with the competition of the super powers, including such matters as nuclear armament or the power balance. Still, a comparative analysis of the Jordanian views of the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, offer some rather conclusive insights.

The richness of their reactions (as reflected by the dominance scores\*) leaves no doubt that the Jordanians have a more vivid picture of the United States than of the Soviet Union. Their image of the United States is also more emotion-laden and ambivalent. Whatever the power balance may be on an objective basis, the Jordanians seem to be more concerned with the U.S.'s power and its misuse in political-military contexts.

While power could be a source of respect, the Jordanians are presently both impressed and frustrated by U.S. political power and its impact on their immediate situation. This creates a strong ambivalence about the U.S. which appears to be the embodiment of several of their own frustrations and sufferings. This strong preoccupation with the

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\*See Appendix II, p. 9.

U.S. power and influence in the Middle East pushes, at least temporarily, the sympathies and affinities they felt a few years ago into the background. The predominant contemporary mood is disappointment and accusation for supporting political oppression and domination.

The United States is viewed more negatively or just as negatively as the Soviet Union in several important contexts. From the Jordanian perspective the United States appears to be the greater power and to pose a greater threat in regard to colonization. That they view the U.S. as more "imperialistic" than the Soviet Union just a few months after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is, to say the least, puzzling.

In search for some explanation we find that while the U.S. and the Soviet Union are both criticized in somewhat similar terms for colonization, oppression, aggression, and misuse of power, one distinct category of reactions which distinguishes the U.S. from the Soviet Union deals with Israel and Zionism. That the U.S.-Israeli alliance may be a major source of the deterioration of the U.S. image is suggested by an "enemy syndrome," which the United States and Israel share in the eyes of the Jordanians. This syndrome involves (a) the reliance on and misuse of power; (b) domination and colonization; (c) racism, Zionism, and (d) immorality, deceptiveness. While the Soviet Union is perceived as having at least two of these characteristics in a rather excessive form, the U.S. is perceived as sharing all four of them. Yet, as we have seen, this alignment of the U.S. with the enemy is not total but merely a part of an intensive ambivalence. Furthermore, as we will see, this represents a rather recent development.

The Jordanians' images of Egypt and Palestine illustrates, on the other hand, how they view their friends, emphasizing (a) Arab-national identity, (b) protection from oppression and exploitation, and (c) the need for freedom and development. This suggests a more or less tacit ideology of nationalism. Central to this ideology is their concept of nation. Their national identification provides a fundamental key to their perception and understanding of the world.



## DOMINANT POLITICAL CONCERNS: TERRORISM, CAPITALISM, FREEDOM

The images of political actors examined clearly indicate that our Jordanian respondents live in their own political world which they organize according to their own subjective priorities.

In their world nationalism occupies a particularly dominant position; it heavily influences their approach to international relations, their relationship to the super powers as well as to their neighbors. Furthermore, political issues like freedom, oppression, and terrorism were found to be particularly salient to Jordanians.

In light of these findings, it is interesting to explore how their foreign policy views tie in with their overall frame of reference. In this respect we may consider their view of politics, how it bears on their approach to international relations, and how it is likely to predicate their future political orientation. By exploring their perceptions of the major political ideologies such as capitalism and communism we expect to gain some insights into their overall orientations---e.g., how strong their doctrinal orientation is and how much it coincides with the practical foreign policy considerations we have just examined in the context of the leading world powers.

A simultaneous analysis of these international and domestic domains of the Jordanians' political frame of reference will be used to explore their position on war and peace and their likely posture toward such timely subjects as the arms race or disarmament.

Politics---From a Nationalistic Perspective

The main overriding difference in the American and Jordanian perceptions of politics is that while Americans view politics predominantly as a domestic concern, the Jordanians see it primarily as national and international. A closer analysis reveals that with respect to their actual political concerns the two groups have relatively little in common.




Figure 10

The Jordanians' view of politics ties in with their inclination to look at world problems from an angle of nationalistic priorities. From them politics principally involves the interrelationship of nations. Affinities and hostilities are more predetermined by past history and generations, often on the basis of blood ties and racial identifications---a social characteristic which follows from this tendency to stress family and "tribal/clannish" relationships. In contrast, Americans see nations as countries with political

organizations which operate more on an ad hoc, situational basis little influenced by traditional or racial based alliances. The Jordanians' focus on international actors contrasts markedly with the American view that political parties and politicians are the main actors. In their view of politics Jordanians pay almost no attention to political parties and politicians or to government. They emphasize national goals and issues of broad national interests such as order, development, advancement, economy, planning. It is consistent with this perspective that Jordanians also stress the importance of wisdom and diplomacy. These classic attributes of statesmanship are complementary to the Jordanian preoccupation with external threat (war, colonization, oppression). This at least partially explains their strong nationalistic focus underlining their preoccupation with large-scale national problems. In this case the feeling of threat is collectively shared yet affects people individually. Collective threat, imagined or real, has been repeatedly identified as the most potent force promoting nationalism.\*

These considerations do not form any identifiable part of the U.S. approach to politics. International considerations receive as little attention from Americans as details of the domestic and political process do from Jordanians. The most salient difference here is the Americans' emphasis on the political process---elections, campaigning, competition, candidates, parties---which constitute the very substance of politics to them but are almost completely ignored by Jordanians.

In view of these clearly bypassing approaches to politics, it is not particularly surprising that we frequently fail to anticipate political events in the Middle East. Surprise and confusion detract from our capability to have an active and positive influence on future developments there.

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\*P. Sigmund, Jr., (ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1967).

## Capitalism---A Salient Issue of Emotional Ambivalence

Just as the Jordanians' image of the United States included capitalism as a salient element, in the Jordanians' view of capitalism the United States is by far the single most significant representative, identified also as the leader of the "western camp." No other country is mentioned, except Europe in general.




Figure 11

In the U.S. view capitalism refers primarily to economic and financial and business activities. The economic, financial dimension is less dominant for Jordanians; in fact they give equal consideration to the social and societal aspects of capitalism. In short, capitalism is an economic and financial system to Americans and a social system to Jordanians.

The Jordanians' positive as well as negative evaluations reflect feelings of intensive ambivalence toward capitalism. A particularly

salient positive attribute is freedom, which along with rights and principles, involves social and political considerations as well. On the negative side the Jordanians show concern with the misuse of power in a capitalistic system---e.g., oppression, colonization, revolution, hostility, lack of equality, etc.

While the positive and negative evaluations reflect strong conflicting feelings, they convey a sense of strong interest in capitalism (the extent of their interest is also conveyed by a dominance score that is clearly above average---see Appendix I, p. 11).

These general findings indicate that the Jordanians attach strong importance to the socioeconomic system of capitalism, which they identify nearly exclusively with the United States and which elicits mixed feelings of admiration for its freedom and suspicion of misuse of power.

#### Communism---An Evil of Little Concern

The attention Jordanians give to communism is far below their interest shown in capitalism. This parallels the previous observation that their attention to the United States was substantially stronger than that given to the Soviet Union---that is, to the main representatives of the two competing systems of capitalism and communism. The Jordanians' perceptions of these systems parallel in many ways their images of the countries.

Americans and Jordanians have similar perceptions of communism. In addition to Russia and China, the two major representative countries mentioned, Americans think of a greater diversity of countries with Communist systems, while to Jordanians the Soviet Union is practically the only actual representative.

Americans stress ideology---Marxism, socialism---more than the Jordanians. The groups are similar in their general criticism and rejection of communism. Americans are opposed mainly to the lack of freedom and to the evil and unfair nature of the Communist system,

while the Jordanians stress more the corrupt and immoral nature of the system. Furthermore, the Jordanians are particularly articulate in condemning communism on religious grounds as an enemy of Islam and of Islamic countries. They also blame communism for war and aggression, not too intensively but more so than the Americans.




Figure 12

Compared to the Jordanians' image of the Soviet Union, their image of communism is apparently more negative. One reason for the difference may be that the Soviet Union is identified not only in terms of a negative systemic label (communism) but also in terms of a more positive label (socialism).

Socialism---The Better Face of the Soviet Union

While to many Americans socialism means totalitarian communism, with the Soviet Union as the main representative, to others socialism stands for democratic systems with strong social and welfare programs.

like Sweden or England. To Jordanians socialism means nearly exclusively the Soviet system, apparently a package more attractive than communism.




Figure 13

For both groups socialism has a close affinity with communism and Marxism, although this connection receives much more interest from Americans than from Jordanians. At the same time both groups view socialism as a system in which government plays an important role.

The Jordanians deviate clearly from the Americans in stressing more positive attributes of socialism. To Jordanians socialism stands for such social values as equality, freedom and justice. Furthermore, it implies more intensively mutual help, participation, that is, attitudes and behavior reflecting social responsibility and commitment. Finally, all these are consistent with the observation that to Jordanians socialism implies emphasis on the people, social class, that is, on society in general. This emphasis represents a more

collective, group orientation which is consistent with the previously observed emphasis on nation, on the national collective as the main basis of social identification.

Despite this natural affinity between socialism and the Jordanians' collective-nationalistic group orientation, the subjective importance of socialism is relatively low. This may be due to its strong association with communism and its relatively abstract nature.

Human Rights---Protection Against the Misuse of Power

The issue of human rights is being debated as one of today's most timely subjects. As we have observed throughout the analysis so far, the Jordanians show an intense preoccupation with the misuse of political power---injustice, oppression, domination. It somewhat logically follows that their concerns with unjust, inhuman treatment could be subsumed under the label of "human rights." Such a conclusion is generally valid but it requires some important qualifications.




Figure 14



The dominance of human rights (as indicated by the lower dominance score, Appendix I, p. 14) falls in the Jordanian mind distinctly below its place in the American way of thinking. This finding would indicate that the human rights problem is not as dominant an issue for the Jordanians as we may have anticipated from other trends. A closer analysis suggests, however, a different explanation. The most salient human right for the Jordanians involves justice and religion. This is in contrast with the U.S. view which stresses individual rights--- particularly of minorities, Blacks, women---and the rights of people in general. The rights Americans consider primarily involve such specific concerns as the right to life, abortion, pursuit of happiness, dignity, and others protected by the constitution and its various amendments. Focus is on the individual and protection of his/her rights against adverse forces represented by the state or other individuals.

The Jordanians show little concern with the rights of the individual, at least not directly. Human rights for them involve primarily ethical considerations which have either religious foundation in Islam or involve the status of Islam in the world in general. Furthermore, they are intensively preoccupied with wrongdoing, oppression, colonialism, racism, and persecution at a level which appears to be national/collective rather than individual. Such conclusions about the Jordanians are supported by the lack of references to individual concerns such as freedom and equality and by their attention to religion, nation and Palestine. The nationalistic/collectivistic overtone of the Jordanian responses as well as their explicit references to oppression and persecution suggest that beyond the protection of the individual, they are more concerned with large-scale problems of national security.

#### Oppression---The Misuse of Power

As was also observed in the context of human rights, Americans are concerned about the oppression of minorities, Blacks, Jews, as well as

of women and the poor. The Jordanians are not so specific, speaking of people and the weak in general.




Figure 15

Americans view the violation of the individual's interest as economic (e.g., in depressions) as well as social and political (e.g., slavery, prejudice, discrimination). In the Jordanian perspective oppression has more political and religious connotations. The source of it is power, tyranny/dictatorship, the governing powers. It is large-scale and violent---involving war, revolution, killing, terrorism, cruelty---and is considered criminal and corrupt. In its large-scale practice it involves colonialism, domination, Zionism. Those primarily blamed as being responsible for oppression are Israel and the United States, with Palestine as the main victim.

The American view of oppression has an element of this political tyranny and enslavement as well, but it is attributed primarily to

Russia and to a lesser extent to China and Cuba. The political systems blamed for it are communism and to a lesser extent capitalism.

Despite this dual domestic and international implication, oppression is not a particularly meaningful concept for Americans, especially compared to Jordanians. (The large difference in the dominance scores reflects the stronger Jordanian concern with oppression---See Appendix I, p. 15). The subject is brought up by Jordanians in the context of a variety of political issues ranging from human rights to capitalism.

When oppression emerged as part of the Jordanians' image of the United States it was not clear whether Jordanians were referring to international or to internal problems such as the treatment of domestic minorities in the U.S. Looking at the Jordanian view of oppression, it is clear that the Jordanians had in mind the external, international misuse of power, somewhat synonymous with colonization and international aggression.

#### Freedom---A High Priority Collective Aspiration

Freedom is probably the highest, most attractive individual and social value in the United States. As the dominance scores indicate, the Jordanians do not feel less strongly about freedom as an issue, but their national, international focus is again greater than their concern with the individual and his rights.

The Jordanians show a particularly strong concern with rights in general and with justice and equality in particular. While this is consistent with previous observations, it comes somewhat as a new and surprising finding that they place such a strong emphasis on freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of thought. These are usually considered to be uniquely characteristic of Western democratic societies. Less emphatic but similarly unexpected is the importance Jordanians give to certain economic and business related dimensions of freedom, involving work, production, and mutual help.




Figure 16

Although we found that freedom was a distinct element of their image of the United States, in the present context of freedom, no explicit references are made to the United States; however, freedom is closely linked to democracy, as practically the only political system identified in this context. Americans think of freedom in close connection with their own national history, the American revolution, constitution, bill of rights, slavery, while Jordanians complain about the lack of freedom---that it is nonexistent. The Jordanians refer to women, men, people, and life with the apparent implication that all should have freedom and benefit from it.

In general, the Jordanian view of freedom shows a remarkable degree of similarity with the American, except that the Jordanian view is less historical and symbolic and shows more contemporary emphasis on

freedom as a broad national issue. In this respect Jordanians see the freedom of the individual as practically inseparable from the freedom of the nation.

#### Terrorism--From the Jordanian Viewpoint

This again is one of those affect-laden political issues which receives a great deal more direct attention from the Jordanians than from the average American. The image, in concordance with the theory of mirror images, is reciprocal, or reversed.\* Although in the eyes of the Americans Iran is currently at the top of the list of those who practice terrorism, the PLO, the Palestinians and Arabs occupy a solid second position. Israel is mentioned slightly, probably more as a victim.

In the eyes of the Jordanians the list is headed by Israel, the Jews and Zionists. Although these perceptions may have been predictable on the basis of a modest familiarity with the nature of the hostility, and the mutual incriminations between Jordan and Israel, other elements of the Jordanians' image are more revealing. Both Americans and Jordanians associate terrorism with war, fighting, and destruction, but Americans show more concern with the use of guns and bombs. Both speak of fears and anxieties but the Jordanians more so.

The most salient characterization of terrorism by Jordanians---and one which goes almost unrecognized by Americans---is that it is a means of pursuing political-military objectives of oppression and colonization by means of force, imprisonment, and slavery. The Jordanians also express strong concern with the human costs of terrorism (killing, death). Jordanians view terrorism as a criminal act attributed to the enemy, and there is no indication that they consider

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\* Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report," Journal of Social Issues, 1961, 17, 45-56. Anatol Rapoport, "Perceiving the Cold War," in Roger Fisher (ed.), International Conflict and Behavioral Science (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964).

similar Arab or PLO actions (e.g., bombings, hostage taking) as acts of terrorism or that they would view them as similarly objectionable or criminal. In other words, there is little apparent inclination to see hostility in terms of mutuality. In the present context this is particularly interesting because of its psychological implications. The general impression is that the Jordanians feel threatened and are filled with intense fears.




Figure 17

Common Trends Across Political Isms and Issues

Our analysis was pursued at two different levels. We first analyzed some dominant political isms and then examined a few specific issues.

On political isms, such as capitalism and communism, we found considerable agreement between Americans and Jordanians, at least compared to their views on specific issues like oppression or terrorism.

The results are consistent with findings on the super powers. The Jordanian view of capitalism shows some agreement with their image of the United States, but their view of capitalism is generally more positive. The Jordanians are intrigued by and attracted to capitalism but they are not free of some ambivalence; a distinctly more intensive ambivalence was expressed toward the United States. On the other hand, they are more critical of communism than they are of the Soviet Union. They reject communism primarily on religious grounds and because of its oppressive nature. They show a certain natural affinity toward socialism with regard to its social and collectivistic orientation.

The findings on political isms support our conclusions in the context of political actors, particularly the super powers. Jordanians are little interested in the ideological dimension of the super power confrontation. Their sympathies or antipathies are little influenced by political or ideological alignment. Their judgments are based primarily on their subjective perceptions of how the super powers and their dominant ideologies bear on Jordanian national interests, how they relate to their confrontation with Israel and to their struggle for advancement of economic development, etc.

Along their interests in economic development, they see potentials in capitalism, while in their social and religious principles they stand closer to socialism and are appalled by communism. Their world view is dominated by nationalism and their orientation is more pragmatic than ideological.

The salient concerns the Jordanians express in the context of political isms and ideologies are closely similar to those noted in the context of political actors. Their main concern regarding both capitalism and communism is with the misuse of political and military power (oppression, colonization, violence). Their numerous references to oppression, violence, terrorism, and rights also reflect a strong preoccupation with the misuse of power.

The second part of our analysis further confirmed the importance of these issues to the Jordanians. One by one as well as in combination, these issues revolve around the idea of political/military domination. They all convey a political orientation whose internal priorities and rationale differ in several important ways from the American approach to politics.

The excesses of power and its misuse are viewed by Americans in the light of their impact on the individual. Freedom and rights imply the freedom and rights of the individual, whose interests have to be protected from other more powerful individuals or from the power of the state or government.

On the misuse of power, the Jordanians' concern goes beyond single individuals and includes their national collective and the Arab world. In thinking of oppression, colonization, terrorism and the violation of rights and freedom, the Jordanians are not insensitive to individual tribulations and deprivations, but in their minds these are primarily collective national issues. From their perspective the nation in general suffers from oppression, colonization, and exploitation by another nation: in other words, collective, national considerations are given top priority.

This view is the product of both historical and contemporary experiences: their tribal, national identification and inheritance of religious-ethical beliefs lead them to view the individual first and foremost as a member of a family, tribe or nation. This view has been clearly and consistently shown by our previous results. Furthermore, the atmosphere of intensive political confrontation in which they live probably reinforces the lines of division along ethnic/national differences. It may be more consequential whether one is Arab or Jew than whether one is "Jim" or "Joe."



The tension and group identification conveyed by the Jordanian responses illustrate the psychological mechanisms of group conflict elaborated by leading social psychologists\* and traced in its historical origins by experts in nationalism and national development.\*\* When people perceive a generalized collective threat, which they feel they cannot escape individually, group or national identification can gain great importance. The resulting nationalistic feelings can become particularly powerful, explosive forces when people come to believe that their self interest can be served or protected only through the strength of the group to which they belong.

While Americans are concerned commonly with the protection of the individual from abuse by other individuals in his own society and by his own government, the Jordanians' reactions reflect intensive concern with the threat of external forces, against which they view their own group, their own nation as the main shield of protection.

The dominant psychological dispositions and mechanisms have national relevance to the tasks of crisis management and problem solving. The findings here deserve special attention since the Jordanian perceptions and cultural experiences on this matter of the individual's relationship to the group are so fundamentally different from the American.

It appears, for instance, that finding ways to reassure the Jordanians that their existence is not threatened could help to overcome a major psychological barrier. Along this line Roger Fisher's strategy of "fractionated tension reduction" may be applicable by separately addressing issues which are of mutual interest.\*\*\*

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\* M. Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms (New York: Harper, 1936).

\*\* John H. Kautsky (ed.), Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962); Paul E. Sigmund, Jr. (ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967).

\*\*\* Roger Fisher (ed.), International Conflict and Behavioral Science (New York: Basic Books, 1964).

The obvious penetration of political considerations into the Jordanians' individual thinking, their extreme concern with the misuse of power, and their preoccupation with the enemy and with colonization and oppression all suggest that Jordanians as a people feel highly threatened. While their psychological state creates an existential interest in finding reasonably reassuring political solutions, at the same time it is likely to block others that are perceived as heightening rather than relieving the threat.

## PEACE OR WAR, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION OR DISARMAMENT

The Jordanian views of the leading world powers, considered in combination with their dominant political concerns, make it interesting to explore their position on critical international issues which involve peace and survival.

Our holistic approach is based on the realization that problems of war, disarmament, and nuclear weapons are inseparable from the overall political frame of reference of the people concerned. Their stand on these issues can be properly understood only in such broader contexts as their views of the enemy and their experiences in past military confrontations, their feelings of threat and frustrations, etc.

The previously observed concern of the Jordanians with the misuse of power and with external threat makes it particularly interesting to explore to what extent the intensity of this threat perception stems from concern with the nuclear weapon capabilities which Israel is suspected to have.

Since in the United States the fear of war is seriously aggravated by anxieties regarding the use of nuclear weapons, despite a parity, the nuclear weapon potential of Israel may be expected to be a source of trauma to Jordanians.

War and peace are highly emotional issues and, as Kissinger has observed, the "unwary outsider" can get flooded by a "linguistic exuberance" by asking the wrong question about such topics.\* By avoiding direct questions we seek to bypass this verbal exuberance and get at people's actual perceptions, at their subjective representation of what they perceive as real.

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\* Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979).

The Enemy---Who is It?

Based on the Jordanians' heavy association of the United States with imperialism, oppression and hostility, the United States could be their number one enemy. A close look at the Jordanians' image of the enemy, however, shows that this is not the case. Despite all their negative feelings toward the U.S. and their view of the U.S. as the embodiment of imperialism, the number one enemy in their eyes is undoubtedly Israel. The United States is only a distant second, and the Soviet Union, third but insignificant.




Figure 18

In thinking of the enemy Americans speak first of the Soviet Union, followed by Iran reflecting contemporary resentments due to the current hostage situation.

In general, the enemy conjures both for Americans and Jordanians images of military confrontation, war and fighting. The negative consequences of confrontation with the enemy are distinctly more vivid in the Jordanian mind, due obviously to their more recent and direct experiences in several wars and armed involvements. With regard to personality attributes, the Jordanians characterize the enemy in terms of deceit, cunningness, and betrayal. The most dominant concerns are military threat: oppression, colonization, domination. General references to hatred and fear by Jordanians are numerous although less so than by Americans. Jordanians are apparently more preoccupied with contemporary problems contributed to by the enemy: dislocation, the refugee problem.

The comparatively high dominance of this subject to Jordanians suggests that the threat of the enemy is a major preoccupation for them.

In comparison with results obtained in 1977, the Jordanians' image of the enemy shows some interesting changes, to be elaborated on in a later section. The two testings three years apart show that the Jordanians' concern with the enemy has not decreased, although it has become more diffuse, including, among others, a greater concern with the role of the United States. Compared to an Egyptian group also tested in 1977, the Jordanians expressed an exceptionally emotion-laden and intense preoccupation with the enemy.

#### War---Views Influenced by the Image of the Enemy

Both to Americans and to Jordanians war refers to large-scale killing, bloodshed, death, and involves fighting, aggression, and violence. Yet due to the obvious effects of differing past experiences and present circumstances, the Jordanians' view of war differs in many important aspects from the American.




Figure 19

The Jordanians have more their present immediate situation and their recent past in mind, while Americans war is a much more distant experience---the civil war, world wars---or a concern with a terrible but ambiguous future threat (nuclear war).

Americans think of war as a potential alternative to peace. The conviction that war could be avoided and peace preserved, granted that people are reasonable, is reflected in the Americans' condemnation of war as both bad and stupid.

In contrast, the Jordanians do not look at it as a matter of free choice. This may be partially a matter of their more fatalistic view of life and of the future. But it involves several other components as well.

Probably due to repeated defeats, Jordanians seem more concerned with the present circumstances created by past wars than with the

possible consequences of future wars. Their imagery of destruction and ruin is particularly vivid and ties in with their past and present miseries: terror, hunger, disease. For the Jordanian respondents, many of them Palestinians, one of the most destructive consequences of war is displacement, being forced to leave one's homeland and become a refugee, a displaced person.

(Not only do the Jordanians make sizable references to the enemy, but they also express strong concern with domination and oppression, the same as they did in the context of their perception of the enemy. This indicates that their intense preoccupation with the enemy influences their image of war as well.

In general, the major differences in the Jordanian and American perceptions of war are that Jordanians think more of the past and present compared to the Americans concern with potential horrors of a future nuclear war; and that the Jordanians' concern with unconventional war, nuclear exchange, is negligible.

#### Disarmament---Realities and Hopes

Americans take a practical, matter-of-fact approach to the problem of disarmament in a mixed emotional atmosphere of high hopes and skepticism. From this perspective disarmament is looked at as a reduction of guns, weaponry, bombs, particularly unconventional weapons with nuclear potential. What it involves is something like a SALT treaty which would reduce the dangers of World War III. Such an arrangement is viewed as dependent mainly on the United States and the Soviet Union but more on the latter.

The Jordanian view is quite different. They do not even mention weapons or nuclear bombs. They see disarmament as a matter of international agreement but not just between the two super powers; they consider the involvement of other countries as well. Jordanians make no specific reference to SALT, which is further indication that the

Jordanians think of disarmament in a different context, more applied to their local concerns and priorities rather than to the U.S.-Soviet power balance.




Figure 20

Even more fundamentally, the Jordanians give much less consideration to what it requires to bring about a viable international agreement about disarmament. Their primary attention is focused on all the highly desirable consequences which disarmament could bring about. They express the conviction that disarmament would end wars, prevent them, and stop the fighting and destruction. It would lead to peace---their most central belief---and freedom, justice, and equality would prevail.



## The Arms Race---Foolish or Criminal?

While the Jordanians view disarmament as a concern to all, the arms race is viewed as the foolish business of the super powers, slightly more of the United States than of the Soviet Union. On that matter there appears to be a considerable agreement between the Americans and Jordanians, except that the Americans are more inclined to blame the Russians than the U.S. Both student groups view the arms race naturally as involving weapons; only the emphasis on weapons and the types considered are different. Americans think more in terms of nuclear weapons and nuclear war; the Jordanians have more conventional types of weapons and fighting in mind. The Jordanians consider the arms race emphatically as competition which could lead to extremely negative consequences ---death, destruction, killing, terror. In their mind the arms race mainly serves objectives of domination, oppression, and colonization and is generally associated with all the evils of war and imperialism. While Americans consider the arms race as ridiculous, foolish, and wasteful, Jordanians view it as inhuman, criminal, backward, against Islam, and as serving Zionism.

As a way to halt the arms race Americans think of SALT with relatively low salience but mention treaties and negotiations in general. The Jordanians strongly condemn the arms race but do not suggest any specific ways which could be used to slow it down or stop it. In the Jordanians view it is related to technological development.

While Americans view the arms race as a dangerous but more or less natural product of power competition, which should and could be stopped based on mutual interests, the Jordanians see it more as a design for domination and oppression.




Figure 21

Nuclear Weapons---Their Use and Threat

On the nature of nuclear weapons and their use there is more agreement between the Americans and Jordanians than on most of the other issues previously explored. There is agreement about their role in war and fighting and about their main forms of use. The Americans do place more emphasis on bombs and missiles, their immense destructive power, their unique potential to kill, etc. In some details there is a difference in emphasis, however. The Americans are more concerned with Soviet weapons, while the Jordanians pay more attention to American capabilities. Americans show more awareness of the dangerous radiation effects and pay more attention to SALT and disarmament as offering potential solutions.

There are two additional Jordanian views here which go beyond the American considerations and reflect apparently their characteristic

frame of reference. The Jordanians emphasize that nuclear weapons are the products of technology, science, and civilization. The undertone of these reactions conveys a certain skepticism about the benefits of Western civilization.




Figure 22

The Jordanians make in this context surprisingly little reference to oppression and domination than is usually the case.

Since such references are usually tied to Israel and Zionism, in the present context their relative lack is rather remarkable. They suggest that rumors about the Israeli nuclear capabilities do not elicit the intensive anxieties as frequently assumed in the West.

SALT II---Its Promise of Peace

As in the case of disarmament, the American view is narrowly focused on the U.S.-Soviet nexus. Special attention is given to the Soviet role, probably because it is frequently viewed as a stumbling

block to an agreement. Along this practical angle may lie the reason that Americans see the role of the leaders---Carter, Brezhnev, etc.--- as particularly important. Following this pragmatic approach, success is considered to be a matter of talks and negotiations leading eventually to a treaty that would effectively limit production of arms, missiles, weapons. Here the Americans show stronger preoccupation with nuclear weapons, while the Jordanians view SALT II in less specific terms as involving weapons in general and their reduction.




Figure 23

As was also observed in the context of disarmament, the Jordanians are generally less specific, less articulate about the details involved in SALT II---that is, about what is actually being done; their primary interest is in the goals and objectives which may be served---peace, security---and in other high ideals like freedom and equality. This distribution of interest contrasts here again with the pragmatic American focus on what could or is being done in terms of practical actions and solutions. This may be partially a consequence of a

situation in which SALT II depends in its details entirely on the two super powers but its effects and consequences could bear on the future of all people of the world, including Jordan. In this context it is particularly consequential that the Jordanians view SALT II as an instrument for promoting peace and safety. They are strongly in favor of SALT II and apparently believe that in their own context strategic arms limitation, if successfully achieved, would bring peace and security.

The intensity of this belief is considerable and, combined with other findings, indicates positive expectations which, if frustrated, could seriously harm our national image abroad. Considering certain negative elements in the Jordanians' image of the United States, particularly their view of the U.S. as a super power with imperialistic leanings, there may be a distinct inclination on the part of Jordanians to blame the United States, should the negotiations fail.

#### Detente---Filled with Hopes and Expectations

The views of Jordanians on detente show a great deal of similarity with their views on disarmament and SALT II. They reflect the same general perspectives or frame of reference. The main difference is that SALT II was viewed in close connection to the super powers, the outcome of peace and safety being dependent on their attitudes and agreement. Detente, on the other hand, is viewed much more as a broad attempt to improve international relations.

While to Americans detente, like disarmament and SALT II, is very much a matter of the United States coming to terms with the Soviet Union, the Jordanians also think of detente in the Middle East; i.e., between the Arab world and Israel.

Jordanians view detente as the opposite of the arms race, disputes, hostility. They see it as leading to peace and security as much desired commodities. Their emphasis on peace and freedom is noteworthy here since it suggests that the Jordanians do not consider a detente between the Arabs and Israel as inconceivable or dangerous to their national interests.




Figure 24.

Even more encouraging is that, against this background, the most salient features attributed to detente are cooperation, understanding, love. These reactions indicate that the Jordanians not only do not dismiss detente in the Middle East as a hopeless dream but view it as a viable possibility for improving relations and leading to active cooperation.

That these positive responses are not merely wishful thinking on the part of the Jordanians is suggested by their willingness to pursue the matter further into the economic and political consequences of detente. They characterize detente as a practical way to promote economic and industrial development. In regard to political implications they have openness, justice, and freedom as apparent consequences in mind.

In general, the Jordanians project a substantially richer and more positive content into detente than do the U.S. respondents, who appear to be more skeptical (see Appendix I, p. 24).

Proliferation---Little Emphasis on Nuclear Arms

In our nuclear age everybody has a certain knowledge of the availability of nuclear weapons and their destructive potential and could be expected to want to prevent their spread, that is, nuclear proliferation.




Figure 25

We intentionally avoided using this explicit term because it would easily have elicited similar negative reactions from everyone and would not tell us whether nuclear proliferation is an issue which is genuinely salient in people's minds. The neutral term "proliferation" was considered more appropriate to explore how intensive people's concerns are with the dangers of proliferation. Although it

reflects less about technical aspects, it reveals more about the degree of preoccupation with this problem. The case of the U.S.-Jordanian comparison is quite illustrative in this respect.

Proliferation is a rather meaningless issue to Americans, much more so than to Jordanians (see dominance scores). To both groups the core element of proliferation is growth and spreading. To Americans the most serious concern is with nuclear proliferation. This nuclear aspect occupies only a small fraction of the Jordanian attention. References to radiation, weapons and the Geneva Conference make it clear that the Jordanians are not unaware of the nuclear proliferation problem; they simply pay it little attention. They are apparently more interested in growth and spread in other areas such as political domination, scientific knowledge, sickness, freedom, Islam, etc.

The relatively minimal attention given by Jordanians to the proliferation of nuclear weapons is consistent, however, with observations we have made in a variety of other contexts as well, ranging from war to the arms race. In all these contexts Jordanians have shown a strong concern with military power, weaponry, and the misuse of power in particular. They have shown several signs that they feel threatened by Israel, and the spread of nuclear arms does not seem to constitute a subject of any great concern to Jordanians.

#### The Military Perspective

Oppression and domination were found to be the most dominant and most consistent concerns of Jordanians with regard to both political actors and political issues. A similar trend emerged here in the context of military issues. The Jordanians showed little interest in the relationship of the super powers to each other. Rather than looking at issues from the perspective of a concerned world citizen, they tend to look at world problems from a more narrow, specifically, Jordanian viewpoint. This viewpoint becomes clear from their reactions but it is based too much on the Jordanians' own personal and national experiences to have been anticipated based only on American logic and experiences.



The military/political issues of broad international importance are interpreted here again from a characteristically Jordanian perspective. Arms race, detente, SALT II and other similar subjects are likely to impress us as typical issues involving the relations of the super powers. Jordanians relate these problems specifically to their own situation. For instance, in regard to disarmament or SALT the Jordanians show little interest in the Americans' main concern with the status and relative strengths of U.S.-Soviet military forces and their negotiated reduction. What the Jordanians are primarily concerned with is how the arms race could be stopped and disarmament achieved in the context of the Middle East. The Jordanians appear to favor solutions that would bring a reduction in tensions and eventually peace in the Middle East. The results indicate that the Jordanians strongly favor disarmament, arms limitations, as well as other measures primarily because they expect an improvement in their own situation in working toward peaceful solutions. Their consistent support of peace oriented solutions goes along with other observations which suggest their interest in a negotiated settlement. Similarly it offers additional support to observations that the Jordanians are little concerned with U.S.-Soviet power relations, compared at least to their intensive preoccupation with their own situation. It also provides a sense for the degree of mistakes we are likely to commit in international surveys when we assume that words like detente or disarmament convey the same meanings we attach to them, which we are inclined to assume are universal.

The Jordanians' view of nuclear threat is particularly interesting since it shows how it could be misleading to anticipate Jordanian views based on our own rationale. Based on the American view of nuclear weapons and of the dangers posed by a stronger enemy armed with nuclear weapons, it is rather natural to expect the Jordanians to show great concern with Israel's nuclear capabilities. Our previous data showing that Jordanians feel intensely threatened by Israel and display strong preoccupation with domination and oppression and misuse of power make

such expectations only stronger and logically more compelling. Yet our findings indicate that this is not the case. The Jordanians' image of the enemy, reflects a great deal of concern with military threat but all the available indicators suggest that the weapons they have in mind are conventional.

Similarly, war brings to mind predominantly images of past and present violence and sufferings, with almost no indication that there is an active Jordanian concern with nuclear war. This is also true about the Jordanian views of disarmament and the arms race. They show a clear awareness of nuclear weapons when asked specifically but in that specific context their main concern was with the super powers and no mention was made of Israel.

While the results show this lack of concern rather conclusively, reasons that would explain this apparent inconsistency remain hidden. Experts familiar with Jordan suggest two complementary explanations. They point out that there are few explicit references in official Jordanian statements or in the mass media to the development of Israeli nuclear weapons. Some see this silence as a deliberate strategy for maintaining morale in face of Israel's acquisition of unconventional military capabilities that would further underscore its military superiority. Such an explanation seems to overlook that Jordan is open to Western communications and that the respondents here were students. If there were a deliberate strategy to ignore or suppress information, it would most likely lead to a flood of rumors among the intellectuals, which would be clearly reflected in our data.

A second explanation of why Israel's nuclear capabilities receive little attention is that these capabilities are considered to be rather inconsequential. They may believe that Israel could not seriously affect the power balance and that Israel would probably use nuclear weapons only as a last resort if its total existence were at stake. If the Arabs do not plan such a threat, the Israeli countermeasures of atomic weapons fall outside the realm of reality. Again here policy plans are clearly beyond the reach of assessment, but the

C

Jordanians' tendency to pay little attention to Israeli nuclear capabilities emerges here rather conclusively, even if the reasons for this apparent paradox remain uncertain.

Another interesting implication of the findings bears on peace and disarmament related communication policies. The results suggest that the formal positions adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union on issues such as disarmament or detente are likely to influence the Jordanians' images. The Jordanians show a strong predisposition to be totally positive on some issues like disarmament and detente and totally negative on others. Their limited familiarity with the complex substantive issues (e.g., control) in combination with their strong emotional support of such issues as disarmament leads the Jordanians to see any disarmament proposal, regardless of its content, as a positive move. Similarly, rejecting such a proposal would appear to be a negative move in their eyes. Such dispositions lend themselves more readily to exploitation by propaganda campaigns which operate on the basis of oversimplification and strong emotional appeal.

## ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

As the findings on political issues have already conveyed, the Jordanians, parallel to their intensive political interests, give high priority to economic objectives, particularly to problems of national advancement and economic development. The findings shed some light on the question of how economic objectives and personal interests in advancement and improvement of living standards tie in with Jordanian political views and beliefs. Their views of development and underdevelopment, their perception of the advantages and disadvantages attributed to foreign aid, and their views on such major concerns as exploitation appear to be particularly relevant and consequential.

### Economy---The Developmental Perspective

The American and Jordanian views of economy differ in several important ways. For both groups economy involves monetary resources and financial status, but Americans stress the role of money and its instrumentality in economic life, while the Jordanians focus on the extreme positions of wealth and poverty.

Americans are very concerned with the state of the economy, its instability and fluctuations, and show a strong preoccupation with recession and depression; Jordanians pay almost no attention to these problems. In this same vein Americans feel beset with problems involving economic failures, poor performance, and frustrations, while again Jordanians show minimal concern with these negative consequences. Apparently failures and malfunctionings of the economy are concerns for those who live in a highly developed economic system.

The most salient Jordanian concern is with developing the economy and with the role of human and material resources in this national development. Jordanians show the most interest in agriculture, followed by industry and business. These fields of economic activity, which seem to be taken for granted by Americans, are particularly valued by Jordanians because they contribute to national development. Americans think in

terms of supply and demand and GNP; the Jordanians, of consumption and trade. Foreign trade, import and export, is the focus of Jordanian interest, while probably due to their greater self sufficiency, the Americans' focus is almost exclusively domestic. Finally, Jordanians relate economy to such social values and goals as freedom and justice. While national development is the overriding concern for the Jordanians, for Americans it is economic troubles, present and future.





Figure 26

Exploitation--A U.S./Israeli Domination

Exploitation is distinctly a more dominant issue in the minds of Jordanians than of Americans. To Americans the major victims of exploitation are women, Blacks, minorities, and children. To Jordanians Arabs and Muslims are the victims, and the main exploiters are the United States and Israel.

## EXPLOITATION

### Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions



NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components and all U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 27.

Figure 27

To Americans exploitation means taking advantage of people primarily in economic and social contexts, while Jordanians view it mainly as a misuse of political power. This is only a part of the whole picture but the most dominant part. The Jordanians also speak of exploitation in terms of the use and misuse of available resources--- material, human, etc. The exploitation of natural resources like minerals, oil and water is of greater concern to Jordanians than to Americans. The resulting profits and wealth are also salient Jordanian considerations. But these material, economic dimensions are apparently part of a more dominant issue which is political.

Unlike Americans, the Jordanians view exploitation as a goal oriented activity practiced in the economic field by monopolies and in the political field by governments that use their strength for domination and oppression. For Jordanians exploitation is less one person taking advantage of another or of an individual being exploited---

whether a Black, a woman, or anyone else in a weaker position; for them it is more a national/collective problem, as in the use of force by one country against another.

Americans tend to view exploitation, economic or sexual, as a personal act and condemn it on moral grounds as wrong, bad, or unfair. They place some blame on systems like communism or capitalism as being exploitive, but these trends do not lead to a primarily political approach as in the case of the Jordanians.

### Underdevelopment---The Plague of the Arab World

There is a broad consensus between Americans and Jordanians that underdevelopment is a source of many human miseries: poverty, hunger, disease, ignorance. The Jordanians use the notions of backwardness and slow development quite broadly to characterize the situation of the Arabs. There is also a general agreement that underdevelopment is characteristic of the Third World, Africa, Asia, India, etc.

Aside from these shared views, there are several additional considerations which deserve special attention. Beyond agreeing that underdevelopment is the misery of the Third World in general, the Jordanians identify the Arab countries and their own country of Jordan as being the ones particularly plagued. The problem of national development has emerged in a variety of different contexts as a salient Jordanian preoccupation. They have a quite realistic, unflattering view of what it means to be underdeveloped, including cultural backwardness and low thinking. However, the main deficiency, in their view, is in lack of industry, technology, planning, etc. Beyond these economic, material reasons there is a certain tendency to relate underdevelopment to the political conditions created by colonization, oppression, exploitation.

While the American perception includes physiological underdevelopment---smallness, weakness of body, body parts, breasts, brain, etc.--- from the Jordanians' perspective underdevelopment is primarily

industrial, technological, and economic backwardness, a state which cannot be isolated from political conditions, and which, though highly undesirable, is characteristic of their own country and other Arab countries as well.




Figure 28

Foreign Aid--An Instrument of Political Domination

Jordanians and Americans agree that foreign aid involves financial support as well as food and industrial and military products, but again the perspectives are rather different.

Americans view foreign aid primarily as help given to needy countries, ranging from Cambodia to Iran. The Jordanians pay more attention to who the donors are---United States, Russia, Saudi Arabia ---and to a much lesser extent to the recipients---Israel and Palestine.

Although Jordanians recognize poverty, hunger, and other needs which aid programs seek to alleviate, nonetheless, their feelings are



mixed, contaminated by suspicions about the self-serving interests of the donors, particularly the United States. They tend to view foreign aid as a political weapon, an instrument of colonization and oppression. Both Americans and Jordanians show awareness of the military dimensions of foreign aid.




Figure 29

While Americans are divided between two opposing views, that foreign aid is good and needed or that it is a waste, Jordanians consider it to have the potential to promote national development as well as foreign interests. The Jordanian view of foreign aid as an instrument of political domination is consistent with their perception of the main donor, the United States, as a power seeking political domination.

## Economic Development, A Link Between Personal and Group Interests

The findings on economic issues reveal several common trends which dominate the Jordanians' views in this domain. Most of these follow from the Jordanians' view of economy which presents a clear contrast to the U.S. view.

From our U.S. perspective economy is a complex system built around the idea of business. Central attention is given to the role of money as the life blood of the system. The complexity of the system probably explains why Americans are particularly preoccupied with how well it functions and especially with the dangers of failure---recession, inflation.

The Jordanians look individually at agriculture, industry, and technology as the essential elements of a well functioning economy. They are particularly concerned with the general stage of development of the economic system and with specific elements which may be presenting barriers to progress and human welfare.

National development and advancement represent the single most central issue at the core of the Jordanian frame of reference. In their view what the economy needs most is development. Instability, recessions, and inflation are the pains of the developed economic systems. An underdeveloped economy, as the Jordanians identify their own, has little chance of achieving prosperity and affluence unless it can reach higher stages of development. This is naturally a common goal of the national collective, which must be achieved in order for the people to benefit from it individually. This dependence of the individual's economic welfare on the fate of the national economy, as perceived by Jordanians as well as by many peoples of the Third World; is a strong and deep condition which explains a great deal of their way of thinking.

First of all, it creates a strong interest in collective, national issues as a part of individual self interest. On the negative side it produces a feeling of dependence, which can lead in its extreme to

disabling feelings of helplessness, according to Frederic Frey and other experts of national and economic development.\* On the positive side it creates a tendency toward united efforts, a tendency for joining and undertaking collective actions along shared national interests. Such plans and actions are inherently political in nature even if they also serve economic objectives. The result can be a close, practically inseparable fusion of economic and political issues, as is evident from the results of this study. In all the economic issues examined, considerations given to political power, its use and misuse, are pervasive. The evidence indicates a sort of intensive politicization of economic issues, from economy to underdevelopment.

These factors help explain the strong emotional ambivalence which we observe in all these contexts. Economic development is good and foreign aid and the super powers are considered as potentially useful, but their appeal is somewhat counteracted by suspicions and fears of exploitation and colonization. The Jordanians' perception of underdevelopment in itself reveals a great deal of self criticism and a recognition of their backward status, not only economically but educationally as well. They see a close interrelationship between backwardness and the possibility of colonization and oppression. The intensive infusion of political perspectives into the economic sphere is best illustrated here by the fact that all the economic issues examined reveal a concern with the misuse of power through oppression and domination.

In the economic context the United States appears to be both the most attractive country as well as the one viewed with greatest anxieties and suspicions.

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\* Frederic W. Frey, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements. Modern Communications and Foreign Policy, February 9, 1967, p. 135; John H. Kautsky, Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962); Rupert Emerson, "Nationalism and Political Development," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change (New York: John J. Wiley and Sons, 1966).

## THE SOCIAL FRAME OF REFERENCE

Previous studies have shown a strong influence of social and moral values on the interpersonal relations in the Arab world.\* Social and moral considerations were found to be extensive in Jordanian thinking as well, and they help to understand politically relevant choices and behavior.

The dominant values developed in interpersonal relations within small social units such as the family are receiving greater recognition for their role in shaping peoples' relations to larger social units, even to the extent of setting the main patterns for how one particular country or nation will relate to another. Egalitarian and democratic values, for example, produce certain patterns for interacting with other nations while authoritarian values produce others. Nationalistic ideologies differentiate between friends and foes more on historical grounds, while mercantile philosophies stress the role of economic interests.

In a previous study, we have explored more extensively the relationship between the Jordanians' (as well as Egyptians') social values and political orientation.\*\* Here we examine a few issues which were found to be closely related to the Jordanians' view of peace and which are likely to influence their political views, present and future.

### Social Problems---Divorce, Low Morals

The dominant social problems as perceived by the Jordanians show only partial overlap with the Americans'. Jordanians appear to be particularly concerned with a series of problems related to family and marriage, such as divorce, adultery, instability, etc. To Americans, these are either less important or may be considered to be personal rather than social.


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\* J. Berque, The Arabs, Their History and Future (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958); S. Hamady, Temperament and Character of the Arabs (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960); R. Patai, The Arab Mind (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973).

\*\* L.B. Szalay et al., U.S.-Arabic Communication Lexicon of Cultural Meanings (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Comparative Social & Cultural Studies, 1978).

## SOCIAL PROBLEMS

### Main Differences in U.S. & Jordanian Perceptions



NOTE: For complete presentation of main perceptual components and all U.S. and Jordanian responses, see Appendix I, p. 30.

Figure 30

A second major social problem in the Jordanians' view is low morals, bad habits, lying, envy, hatred. Another is poverty, unemployment, welfare, and a variety of other problems related to deprivation and lack of material resources. Jordanians are also concerned about deviant behavior, crime, theft, killing, etc. While Americans and Jordanians recognize hunger as an important social problem, Americans show distinctly more concern with other health problems. The Jordanians pay a surprising amount of attention to cigarette smoking as a social problem, much more so than to alcohol or drugs.

The differing attention given to these various social problems by Americans and Jordanians reflects priorities influenced by contemporary domestic concerns and local conditions.

Americans emphasize social, racial, and other intergroup relations involving inequalities, tensions, and problems in American urban society.

Finally, as a rather consistent trend, Jordanians show particularly strong concern with problems resulting from the misuse of power: war, violence, invasion, oppression, slavery, etc.

While the attention given to specific problems may vary because of differences in the objective situations, another source of variation is in the differing frames of reference in which some problems loom large and others go unnoticed.

### Justice---Morality Over Legality

From the American perspective justice is a high value involving legal and moral considerations to about the same extent. In a very practical context justice is the proper implementation of the law through the courts, judges, and the police. As a moral principle it involves fairness, equality, and rights.

Jordanians are preoccupied with moral principles and pay little attention to the legal aspects of justice. Their most salient considerations are equality and rights, which in their view are moral values closely tied in with affect-laden ideals and Islamic religious beliefs. While Americans think of law, Jordanians think of love, brotherhood, and mutual help. Islam, God, and religion are important elements in the Jordanians' idea of justice.

Furthermore, as in the case of equality, Jordanians view justice in relation to political institutions, the nation, government, and democracy as well as to society in general. The Jordanians are particularly articulate in stressing the relationship between government and people, conveying the view that justice and the political system are related. Along the previously outlined differences, while crime represents the antithesis of justice to Americans, the Jordanians think of slavery and Palestinian camps.




Figure 31

Equality---A High Ideal with Religious Connotations

Equality is a particularly important social value to the Jordanians (as shown by the high dominance score, Appendix I, p. 32). Unlike the Americans, they stress general humanistic, religious principles and the relationship of man and woman. The Americans expressed concern with the equality of people---particularly minorities, Blacks, women---that is, with those who fail to receive their equal share in life.

For Americans equality ties in primarily with a sense of fairness, while for Jordanians justice, rights, and Islam are the main value considerations. Americans consider equality as a value often competing with freedom, but to the Jordanians equality is more synonymous with freedom. From the Jordanian perspective both equality and freedom are dependent on justice and rights. Their views have their roots in the Islamic ethical religious traditions. Consistent with this perspective they stress love, brotherhood, mutuality, and sharing.

Americans view equality as a matter of fairness, equal rights, even chances, sameness, that is, from an individual-centered perspective built on the moral principle of equity, but frequently violated by discrimination and prejudice.

To Jordanians equality is a part of their idea of ideal interpersonal relations as characteristic of religious communities built on the love of one's neighbor. Those who violate these ideal precepts are the racists and the oppressors who perpetrate economic and political inequalities on others. The unequal distribution of jobs and money is apparently a more salient concern to Jordanians than to Americans, and differential levels of development, industrialization, and production also receive more recognition as well.




Figure 32



It is rather consistent with these perspectives that the Jordanians pay also more attention to political systems like democracy and socialism as presenting human conditions which favor or hamper equality.

Peace---A State of Security and Freedom

To Americans peace is a state of love and happiness, the opposite of war. These are a part of the Jordanian view of peace as well, but their main thrust is somewhat different. The most important difference is that Jordanians view peace as a function of international relations, which depends on a number of important actors---nations, statesmen, national leaders, etc. The Jordanians have particularly in mind Israel and Begin, Egypt and Sadat, the United States, Palestine, and the Arabs in general. While the Jordanians refer to Israel in numerous other contexts as the enemy, the attention they give to Egypt and Sadat here seems to indicate that the Jordanians see Sadat's diplomatic efforts in close relationship to peace.




Figure 33

The most desired conditions associated with peace in the Jordanian mind are freedom, justice, and equality on the one hand, and security and stability on the other. As we have previously observed, these social and political values stand high on the Jordanian list of aspirations and priorities. These desiderata receive very little attention from Americans, who think of peace more as a happy state, threatened by the possibility of war.

The Jordanians are more concerned how peace could be achieved. While Americans speak of peace treaties in general, the Jordanians show a distinct awareness of the Camp David agreement and peace talks. It is also interesting and encouraging to observe that the Jordanians see a distinct connection between peace and development, economic advancement and production. In general, Americans view peace as a state they are eager to maintain, and Jordanians see it more as a state associated with freedom and justice which they would like to achieve.

#### Peace and the Jordanians' Social Frame of Reference

The social domain constitutes an important link between several domains of the Jordanian frame of reference.

In contrast with the American approach in which the individual is the major point of reference, social considerations of broad personal as well as collective/national nature are more primary and central to Jordanians. The Jordanians seem to be particularly concerned with problems of social and political consequence: divorces, crimes, social deviance, bad morals, war, violence. Americans show more concern with how adverse social conditions, such as hunger, poverty, disease, and addiction, affect the individual. While Americans focus on material dimensions (e.g., economic and physical well being), to the Jordanians social issues have stronger moral, religious implications. They perceive a close, intrinsic relationship between social conditions and peace as a part of their moral philosophy.

It is not accidental that all the social issues examined here had strong religious and moralistic undertones for the Jordanians. They express a strong, explicit concern with morality in general as well as with religion and Islam. Religious and moral considerations in the Jordanian and Arabic context reflect an intensive preoccupation with proper interpersonal relations between people.

From the Jordanian viewpoint of morality and conscience human actions are evaluated primarily on the basis of their social implications. This explains why for Jordanians justice, equality, and peace involve strong emotional ties such as love and brotherhood. Furthermore, the Jordanians' concern with just and equal human relations transcends the interpersonal to the international realm.

The social issues examined here are nearly exclusively domestic considerations to Americans. They involve fewer international considerations like war and violence, racism and oppression, than they do from the Jordanian viewpoint. In the American context morality and religion are considered to be a matter of individual choice, and each person acts in accordance with his own principles and conscience.

Peace naturally has international implications to Americans as well, but the Jordanians' emphasis on peace as an international issue is particularly strong. They see some of their most dominant national objectives, such as development, safety, and freedom, as dependent on peace. The Jordanians' emphasis on safety and stability, on work and development, together with their overall emphasis on peace, disarmament and detente, also indicates that peace is a dominant timely issue. This suggests that Camp David did create some hopes and expectations in Jordan.

One may ask how these general dispositions translate into actions and developments actually promoting peace. Since the Jordanians were repeatedly defeated in past military conflicts, they are presently limited in their potential for making peace initiatives. Perhaps more attention could be directed to the possibility of the Jordanians joining the Egyptians in their peace efforts. Among the countries

mentioned in the context of peace, Egypt held a leading position in the eyes of the Jordanians. Similarly, Anwar Sadat---the chief engineer of Camp David---was one of the statesmen most frequently mentioned. While the Jordanians made few direct references to Camp David, probably because of the Jordanian government's formal opposition, connections perceived by Jordanians between peace and those representing this peace initiative are close. This seems to indicate that as private citizens Jordanians do attach distinct hope to this option.

## CHANGES IN JORDANIAN NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS SINCE CAMP DAVID

In 1977 a data collection similar to the one used in the present study was performed at the University of Jordan in Amman on a comparable student population. The availability of these comparable data acquired three years before the Camp David accords makes it possible to explore possible changes which may have taken place in this important period.

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Jordan is not a participant but has frequently been a critic of these peace initiatives. This makes the comparison particularly interesting for two reasons. First, Jordan could be considered more or less representative of the numerous other Arab states that did not join in the peace initiative but whose participation may be possible despite frequent official criticisms. Furthermore, our earlier assessment indicated that the Jordanians were haunted by the threat of an enemy. Their strongly emotion-laden image of the enemy had obviously influenced their entire frame of reference. Had their image of the enemy changed or lost its intensity? There are some indications in the present study that Camp David and the role of Sadat are connected in the Jordanian minds with peace.

Since the two studies were not designed to be interrelated and thus overlap only on a few relevant issues, we cannot draw inferences across all potentially relevant topics but must work within a more limited area of findings which offer less opportunity for testing internal consistency. Keeping these limitations in mind, we will explore a few more or less specific topics like the Jordanians' image of the United States, their image of the enemy, of war, oppression, etc. We will try to trace to what extent Jordanian perceptions and priorities have changed during these few critical years which separate our two comparative assessments.

### United States---Changes in the Jordanians' Image

A comparison of the Jordanian perceptions of the United States in 1977 and in 1980 indicates that a few characteristics have attracted

growing attention. The Jordanians became much more conscious of and concerned about the super power status of the United States, stressing the characteristics of power and strength. This represented the most sizable increase. One source of their increased concern appears to be with the U.S.'s technological and economic potential. A more important source of their concern, however, appears to be political. Colonization and oppression became much more strongly attributed to the United States. While references to war decreased, there were other references to violence, killing, weapons, destruction of Islam, indicating negative feelings toward the U.S. They also expressed greater moral condemnation in accusing the U.S. of having bad morals, taking advantage of the world, and betraying other nations.




Figure 34

Parallel to this growing concern with the strength and misuse of power by the U.S., some of the more human, social elements of the U.S. image have faded. In the human dimension the U.S. as a country, a

people, a culture, attracted less interest. The political, organizational dimensions also appear to be less important now to Jordanians, including the role of specific national leaders, like Presidents Carter and Nixon and Henry Kissinger, and the importance of the United Nations.

While three years before the United States was seen in closer relationship to a variety of other nations, the Jordanians now mention ties only with Israel, and although direct references to Israel also decreased, Zionism received more attention.

Another noticeable change is the lack of references to America, which is due to the fact that the Jordanians responded to "U.S." earlier, then to "America" in the present study. This semantic factor would partially account for the decrease in the dominance score (see Appendix I, p. 34), which would usually indicate a drop in interest in the U.S. by the Jordanians.

#### Politics---A Growing Concern with U.S. Foreign Policy

The U.S.-Jordanian comparison has shown some fundamental differences in their approaches to politics and some of these differences have become accentuated in the last few years.

The single most outstanding contrast is that politics is nearly exclusively a domestic issue for Americans, while it has a particularly strong international and foreign policy dimension to Jordanians. The importance of this international dimension showed the strongest increase over the last few years, with the U.S. assuming a particularly central and dominant position. Similarly, Israel and the U.S.S.R. are seen as playing a growing role as well.

A second dimension involves a growing emphasis on socioeconomic development. From the Jordanian perspectives, these goals appear in political contexts, while in our U.S. frame of reference, these are typically economic in nature.

The most sizeable decrease occurred in the political science, diplomacy, planning aspects of politics which three years earlier indicated a rather sophisticated concern with politics as a field of scientific inquiry, or profession. These more theoretical and technical considerations have given way to more immediate considerations in addressing pressing timely needs in the second assessment. Considering the above immediate priorities, there was also somewhat less attention given to political leadership and influence, to government and law.




Figure 35

Capitalism---More American, Less Negative

While capitalism was found in 1977 to be strongly associated with the United States and to be rather negative in connotation, the results of the new assessment are surprising in two ways.

Capitalism, is now more strongly identified with freedom and human rights and with the economic process of free enterprise. Another positive change is that although Jordanians earlier viewed capitalism



as very closely connected with oppression, exploitation, and colonialism, some of these connections have weakened. Capitalism has lost much of its previously negative connotation.




Figure 36

These changes suggest a positive development in view of the strong identification of capitalism with the American way of life. This finding may appear to be inconsistent, however, with our observation that during the last few years the United States has lost some of its popularity with the Jordanians and its image has become more negative.

To reconcile this apparent contradiction we need to consider U.S. foreign policy, in relation to Israel, which seems to be at the very core of the Jordanians' negativism. The negative feelings which were deepened during the most recent few years, since Camp David, seem to be centered on this foreign policy context and apparently are not generalized automatically to all aspects of the U.S., its way of life, its economic and social system, its technological, scientific

achievements: These other aspects of American life are not ignored but simply overshadowed in a period when U.S. foreign policy affecting the Middle East appears of utmost importance to the Jordanians.

The Enemy---Less Dominant, Less Negative Image, But More American

The Jordanians' intensive preoccupation with the enemy, found to be a most salient characteristic in the Jordanian frame of reference in 1977, has decreased somewhat (see dominance scores).




Figure 37

While there is similar concern with large-scale military actions (wars, battles), there is now more concern with violence directed against single individuals, particularly with killings and other acts of violence such as torture and terrorism. This suggests a great deal of internal tension as well as feelings of external threat. Explicit references to hatred and fear of the enemy have decreased somewhat and attention has turned more toward describing tribulations---sickness,

instability, dislocation---perpetrated by the enemy. Also, accusing the enemy of colonization and oppression has decreased somewhat, at least compared to the extremely strong reactions obtained in 1977.

The enemy in 1977 was identified almost exclusively as Israel and the Jews, but this rather unequivocal identification has decreased somewhat. From the angle of U.S. involvement it is revealing that explicit references to the United States have increased, suggesting that the U.S. is presently viewed more as a party directly involved in the situation as an active ally of Israel. This perception may partially explain the deterioration of the U.S. image in the eyes of the Jordanians.

#### War---Less Conventional Military Actions, More Civilian Sufferings

As previously observed, the Jordanians feel that their situation is neither one of peace nor war, at least in the traditional sense. This same impression is reinforced by looking at the changes in their view of war during the three year period.

In contrast to Americans who view war as a frightening alternative to peace, Jordanians do not see two mutually exclusive alternatives in the sense that the existence of one would preclude the other. This is probably due to the fact that half of our respondents are of Palestinian origin. They left their homeland in the context of war and consider their dislocation as continuing an existence that is too unstable and violent to be viewed as peace.

While in 1977 the Jordanians have viewed the Arabs and Palestinians as active participants together with Israel and the United States, by 1980 they came to see only the latter two as associated with war.

In general, in their image of war the military elements--- fighting, battles, weapons, bombs, soldiers, armies, etc.---lost some of their previous salience because their memories of large-scale military confrontations are fading away. Yet their concern with death

and killing has not diminished since casualties continue to be suffered from guerrilla and terrorist activities. Some of these concerns may be based on first hand personal experience and others from the accounts of friends and relatives in Jordan or in Israel. Finally, there is also extensive press coverage given to guerrilla activities and retaliatory measures which have relentlessly continued over the years.




Figure 38

To Jordanians terror, hunger, and other human sufferings are consequences of a war produced by political intents of domination and oppression. The attention given to these human consequences has increased dramatically. While memories of large-scale military confrontations have faded, the human sufferings which persist give the Jordanians a view of war as an extended experience which gains weight and intensity in its timeliness.

Peace---Less an Abstract Ideal; More an Immediate Need

Considered in conjunction with changes in the Jordanians' subjective view of war, the same observations appear to be applicable to peace and explain most changes as well. Although the changes are somewhat smaller, they similarly characterize experiences in a "no war, no peace" situation.




Figure 39

In 1977 religious and moral considerations played an important part in shaping the Jordanians' expectations regarding peace. Love and brotherhood were also seen as positive moral forces. During the last three years those hopes and beliefs have apparently lost some of their strength.

In contrast, there is a growing concern with freedom and particularly with rights and equality. As the various other contexts have revealed, these issues are not simply abstract ideals to Jordanians,

in their mind they are practical needs and protection against domination and oppression which are their most dominant concerns.

The international dimension of peace also became more prominent. Their mentioning of Egypt and Sadat reflects interest in a new practical alternative associated with peace. There is some growing awareness of the roles of Israel, Begin, and the U.S. All of these spontaneous reactions suggest that the peace initiative associated with Camp David has attracted considerable attention from the Jordanians. They do not dismiss it as readily as the Jordanian government spokesmen or voices in the media may suggest. In view of the predominantly negative nature of the official criticism, it does come as some surprise that the direction taken at Camp David is viewed by Jordanians as a practical move which could serve peace.

#### Changes Could Promote Rapprochement

Within the limited scope of this comparative analysis of changes since the Camp David agreements, our interest was focused on the Jordanians' perception of the U.S. role and its implications for the future. A rather consistent picture emerges here. There are several welcome changes which suggest a certain decrease in the intensity of confrontation. The memories of war seem to be fading, their preoccupation with the enemy also has decreased, and there are fewer references to hatred and deceptiveness. These changes suggest that Jordanians do not feel as intensely threatened, at least not in a strict military sense, and they may be psychologically more willing to consider a compromise.

Their concern with human suffering---death, torture, terror, hunger---has greatly increased and they place the blame for these sufferings on political intentions of domination, oppression and colonization. While Israel was viewed earlier as the number one enemy, the sole power responsible for this violence and suffering, presently the U.S. is seen as a major contributor. The U.S. image shows considerable deterioration and a certain refocusing and reordering along these same lines. This could mean a considerable loss in the U.S.'s

potential to exert a positive influence from a neutral mediating position on Jordanian behavior. Yet there are some positive indications that the Jordanians' views offer some opportunities as well.

The findings that Jordanians view Egypt's role and the leadership of Sadat in close relationship to peace, along with other findings such as their longing for peace and their readiness to work toward regional detente and disarmament, suggest that there are strong popular dispositions to welcome a Camp David type of compromise, granted reasonable assurances that it could work.

Jordanians' deep despair over the violence and human suffering which they attribute to oppression and colonization could make them also more receptive to a compromise solution, particularly if active U.S. involvement can be shown to produce a just and viable settlement.

Furthermore, there are numerous indications throughout this study that the Jordanians, motivated by strong individual as well as national self interest, recognize the importance of economic development and view peace as the prerequisite for achieving such a development. If Camp David can be shown to work, there seem to be strong enough popular sentiments to press for joining in a compromise solution with Israel, even if extremist elements in positions of political influence do maintain less conciliatory attitudes.

SOME SALIENT CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S.,  
JORDANIAN, EGYPTIAN, AND ISRAELI FRAMES OF REFERENCE

The following analysis expands upon the U.S.-Jordanian comparison in two ways. In addition to American and Jordanian samples it also includes two other national/cultural samples: Egyptians and Israelis. All these groups were made up of matching student samples (N=50) from diverse fields of study and included males and females who were comparable in age. The American sample was made up of students in the Washington, D.C., area. The Jordanian sample was tested at the University of Jordan in Amman, and the Egyptian sample, at the American University in Cairo. Data from these three groups were obtained in 1977. The Israeli sample was tested in 1979 at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem as part of a study conducted by Rutgers University:

As a second line of extension the analysis has a broader scope. The comparisons are based on results obtained in ten domains of life, each represented by eight relevant issues.

While the previous analysis used the perceptions of selected specific issues as a point of departure, the following analysis relies on general perceptual and motivational trends. These trends emerge across several issues and domains and reflect broad general pre-dispositions affecting each national/cultural group's views and attitudes in many specific contexts.

The comparison of Jordanians and Americans with regard to their perceptions of specific issues revealed some consistent trends. Americans tend to perceive several of the issues in the framework of the super power confrontation, giving special attention to the dangers created by nuclear weapons. The Jordanians, on the other hand, tend to view the international issues in relation to their confrontation with Israel and thereby disregard or ignore the threat of nuclear



holocaust. Americans were also found to look at social issues from the viewpoint of the individual, while the Jordanians considered the societal viewpoint or that of Arab nations.

To trace such general trends which reflect the perceptual predispositions characteristic of particular groups, a computerized analysis was performed on all reactions produced by the four groups to 80 issues representing ten major domains of life (see Appendix I, p. 40). The procedure is briefly outlined in Appendix II (p. 8), and the results of this analysis are presented in the following tables. The score values reflect how much weight a particular perceptual or motivational trend accumulated from each group in the context of the same large sample of issues. Since all four groups responded to the same issues, score differences may be interpreted as reflecting genuine differences in their perceptual and motivational predispositions.

Within-group differences are somewhat less readily interpretable since the topics and issues included in the study do not provide a complete, balanced representation of all domains of life. For instance, there were no themes representing the entertainment domain, so it would be wrong to conclude from their lack of references to entertainment that this domain of life is unimportant to them. For domains that were not represented at all in the sampling of themes used in the study, the reactions are likely to underrepresent those areas compared to domains well represented (e.g., international relations and politics).

The focus of the analysis is clearly on broad-brush characterizations of the groups based on the culturally shared psychological predispositions of their members. The groups are characterized by such broad terms as individualism, nationalism, and economic motivation, yet as we have seen in the previous analysis, some of these issues, like the concept of economy, are seen from a drastically different perspective by Americans and Jordanians. Since it would be tedious to repeat these findings, we will make only occasional references to them to remind the reader of these differences.

International Relations---The Dominance of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The addition of two other countries to the U.S.-Jordanian comparison helps place our findings in broader perspectives.

Table 1.

DOMAIN: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Response Clusters	Total Group Score			
	American	Jordanian	Egyptian	Israeli
U.S., America	1295	336	450	880
Jordan	23	202	7	52
Egypt	189	111	1008	376
Israel	497	247	359	2641
Russia, U.S.S.R.	153	83	54	376
Other Countries, Nations	270	62	33	166
Arabs, Palestinians	492	996	618	1282
Jews, Hebrews	539	186	316	1021
Country, Nation	913	1339	1251	1565
Race, Origin	421	276	350	425
International	411	191	159	245
Places, Regions	246	52	30	210

The Americans, Israelis and Egyptians show a natural focusing of interest on their own countries. This national interest is particularly strong among the Israelis along three points: (a) their country (Israel), (b) their ethnic identity (Jews, Hebrews), and (c) their general emphasis on country and nation as important concepts. Among Americans national identification (U.S., America, American) is important but not a separate racial identification.

The Jordanians rank first in identifying themselves as Arabs. Although they stand in last place in speaking of their own country

(Jordan); they show the strongest tendency to stress nation and national identity. These trends suggest a Jordanian predisposition to stress common Arab, ethnic ties rather than territoriality in defining their national identity.

In regard to the level of international awareness and involvement, the Americans, as a leading world power, show a widely spread interest in various countries, continents, international organizations, etc. The Israelis' concern is mainly with their adversaries, Arabs as well as Russians.

Our previous finding that the Jordanians show much greater interest in the role of the U.S. than the U.S.S.R. is reinforced here and the same seems to be true about the two other Middle Eastern countries as well.

#### Politics and Government---Procedural vs. Leadership Perspectives

There is a rather clear-cut split of interest here between political process and political systems. The political process--- political parties, elections, voting---has high salience to Americans, while the various political systems---democracy, socialism, communism--- are of more interest to the Jordanians as well as the Israelis. The Jordanians are especially interested in capitalism, particularly compared with communism.

A second dimension in which Jordanians and Americans differ is leadership. The American focus is on government and governmental organization, while the Jordanians think primarily of national leadership and high offices. It is quite consistent with their focus on leadership and high office that our Arab samples show more intensive interest in authority and other qualities of leaders and rulers.. The Jordanians and Egyptians also appear to be more concerned about problems related to power and control. The Israelis and the Americans are strongly impressed by the role and performance of specific leaders, famous historical figures, statesmen. It is

interesting to note that the Israelis expressed about equal interest in Sadat and Begin, while Nasser captured more Egyptian interest than Sadat.

Table 2

DOMAIN: POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Response Clusters	Total Group Score			
	American	Jordanian	Egyptian	Israeli
Politics, Parties, Elections	624	361	476	520
Political Systems, Isms	726	1392	594	1186
Government, Organization	867	345	535	464
Leadership, High Office	468	894	414	311
Famous Presidents, Statesmen	1026	180	655	1394
Authority, Rule	194	306	680	216
Power, Control	1152	1471	1608	1062

Generally speaking, Americans are primarily interested in the sources and organization of political power, while the Arab groups appear to be more impressed by leadership and leadership qualities.

War, Military---Peace or Oppression

War and peace appear to be pervasive issues in the Israelis' thinking. They seem especially preoccupied with war and other military considerations. The Jordanians also express a great deal of concern with the war/peace alternatives. Compared to the other groups, the Jordanians show the most concern with the enemy and with the possibility of defeat, losses, and failure, which is understandable in light of the repeated defeats they have suffered in past military confrontations. These past experiences may also account for the Jordanians' extreme preoccupation with other consequences of

military defeat: namely, occupation and domination as well as oppression and tyranny. The Egyptians share these views to some extent, although their concern with the enemy and their feelings of threat, danger, and fear are more moderate.

Table 3  
DOMAIN: WAR, MILITARY

Response Clusters	Total Group Score			
	American	Jordanian	Egyptian	Israeli
Wars, Military	1303	1556	1237	3053
Enemy	35	235	218	101
Killing, Violence	799	676	830	769
Victory, Defeat	219	321	286	95
Occupation, Domination	14	1050	254	20
Oppression, Tyranny	132	925	636	114
Peace	521	1317	865	1913

These indicators suggest that the Egyptians take a generally more relaxed posture in regard to military confrontations than do the Jordanians. The Egyptians' attitude seems to be consistent with the position taken by President Anwar Sadat in his foreign policy (i.e., his willingness to enter into peace negotiations with Israel, which led to the Camp David agreements. The results suggest that, aside from Sadat's statesmanship, the public sentiments facilitated such a rapprochement.

Our assessment was informative in showing that some of our most pressing concerns are actually not important concerns of the Jordanians. Such military issues as SALT II, proliferation, and nuclear weapons were found to have low priority for the Jordanians. This conclusion is reinforced here by the fact that the military issues which bear

primarily on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. super power confrontation did not emerge to any noticeable extent in the present comparative analysis.

Self and Society---Individualism vs. Primary Group Identification

Three patterns of social orientation emerge here. They each bear on how people interact with their social environment. The American emphasis is clearly on the self. The individual receives less attention from the Israelis and even less from the two Arab groups. The American sees himself in interaction with two major human components in his social environment. One is the general aggregate of individuals to be dealt with on a one-to-one basis, and the other is the family, probably the only social unit truly recognized in American society. Americans do recognize social classes but only as categories helpful in making distinctions between people according to status, living conditions, income, etc. Society receives the least attention from Americans because to them it is such an abstract concept with little practical value.

Table 4

DOMAIN: SELF AND SOCIETY

Response Clusters	Total Group Score			
	American	Jordanian	Egyptian	Israeli
Society, Groups, Neighbors	316	868	431	420
Social Classes, Social Status	646	163	344	334
Self, Me, Individual	1645	347	627	960
People, Human Beings	1525	1421	1713	1848
Man, Woman, Sex	432	346	691	701
Masses, Crowds	278	204	234	214
Family, Relatives	1246	1375	2083	1530
Love, Friendship	2143	1938	2673	2393

This pattern is almost reversed for the Arab groups, particularly the Jordanians. Jordanians pay little attention to the individual or his class position. Family is very important to both Arab groups and not only because of the role of the individual family members. Finally, in the eyes of the Jordanians, society is a very important concept, closely related to nation. The social interest of Jordanians and of Arabs in general is primarily oriented toward the group rather than the individual; they tend to think of themselves as members of their family, their community, and their nation. The Israelis seem to represent a combination of the American individual orientation and the Arab social group orientation.

All four groups stress the importance of affective ties such as love, friendship, and brotherhood. The Egyptians speak more of love, the Israelis of friendship, and the Jordanians, of brotherhood. The extent to which the cultural meanings of love varies---whether the emphasis is on sexual rapport, individual needs, or social commitment---becomes apparent from the results of a more inclusive study of American and Arab groups.\*

#### Money, Economy, Work---The U.S.-Arab Contrast

On economic and work related themes considerable similarities can be seen in the U.S. and Israeli views, on the one hand, and the Egyptian and Jordanian views on the other. The split is between countries that are more developed and less developed economically. Money, business, economy, and inflation have high dominance for the U.S. and Israeli groups; they reflect the importance given to financial considerations as the driving forces of an advanced economy. The priority given to energy and oil is part of this same syndrome.

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\* L.B. Szalay, A. Hilal, J.P. Mason, R. Goodison, and J.B. Strohl, U.S.-Arabic Communication Lexicon of Cultural Meanings: Interpersonal and Social Relations (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Comparative Social and Cultural Studies, Inc., 1978).

Table 5

DOMAIN: MONEY, ECONOMY, WORK

Response Clusters	Total Group Score			
	American	Jordanian	Egyptian	Israeli
Money, Business	1535	726	1350	1438
Economy, Inflation	542	210	192	554
Wealth, Prosperity	329	494	712	382
Development, Progress, Change	552	1299	848	552
Achievement, Accomplishment	292	574	311	160
Industry, Production, Trade	72	494	32	25
Work, Effort	960	2002	1569	875
Action, Doing	59	279	35	51
Energy, Oil	710	174	211	654
Cooperation, Help	138	1089	416	305
Poverty, Sickness, Hunger	444	563	918	474

The contrasting syndrome characterizing the two Arab groups is formed of priorities given to issues essential to economic development. The leading factors are development, progress, achievement, work, industry, and production. These stress the mobilization of manpower resources and production. Both Arab groups pay consistently more attention to these factors than do the Americans or Israelis. Furthermore, the Jordanians pay more attention to these factors than do the Egyptians. The Jordanians' emphasis on development, work, and cooperation conveys an exceptionally strong motivation for national development. The pattern is clear and in good agreement with other findings which show a strong Jordanian interest in advancement and economic development.

The comparative data here also underscore the previous findings which show some classic differences in the American and Jordanian



approaches to economy: the Jordanian position which epitomizes the developmental philosophy of an underdeveloped country and the American position which reflects the perspective of a highly developed country concerned with dangers of recession, inflation, depression, etc.

Dominant Aspirations---Justice, Freedom, Happiness

The emphasis placed on goals, needs, and wishes generally reflects the intensity of people's motivation to meet their desires and interests. While hopes and wishes are more vague, goals and aims imply more specificity and planning. The four groups compared do not show any striking differences; their motivational levels appear to be similarly high.

Table 6

DOMAIN: DOMINANT ASPIRATIONS

Response Clusters	Total Group Score			
	American	Jordanian	Egyptian	Israeli
Goals, Aims	124	214	33	44
Important, Needed	655	751	999	990
Hopes, Wishes	243	419	408	400
Justice, Equality	964	1482	1110	1111
Freedom, Independence, Liberty	962	1107	1117	704
Togetherness, Unity	899	277	393	356
Happiness, Joy	441	858	551	680

Justice and equality are emphasized particularly by the Jordanians. Freedom and independence are also stressed by the Jordanians, while liberty is emphasized more by Americans than by any of the other groups. Happiness is an objective stressed somewhat more by the Jordanians and Israelis than by the other two groups.

Interestingly, togetherness appears here, as in many other cross-cultural comparisons, to represent a salient American need. It conveys the need of the individual to associate with others on a free voluntary basis to avoid the feeling of loneliness.\*

Education and Knowledge---The Influence of Developmental Perspectives

This domain was not included in our detailed discussion of U.S.-Jordanian findings, but since the respondents were students, a comparison of the four groups' interest in issues involving education and knowledge is of some relevance here.

Table 7

DOMAIN: EDUCATION, KNOWLEDGE

Response Clusters	Total Group Score			
	American	Jordanian	Egyptian	Israeli
Education, School	851	550	905	1106
Science, Knowledge	306	656	472	295
Thought, Ability, Intelligence	323	874	911	316
Opinions, Communication, Decisions	400	594	434	142
Unknown, Nonexistent	198	122	245	160

Education as a process and the role of the teacher are particularly salient to the Israelis, Americans emphasize the role of the schools, and the Arab groups emphasize studying and learning. The Arab groups also stress knowledge as the purpose of studying. Somewhat unexpectedly they also stress science rather heavily. This may be a part of their concern with national development, which stresses the need to work and to develop human resources.

\* D. Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

There is a consistently higher Arab emphasis on thought, abilities, and intelligence. Since we found in the specific context of underdevelopment that Jordanians made references to educational backwardness, this emphasis on mental abilities could be a part of their general concern to catch up with the developed nations.

The cluster of reactions involving opinions, communications, and decisions refers predominantly to the political communication process---diplomacy, negotiations, the press. This again illustrates the more politically oriented Arab frame of reference, how timely political, national concerns spill over into seemingly apolitical, intellectual domains.

Law, Customs, Duty---Internalized Law or External Obligations

These three response trends reflect internal mechanisms which regulate how people interact with others. Certain habits and customs represent universal regulatory mechanisms; they prescribe what people should or should not do. All four groups show a strong awareness of the role of customs and culture.

Table 8

DOMAIN: LAW, CUSTOMS, DUTY

Response Clusters	Total Group Score			
	American	Jordanian	Egyptian	Israeli
Law, Constitution	1172	800	675	1015
Customs, Culture	1630	1352	1661	1148
Duty, Obligation	481	1444	1488	307

Laws and constitution represent more formal and more explicit regulations passed down from legislative authorities. The U.S. and the Israeli groups place greater emphasis on these than do the Arab groups. A sense of duty and obligation regulates behavior toward

other individuals or groups to whom a person feels commitments or identifications. This is the mechanism dominant in "other-oriented" groups (rather than inner-oriented ones, according to Rotter)\* and in "shame" cultures (rather than guilt cultures, as defined by Benedict).\*\* Our Arab respondents stress the importance of these inner controls of duty and obligation.

Religion, God---Modest Differences in the Focus of Attention

This domain also falls beyond the scope of our original inquiry. Religion as a subject receives the least attention from the Jordanians, although both Arab groups stress the importance of faith and religious belief, the role of Allah, and the importance of religious identities: Christian, Muslim, Jew.

Table 9

DOMAIN: RELIGION, GOD

Response Clusters	Total Group Score			
	American	Jordanian	Egyptian	Israeli
Religion	919	531	956	802
God, Allah	989	1030	1315*	526
Faith, Beliefs	509	957	786	624
Soul, Spirit	210	515	620	417
Christian, Muslim, Jew	392	819	846	608
Church, Temple, Mosque	733	732	716	472
Priests, Prophets	250	381	430	396
Bible, Koran	315	388	147	433
Holy Places, Pilgrimage	143	346	259	206

\* J.B. Rotter, "Generalized Expectancies for Internal Vs. External Control of Reinforcement," Psychological Monographs, 1966, 80, 609.

\*\* R. Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946).

To Americans the church, both as an organized religious affiliation and as a building, has high salience, while the soul and spirit receive the least attention, at least compared with the other groups. The related key notion is truth.

Personality Characteristics---Self vs. Other Orientation

The personality attributes stressed by the four national-cultural groups reflect different views and priorities in interpersonal relations.

Table 10.

DOMAIN: PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS

Response Clusters	Total Group Score			
	American	Jordanian	Egyptian	Israeli
Good, Kind	1155	1070	909	2218
Honest, Sincere	1188	803	802	673
Proud, Courageous	472	722	454	139
Loyalty, Fidelity	140	512	521	110
Bad, Evil	720	332	739	1123
Deceptive, Corrupt	479	617	553	231
Misc. Characteristics	101	329	421	152

The characteristics most valued by Americans are honesty and truthfulness. This is fundamentally in line with the inner-directed, individualistic personality type dominant in American society.

Courage and pride are particularly valued by the Jordanians. Loyalty and fidelity, which represent other-directed personality characteristics, are also important to both Arab groups. Of the negative personality characteristics, deception and corruption were considered the worst by the two Arab groups. They tend to stress attributes implying social commitment, which is in agreement with

their emphasis on the family and nation as major sources of identification.

The Israelis tend to evaluate people, issues, or situations as good or bad. They show an even stronger tendency to use evaluative terms than the Americans, who are usually the strongest on this predisposition. Whether the Israelis' evaluations are made from the angle of the individual or the group cannot be determined on the basis of the above results, but the findings on individual and group orientation (see data on self and society) suggest that the Israelis try to combine both.

#### Existence---Problems, Anxieties

Beyond general concerns with life and existence, each group's interests are focused on different problems. Problems in general receive more attention from the Arab groups.

Table 11

DOMAIN: EXISTENCE

Response Clusters	Total Group Score.			
	American	Jordanian	Egyptian	Israeli
Life Existence	1413	1203	1538	1127
Problems, Difficulties	257	584	719	299
Age, Old and Young	958	294	292	622
Hatred, Discrimination	213	470	661	427
Fear, Anxiety	233	508	289	198
Sadness, Sorrow	227	124	118	97

Of the specific problems, Americans see aging as particularly important. By contrasting young and old and by their many references to the disadvantages of aging, there appears to be a cultural sensitivity little shared by the Arab groups. Other reactions show indeed that Arabs do not regard age as a special disadvantage. The unquestionable physical

handicaps are compensated by respect, esteem, and other social regards. The Arab groups express strong concern with negative feelings and express fears and anxieties. The negative feelings expressed are the strongest from the Egyptians: they involve hatred, bigotry, racism, and discrimination---that is, complaints with distinct racial and political undertones. Explicit reactions of fear and anxiety are strongest from the Jordanians. Although in their minds fear and cowardice are closely related and courage and pride are highly valued virtues, we still find explicit Jordanian references to fear, danger, anxieties, and worries. These explicit references agree with our previous observations that the Jordanians' concern with domination, oppression, and threat is intensive and suggests a high level of anxiety.

Miscellaneous Issues, Concerns

This last category of response trends has little relevance to international relations but we include them here to provide a complete presentation of all the salient elements that attained a score of 30 or higher by one or more of the four groups compared.

Table 12

DOMAIN: MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES, CONCERNS

Response Clusters	Total Group Score			
	American	Jordanian	Egyptian	Israeli
Nature, Environment	538	185	444	175
Appearance, Looks	590	476	747	566
Physical Attributes	1851	214	371	914
Fun, Sports, Travel	694	447	526	333
Things, Places	765	103	597	448
Time, Duration	1038	830	723	1126
Symbolic Reactions	374	158	224	241
Miscellaneous	675	403	200	518

Traditional public opinion surveys focus on issues the investigator feels are important; they may or may not cover issues that are actually important to the group studied. The approach presented here allows for a more inclusive reconstruction of the system of perceptual representation characteristic of the group studied. The results emerge across a broad variety of key issues and important domains of life. The differential priorities and concerns resulting from the comparison offer broad-based inferences on what is important to one group or the other.

### The Main Contrast

The comparative presentation of the main perceptual and motivational trends is brief enough to make a summary superfluous. Yet there is one trend which deserves some additional attention here because of its broad importance and explanatory value and its hidden nature. It bears on the much discussed characteristics of individualism. Although a great deal has been written about this topic in view of its relevance to the American psyche, it still remains controversial partially because of divergent views but mainly because of the scarcity of clear-cut empirical evidence.

In light of the results just reviewed, the reactions of the U.S. group indicate a clear preference for the individualistic alternative in all social contexts. In the context of social units the American score highest on "me" and "ego," in the context of personality characteristics they score highest on attributes describing a person with individual autonomy, honesty, integrity; and in the context of human values the Americans placed the strongest emphasis on freedom.

The Jordanians and the Egyptians show a contrasting tendency toward group identification or group affiliation. In the context of social units they score the highest on primary groups, family. In the context of personality attributes they stress socially relevant ones - such as loyalty and fidelity. They also emphasize social commitment: duty and obligation. The values and aspirations most frequently mentioned by the Jordanians convey social undertones to justice and equality.



These broad contrasting trends are important both for their political implications as well as for the insights they convey about the very nature of culturally based psychological/behavioral dispositions. The political implications are clear when we consider how our individualism ties in with our pragmatic, process-oriented approach to political problems, which tacitly assumes that in the final analysis politics is, or should be, an aggregate expression of individual self interest. How the Jordanians' group-oriented approach to life leads to nationalism and to political perspectives fundamentally different from ours becomes apparent in the previous analysis.

These two main patterns of interpersonal relations tell us a great deal about the nature of nationally shared psychological dispositions. The findings suggest that the realm of interpersonal relations may be the one most critically affected by cultural background. How people relate to themselves and to each other varies a great deal from country to country. The cultural background, social environment and experiences that people living in a particular country share affect most significantly how they perceive and interact with others--- including themselves, their immediate social environment (family, friends, coworkers) and social organizations, close and distant. These naturally include all the people and social institutions essential to their political views and behavior.

Our recent comparative study of Anglo and Hispanic Americans, systematically sampled to represent different sex, age, and income groups, produced similar findings: namely, that divergent patterns of interpersonal relations are at the core of cultural differences.

Although we have elaborated here only on the Jordanians, the four group comparison indicates across most of the domains studied that Egyptians and Jordanians show generally similar trends. The Israelis occupy a position somewhere between the Arabs and the Americans.

## METHODOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS

As stated at the outset, the AGA method used in this study is not a survey technique. As a method of indepth assessment it suggests a useful technique to complement opinion surveys, particularly in overseas applications.

Although social science research methodology is not his major field, Henry Kissinger made the following observation about asking delicate judgmental questions in the Middle East:\*

Whether in the Israelis' Talmudic exegesis or the Arabs' tendency toward epic poetry, the line is easily crossed beyond what the pragmatic West would consider empirical reality into the sphere of passionate rhetoric and the realm of human inspiration. Woe to the unwary outsider who takes this linguistic exuberance literally and seeks to find a solution by asking adversaries what they really meant.

Whether Kissinger had a specific case in mind is uncertain, but Joan Peters' analysis in Commentary (Summer 1975) provides a relevant example. In interviews with members of Egypt's political elite she asked questions using affect-laden issues like Zionism and in turn received highly emotional reactions in the "passionate rhetoric" Kissinger alludes to. She mistook them for the Egyptians' actual views and concluded that the Egyptians are deeply hostile toward Israel with little hope in sight for normalization. Her article, "In Search of

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\*Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979), pp. 342-343.

Egyptian Moderates," ended with a pessimistic conclusion to be refuted by the Egyptian position at Camp David.

The difficulties of assessing people's perceptions and opinions are not limited naturally to the Middle East. An extensive review of the literature on national perceptions has shown the various types of concerns scholars have with how to adapt opinion surveys to provide useful information on foreign populations.\* As Cantril has pointed out, an accurate assessment of foreign perceptions is practically impossible if we force people to make choices between 'our' categories, alternatives, symbols or situations as this is done by the usual type of questionnaire. \*\* We have advocated a "representational" approach which aims to reconstruct people's perceptions and motivations in the context of their view of the world.

The U.S. and Jordanian findings provided the subjective representations of selected topics and issues as they are generally perceived by these two national groups. The findings demonstrate the need for representational assessments in at least two important ways.

First, the differences found in the American and Jordanian perceptions of specific issues, from development to economy, made it abundantly clear that unless these differences are known, the findings of Jordanian survey results on similar issues are likely to be misunderstood. Jordanians responding to a question involving economy will respond with their idea of economy in mind, while Americans will interpret the Jordanian reactions along their own view of economy.

Secondly, as is shown again and again in the findings, the Jordanian perception of individual issues like politics, economy, or peace are closely interrelated. They form a network of interdependent perceptions---

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\*L. B. Szalay and J. Bryson Strohl, National Perceptions: Critical Dimensions, Policy Relevance and Use (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Comparative Social and Cultural Studies, Inc., 1980).

\*\*W. Buchanan and H. Cantril, How Nations See Each Other (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953).

what we have labelled their system of perceptual representation, or what is simply their world view. The Jordanians' perceptions of single issues are influenced by such factors as the acute political-military confrontation, their feelings of threat, and striving for national development. These emerge as perspectives which are built into their view of the world and which affect their perceptions of many specific issues and events.

The Jordanians, like everyone else, are unaware that their perceptions are not shared universally. Nor do they realize the extent to which their thinking is influenced by their system of perceptual representation. This lack of awareness explains why questions aiming at judgments and opinions, even if they are candidly answered, have only limited chance to reproduce people's perceptual and motivational dispositions built into their system of representation.

The representational approach, as illustrated here with the Jordanian data, does reproduce perceptual and motivational components in their subjective intensity and reveal perceptual trends that are below awareness.

The need to complement opinion data with representational data increases as a direct function of "cultural distance." In our own cultural environment we have generally the same ideas of what economy or government is although our judgments about what form they should take or what actions are needed frequently vary (e.g., do the ills of our economy come from too much or too little control?). Since in domestic contexts we are clear about what the implications of each option are, opinion data on how many people share one or the other position are very informative.

In dealing with countries where the backgrounds and experiences of the people may be very different from the American, many of the dominant issues will not represent the same thing that they do to Americans; the greater the differences, the greater the need to complement opinion data with representational data.

This conclusion naturally has implications in regard to the five methodological problems we identified in our inquiry with policy officials.

With regard to the most useful policy relevant variables, the answer is not simple but is inherent in our preceding conclusion. It suggests that the choice depends on the characteristics of the country under consideration. If the populations are culturally close---e.g., the democratic societies of Canada, Australia or Western Europe---traditional public opinion surveys can offer informative, readily interpretable data. When dealing with countries from Asia or Africa where the cultures are vastly different from ours, opinion data need to be used in combination with representational data. Representational data are indispensable for deciding what issues are truly dominant in the minds of the people in question. Similarly, they are critical in showing how their perceptions and meanings of the relevant issues are different from ours. Such insights are essential to gain full benefit from opinion results.

With regard to the most useful information source, the above research principle suggests that we should rely on opinion survey research capabilities wherever they are available. Furthermore, representational information as offered by cultural anthropology, ethno-science, social psychology, and intercultural communication research should be sought for countries that are culturally more distant and not readily open or accessible to attitude and opinion surveys.

It is important to recognize that there is a great deal of variation within contemporary opinion surveys with regard to their potential to shift from purely judgmental toward more representational modes of inquiry. Highly structured multiple-choice strategies, for instance, are generally judgmental and constrained, while open-ended questions and indepth interviews can provide broader and better representational insights.

With regard to the effective use of authentic experts, the above principle has two main implications. First, indepth familiarity with the foreign group is essential. This requires first-hand experience involving living among them, as is usually a part of anthropological training. Second, area expertise in the human dimension should be evaluated by some empirically based independent criterion data.

With regard to the question of whose views should be assessed, a representational focus simplifies the dilemma. Perceptual/representational differences within the same nation/culture are much narrower than judgmental differences that could be expected to exist in various segments of the society. This is because shared native background and experience produces a certain homogeneity across the social classes and strata. Some leading anthropologists like Margaret Mead suggest that a culturally representative sampling can be based on simpler sampling strategies than those posed by public opinion research which calls for statistically representative sampling of broad national populations. Recent research findings show that representational differences within the same country are distinctly smaller than between different countries.\* This implies that by testing groups of comparable educational and socioeconomic background (e.g., students), it is possible to assess national/cultural perceptual trends which are generalizable to the people at large and to a certain extent to the elite as well.

With regard to the last and most practical question of how to differentiate valid from biased information, primary data suggest our only natural resource. Since our cultural perceptions prevent us from seeing the world the way Jordanians do, and since they are unaware of how their own perceptions differ from ours, primary data derived from parallel tests may be the only way to identify differences objectively along their natural dimensions and in their actual proportions. The spontaneous, free Jordanian reactions reveal, indeed, perceptions and motivations which could hardly have been provided by an outsider, just as the U.S. reactions reflect characteristic psychological and behavioral dispositions which could not have been predicted by someone unfamiliar with the American culture.

The simplicity and directness of opinion survey data and the depth and inferential nature of the perceptual-representational data offer a

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\*Lorand B. Szalay, Won T. Moon, and Jean A. Bryson, Communication. Lexicon on Three South Korean Audiences: Domains Family, Education, and International Relations (Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1973).

powerful combination when used together. In the field of international relations a combined and coordinated use of these two research strategies promises a much desired flexibility. To obtain maximum benefit the components of this two-pronged approach have to be planned together, but the data should be collected separately to provide for two independent data sets which can be compared and cross-validated. /

Opinion assessments are required more frequently because of the frequent changes in peoples' attitudes and judgments. Within a single presidential term, for instance, opinions regarding the president's social, economic, and foreign policies go through considerable fluctuation, as does his popularity. The perceptual-representational assessment does not have to be performed as often since people's basic patterns of thinking do not change fast. The basic differences between how Americans and Jordanians perceive economy, for example, reflect much more stable predispositions. These fundamental differences in cultural views require recognition in the interpretation of any new public opinion results which involves U.S.-Jordanian comparisons.

The opinion survey can be focused very specifically on single issues (e.g., "supply economy" or tax cut). The perceptual-representational strategy, on the other hand, has to be more holistic; it has to encompass the dominant priorities of the foreign culture group to be truly informative about their way of thinking. For instance, without covering the issues of national development, the Jordanians' frame of reference would probably not be clearly understood.

To offer generalizable, useful information the opinion surveys have to meet the requirements of statistical representativeness; this requires the use of large samples and elaborate sampling procedures. To be valid and informative a representational assessment can be performed on matching samples of relatively small size ( $N = 50$ ). For example, three foreign samples (students, workers, farmers) from a foreign country, compared with U.S. samples matching in age, sex, and educational composition, can provide timely information on basic cultural differences in perceptions. They can also inform on the nature and scope of domestic perceptual differences within the countries compared.

The advantage of such a two-pronged approach is that the complementary qualities---depth and width, permanence and timeliness---can combine in a way which is both informative and economical. By using the representational approach, finally we can extend the scope of inquiry to populations who do not feel free to express a particular position in response to direct inquiries.

What we have tried to illustrate throughout this report is how our characteristically American preferences result in choices and solutions---the choice of variables (attitudes and opinions), of population (the statistically representative sample of the entire population), and of method (direct questioning, preferably with simple, multiple-choice answers)---which well suit our domestic conditions but have limited applicability overseas. As a result of these logically consistent, interlocking choices, we unintentionally decrease our capability to recognize the shared views and priorities of foreign national/cultural collectives which influence their behavior.

The choices are interlocking because they result from similar experiences and reinforce the same rationale. Much of the problem stems from the natural but false assumption that the various nations of the world follow a sort of universal rationale, the same as our own. This line of thinking leads one to overlook important views and priorities that contribute to a different representation of the world and that lead (in other predictable ways) to different choices and different behavior. Our logically consistent, mutually reinforcing patterns of thinking and behavior provide a protective shield against experiences and views which are inconsistent with ours. This shell could crack under the continuous pressure of adverse realities working from the outside. A safer and more constructive alternative would be to open the shell from the inside by introducing elements of external realities to promote the realization that the shell is more a trap than a protection in dealing with our international environment. A nation that is so deeply committed to freedom in every walk of life---political, social, economic---would not knowingly accept the limitations of a shell.



However, in order to work toward removing this invisible barrier, its existence must first be recognized. Presently, alternative views are rather systematically screened out and eliminated due to a combination of processes and choices promoted by our own cultural dispositions.

Empirical evidence is needed to demonstrate the existence of different psychological predispositions as characteristic of other nations. This seems to promise the critical force needed to remove the shell which hinders our effectiveness in the field of international relations.

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## APPENDIX I

### THE U.S. AND JORDANIAN GROUP RESPONSE LISTS

Included here are the original response lists with all the actual reactions produced by the U.S. and Jordanian groups. These reactions are the empirical foundation for the results presented in this volume.

While we have used nontechnical language in the main body of this work, several of our terms have technical definitions which have assured consistent treatment of the data over many years of intercultural investigation. In the text, the "salience" of a particular idea or subject is frequently mentioned. This term refers to the magnitude of a particular response score. A "perceptual component" is the cluster of semantically related responses characterized by a score value, which is the sum of the individual response scores included in the cluster. We speak in the text of the "dominance" of a particular theme. This is defined as the total score accumulated by all the responses from a group which are elicited by a particular theme.

The following tables show all the responses elicited by each theme. The responses in each list are arranged in semantically related clusters identified through content analysis. The score for each response is based on the frequency with which that response was made. The scores are summed within each cluster to reflect the salience of each perceptual component in the group's cultural images. Each of the response lists is presented with a percentage table which summarizes the relative contributions of each of the semantic clusters. At the bottom of each percentage table, the "total dominance score" of all responses is presented. This score is analogous to Clyde Noble's (1952) measure of "meaningfulness," and shows the subjective importance of a particular subject to the culture groups studied based on solid empirical foundation.

The last table on page 40 provides a list of the eighty themes used in the response trend analysis of the U.S., Jordanian, Egyptian, and Israeli group comparisons. The procedure is described in Appendix II, page 8.

Main Components and Responses US J

US, AMERICA	168	105
U.S., America	168	105
<b>OTHER COUNTRIES</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>109</b>
countries	8	23
China	71	13
Europe	-	7
nations	14	-
England	-	23
Germany	-	9
gov't	14	-
France	-	19
Iran	-	8
Japan	6	-
world	6	-
Arabs	-	7
<b>RUSSIA, USSR</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>102</b>
Russia, USSR,		
Soviet Union	105	102
<b>WAR, CONFLICT</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>55</b>
war	34	12
cold war	7	-
military	6	-
fighting	5	8
conflict	10	-
destruction	-	13
danger	10	-
terror.ism	-	9
death	-	7
killin,er	-	6
<b>POWER, AUTHORITY</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>64</b>
influence	-	8
strength	15	28
strong	12	-
power,ful	20	-
big	15	-
the authority	-	15
ruler	5	13
<b>WEAPONS, NUCLEAR POWER</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>31</b>
arms race	10	-
nuclear-power	-	-
-weapons	33	-
weapons	6	31
bomb,atomic-	6	-
<b>SUPERMAN, BATMAN</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>-</b>
Superman	37	-
Batman	5	-
super heroes	6	-

SUPER POWERS

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY  
U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
U.S., America	23	11
Other Countries	16	11
Russia, U.S.S.R.	14	11
War, Conflict	9	6
Power, Authority	9	7
Weapons, Nuclear Power	8	3
Superman, Batman	6	-
God, Islam	3	17
Colonization, Domination	1	14
Rights, Justice, Equality	2	9
Development, Technology	2	7
Miscellaneous	6	4
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>740</b>	<b>934</b>

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>GOD, ISLAM</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>155</b>
God	22	96
Islam	-	30
creed	-	20
religion,stick to-	-	9
<b>COLONIZATION, DOMINATION</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>129</b>
colonization	-	37
oppression	-	17
dictatorship	-	6
overpowering	-	20
taking possession	-	7
domination	-	42
control	8	-
<b>RIGHTS, JUSTICE, EQUALITY</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>85</b>
rights	-	6
justice	-	14
laws/justice	-	11
liberation	-	8
unity	-	9
holding together	-	9
equality, no-	-	12
peace	6	-
love	-	8
good	-	8
detente	7	-
<b>DEVELOPMENT, TECHNOLOGY</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>62</b>
development	-	25
technology	-	16
economy	8	-
rich	6	-
inventions	-	8
industry	-	9
getting to moon	-	4
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>37</b>
greed	7	-
ESP	12	-
interests	-	12
game	5	-
president	5	-
oil	5	-
politics	7	-
capitalism	-	5
communism	-	5
humanity	-	7
we don't	-	-
perceive it	-	8

Main Components and Responses US J

AMERICA, STATES 174 -  
 America,n 112 -  
 states 9 -  
 50 states 10 -  
 50 7 -  
 USA 28 -  
 California 8 -

GOVERNMENT, POLITICS 129 72  
 government 43 -  
 politics 5 10  
 Jimmy Carter 10 -  
 Wash. DC 7 -  
 democracy 40 17  
 capitalism,tic 8 33  
 Army 10 -  
 Navy 6 -  
 organization - 8  
 veto rights - 4

LOVE, PATRIOTISM 124 -  
 love,d 7 -  
 good 8 -  
 pride,proud 9 -  
 greatest nation 5 -  
 #1 6 -  
 flag 17 -  
 beautiful 8 -  
 home 32 -  
 my country 10 -  
 red/white/blue 8 -  
 united 14 -

COUNTRY, PEOPLE 117 24  
 country 72 24  
 nation,al 18 -  
 map 6 -  
 people 21 -

FREEDOM, JUSTICE 92 9  
 freedom 49 9  
 free 11 -  
 liberty 8 -  
 justice 7 -  
 peace,ful 5 -  
 July 4 6 -  
 opportunity 6 -

ISRAEL, RUSSIA 14 29  
 Israel - 29  
 Iran 5 -  
 Russia,n 9 -

MISCELLANEOUS 14 23  
 help,er,ful 6 -  
 life - 9  
 interest - 6  
 history 8 -  
 playing around - 8

UNITED STATES

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
America, States	22	-
Government, Politics	16	7
Love, Patriotism	16	-
Country, People	15	2
Freedom, Justice	12	1
Power, Control	13	23
Technology, Progress	1	22
Colonization, Oppression	-	16
Immoral, Unjust	2	12
Weapons, Killing	1	10
Israel, Russia	2	3
Miscellaneous	2	2
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>796</b>	<b>985</b>

Main Components and Responses US J

WEAPONS, KILLING 6 100  
 war 6 -  
 violence - 13  
 weapons - 35  
 killing - 24  
 enemy-life, frightful - 19  
 supporting terrorism - 9

Main Components and Responses US J

POWER, CONTROL 101 231  
 military power - 5  
 superpower 10 -  
 power,ful 22 -  
 great powers - 47  
 big 16 8  
 large 5 -  
 great 16 -  
 strong,strength 10 71  
 rich 12 -  
 wealth,y 10 -  
 greatest country - 16  
 largest country - 10  
 overcoming - 20  
 influence,-tia 41  
 rich - 13

TECHNOLOGY, PROGRESS 8 215  
 technology 8 32  
 factories - 6  
 advancement; development - 74  
 help - 7  
 exports - 3  
 industries - 20  
 advance in science - 23  
 space investigation- educated - 9  
 educated - 6  
 high level of education - 6  
 thought advancement- civilized - 11  
 civilized - 5  
 buildings, skyscrapers - 7  
 resources - 6

COLONIZATION, OPPRESSION - 163  
 colonization - 61  
 imperialism - 7  
 destruction of Islam - 12  
 Zionism - 12  
 oppression - 71

IMMORAL, UNJUST 17 119  
 taking advantage of world - 17  
 corruption - 6  
 injustice - 8  
 bias - 13  
 racism - 9  
 crimes - 9  
 betrayal - 17  
 bad morals - 20  
 tumbling down - 10  
 wasteful 5 -  
 poverty 12 -  
 overpopulation - 10

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>RUSSIA, MOSCOW</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>-</b>
USSR	62	-
Russia	151	-
Moscow	20	-
Leningrad	6	-
Kremlin	12	-
bear	12	-
Olympics	26	-
ballet	6	-
Sputnik	6	-
government	6	-

<b>COMMUNISM, RED</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>154</b>
communism,t	122	145
red	36	-
party	-	5
politics	-	4

<b>ASIA, EUROPE</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>34</b>
country	18	12
Afghanistan	22	13
Siberia	16	-
USA	18	-
Palestine	-	9

<b>LEADERS:</b>		
<b>LENIN, STALIN</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>9</b>
Qzar	6	-
Breshnev	18	-
Kruschev	6	-
Lenin	22	9
Marx	6	-
Stalin	19	-

<b>BAD MORALS, EVIL</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>27</b>
enemy	6	-
evil	8	-
hate	5	-
threat,ening	8	-
wrong	8	-
bad morals,		
degeneration	-	12
cancer	-	4
enemy of Islam	-	11

<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>41</b>
belief	-	16
capitalism	-	4
democracy	-	6
people	6	-
disease	5	-
interest	-	8
renegation	-	7

SOVIET UNION

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Russia, Moscow	36	-
Communism, Red	19	17
Asia, Europe	9	4
Leaders: Lenin, Stalin	9	1
Bad Morals, Evil	4	3
Advancement, Technology	-	16
Oppression, Colonization	4	16
Powerful, Big	9	14
War, Weapons, Killing	5	10
Socialism, Marxism	1	8
Peace, Equality, Unity	2	8
Miscellaneous	1	4
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>840</b>	<b>907</b>

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>ADVANCEMENT, TECHNOLOGY</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>148</b>
surpassing	-	6
advancement	-	55
country to moon	-	8
resources	-	7
material	-	7
organized	-	12
industry	-	7
space flights	-	18
science,tific	-	17
self sufficiency	-	11

<b>OPPRESSION, COLONIZATION</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>145</b>
dictatorship	8	-
oppression,ive	16	33
repression	8	-
overpowering	-	10
domination	-	28
restraint of freedom	-	8
interference	-	6
no equality	-	8
colonization	-	36
restraint	-	4
opportunist	-	12

<b>POWERFUL, BIG</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>118</b>
superpower	6	-
big	16	-
large,-territ.	8	9
power,ful	26	-
cold	20	-
snow	-	11
great country	-	24
strength	-	74

<b>WAR, WEAPONS, KILLING</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>90</b>
war	28	6
competition	10	-
aggressive	6	-
weapons	-	21
revolutionary	-	11
terrorism	-	6
enemy,-like	-	8
killing	-	21
military forces	-	7
against US	-	10

<b>SOCIALISM, MARXISM</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>77</b>
socialism,t	11	63
Marxism	-	14

<b>PEACE, EQUALITY, UNITY</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>71</b>
peace	7	6
SALT,-II,-talks	8	-
equal	-	15
united	-	18
clean	-	7
beauty,ful	-	7
justice	-	17

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>US, JAPAN, RUSSIA</b>	269	183
USA	50	106
America	12	-
Russia, USSR	36	14
China, Chinese	29	-
Japanese	44	-
European	8	-
England	20	10
British	25	-
France	5	-
Third World	5	-
African countries	6	-
nations	18	-
Western countries	11	-
Israel	-	26
international	-	22
<b>KING, QUEEN</b>	111	-
king	48	-
queen	14	-
royalty	10	-
crown	9	-
emperor	6	-
kingdom	6	-
empire	12	-
imperial	6	-
<b>CAPITALISM, COMMUNISM</b>	56	10
communism	18	-
dictatorship	8	-
capitalism	30	10
<b>GOVERNMENT, POLITICS</b>	44	45
government	24	-
political	20	20
rule, type of	-	13
slogans	-	12
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	18	48
rich	5	-
money	7	-
acting	-	6
Margarine	6	-
opinions	-	9
fright	-	6
interests	-	9
term, word	-	12
industrial	-	6

IMPERIALISM

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
U.S., Japan, Russia	38	22
King, Queen	16	-
Capitalism, Communism	8	1
Government, Politics	6	5
Oppression, Exploitation	6	17
Colonization, Zionism	7	14
Power, Domination	10	13
Injustice, Inhumanity	3	11
War, Violence	3	10
Miscellaneous	2	6
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>-697</b>	<b>830</b>

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>OPPRESSION, EXPLOITATION</b>	40	144
take over	20	-
overpowering	-	33
exploitation	9	-
slavery	5	-
oppression	6	34
taking advantage of	-	35
subduing	-	6
possession	-	6
tyranny	-	6
weakness	-	12
depriving of rights	-	12
<b>COLONIZATION, ZIONISM</b>	47	115
colonization	-	55
colonialism	25	60
Zionism	-	60
colonies	14	-
expansion,ism	8	-
<b>POWER, DOMINATION</b>	73	111
power	21	-
control	8	-
domination	12	-
rule, r	18	-
supreme	8	-
strength	6	46
influence	-	54
authority	-	11
<b>INJUSTICE, INHUMANITY</b>	20	89
greedy	6	8
savageness	-	7
bad	8	-
wrong	6	7
injustice	-	20
inhumanity	-	6
crime	-	4
betrayal	-	8
backwardness	-	9
not equalizing	-	11
racism	-	9
<b>WAR, VIOLENCE</b>	19	85
war	10	-
aggression	9	-
enmity	-	30
killing	-	8
destruction	-	9
violence	-	15
terrorism	-	6
military	-	9
reactionary forces	-	8

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>PEOPLE, JEWS, ARABS</b>	<b>299</b>	<b>73</b>
people	22	13
Jews	191	39
Hebrews	8	-
Arabs	65	-
Golda Meier	-	5
Begin	-	13
Dayan	-	3
blacks	7	-
roommate	6	-
<b>SMALL, FOREIGN</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>20</b>
underdog	6	-
small	11	-
strength, power	12	14
new	11	-
aid	8	-
support	-	6
foreign	11	-
tradition	10	-
kibbutz	18	-
desert	14	-
hot	18	-
travel	9	-
oil	25	-
embargo	6	-
<b>MIDDLE EAST, AMERICA</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>37</b>
Egypt	31	-
Jordan	13	-
Syria	6	-
Middle East	28	-
America	-	37
<b>NATION, COUNTRY</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>45</b>
nation	28	17
country	22	-
land	-	11
state	-	17
homeland	11	-
<b>FREEDOM, PEACE</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>68</b>
independence	9	-
freedom	12	-
rights	-	18
insistence	-	13
peace	11	-
love	6	-
proud	6	-
respect	9	-
safe	-	6
promise	-	8
development	-	8
movement	-	6
capacity	-	9

## ISRAEL

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
People: Jews, Arabs	32	7
Small, Foreign	17	2
Middle East, America	8	3
Nation, Country	6	4
Freedom, Peace	6	6
War, Aggression	14	29
Racism, Zionism	1	20
Colonialism, Occupation	-	19
Palestine, Jerusalem	7	7
Religion	7	1
Miscellaneous	1	2
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>927</b>	<b>1122</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>WAR, AGGRESSION</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>314</b>
war	76	56
fighting	23	-
destruction	-	13
killing,er	-	19
terrorists	12	-
weapons	-	7
tanks	8	-
army	10	8
attacking	-	73
defeat	-	3
assailant	-	135
<b>COLONIALISM, OCCUPATION</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>222</b>
colonialism,ation	-	25
occupation	-	87
banishment	-	27
exploiters	-	22
stealing	-	36
prisons	-	25
<b>DISCRIMINATION, DECEIT</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>147</b>
hatred	-	8
discrimination	-	56
race hatred	-	32
Zionist	8	-
unfairness	-	6
corruption	-	16
cheater	-	10
deceit	-	12
unfaithful	-	7
<b>PALESTINE, JERUSELUM</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>79</b>
Palestine	18	70
Tel Aviv	10	-
Jerusalem	19	9
Bethlehem	10	-
holyland	8	-
<b>RELIGION, JUDAISM</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>90</b>
Bible	7	-
belief	6	-
Christ	13	-
Jesus	12	-
religion	13	-
star	15	-
holy book	-	6
Judaism	-	80
mosque	-	4
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>27</b>
frightening	9	-
coward	-	14
abnormal	-	13

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>WAR, GUERRILLAS</b>	<b>327</b>	<b>126</b>
war	126	27
fight	49	11
struggle	-	6
conflict	18	4
battle	9	-
guerrillas	50	-
terrorists	20	-
kill	9	-
weapons	-	2
tank	8	-
bombs	6	-
gun	16	-
PLF	16	-
troubles	-	9
problem	-	10
defense	-	8
PLO	-	27
revolution	-	18
rough	-	4
<b>PEOPLE, ARABS, JEWS</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>148</b>
people	22	6
Arab,ian	69	96
Jews	71	37
Palestinian	14	9
<b>FOREIGN, BEAUTIFUL</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>42</b>
beautiful	-	17
mountain	-	5
desert	10	-
sand	6	-
oil	18	-
oranges	-	20
history	8	-
ancient	10	-
unknown	17	-
foreign	24	-
<b>RELIGION</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>41</b>
religion	11	-
Bible	39	-
Jesus	14	-
Muslim	7	-
church	-	6
Islam	-	14
Mosque	-	21
<b>MIDDLE EAST, AMERICA</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>24</b>
Egypt	21	-
Jordan	10	12
Middle East	16	-
America	-	12
<b>GOVERNMENT</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>-</b>
government	9	-
king	9	-
news	12	-

## PALESTINE

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
War, Guerrillas	33	12
People: Arabs, Jews	18	14
Foreign, Beautiful	10	4
Religion	7	4
Middle East, America	5	2
Politics, Government	3	-
Colonization, Banishment	1	18
Country, Nation	4	17
Israel	11	12
Rights, Freedom	7	11
Love, Hope	-	6
Miscellaneous	1	2
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>977</b>	<b>1095</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>COLONIZATION, BANISHMENT</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>196</b>
occupied	-	97
banishment	-	45
refugees, -camps	7	-
immigrants	-	12
lost	-	6
prisons	-	6
stealing	-	12
unfair	-	16
weakness	-	2
<b>COUNTRY, NATION</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>186</b>
country	24	-
nation	10	95
land	7	40
my country	-	17
region	-	34
<b>ISRAEL</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>132</b>
Israel	99	50
Jerusalem	-	73
holy city	7	-
Palestine	-	9
<b>RIGHTS, FREEDOM</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>117</b>
rights	-	22
liberation	43	37
freedom	13	9
independence	-	21
cause	10	-
future	-	7
succeed	-	8
victory	-	11
movement	-	2
<b>LOVE, HOPE</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>61</b>
good	-	7
love	-	27
hope	-	11
promise	-	3
courage	-	3
unity	-	4
power	-	6
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>22</b>
mother	-	11
citation	-	11
hate	7	-
open	6	-



Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>PYRAMIDS, PHAROAHS</b>	<b>231</b>	<b>.97</b>
pharoahs	33	22
Tut	35	-
sphinx	20	11
tomb	32	-
pyramids	93	64
mummy	18	-
<b>DESERT, HOT</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>13</b>
desert	44	-
sand	51	-
dry	8	-
hot	32	13
sun	7	-
camels	14	-
<b>MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>96</b>
Mid East	21	-
Africa	22	-
Israel	24	6
Jordan	-	24
Lebanon	-	14
Kuwait	-	4
Iraq	-	6
Syria	-	14
Saudi Arabia	-	10
Russia	-	8
Sudan	-	7
<b>OIL, INDUSTRY</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>24</b>
oil	50	-
industry	-	12
progress	-	12
<b>LOVE, FUN</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>29</b>
love	-	11
beautiful	-	6
fun	-	12
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>20</b>
far	12	-
socialism	-	6
sla	-	5
university	-	9

## EGYPT

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Pyramids, Pharoahs	26	9
Desert, Hot	17	1
Middle East Countries	7	9
Oil, Industry	6	2
People, Arabs, Egyptians	12	28
Nile, Cairo	14	18
Nation, Country	2	13
Poverty, War	6	8
History, Tradition	8	7
Love, Fun	-	3
Miscellaneous	1	2
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>893</b>	<b>1061</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>PEOPLE, ARABS, EGYPTIANS</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>296</b>
people	9	27
Arab,ian,ic	20	123
Egyptian	13	-
Muslim	9	-
dark skin	8	-
Mohammed	10	-
Nasser	10	45
Sadat	20	58
brother	-	26
Islam	-	17
<b>NILE, CAIRO</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>188</b>
Cairo	25	7
Alexandrie	-	23
Nile	77	101
Suez,-canal	21	43
Sinai	-	6
high dam	-	8
<b>NATION, COUNTRY</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>143</b>
nation-state	-	72
country	23	-
republic	-	37
state	-	8
sister country	-	26
<b>POVERTY, WAR</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>89</b>
war/confrontation	31	26
fight	11	-
poverty	-	16
crowded,ing	-	25
Bar Lev line	-	5
corruption	-	4
pick pocket	-	6
revolution	-	7
enemy	7	-
bad	8	-
<b>HISTORY, TRADITION</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>71</b>
history,ic	9	-
old	6	-
ancient	21	-
antiquities	-	7
Cleopatra	18	-
slaves	6	-
snakes	3	-
jewels	6	-
sheets	6	-
arts	-	34
books	-	4
movie	-	10
sciences	-	16

Main Components and Responses US J

COUNTRIES:	US	J
U.S., EGYPT	473	335
national	-	13
state	34	32
Spain	11	-
land	16	76
world	16	-
country, my-	112	57
Poland	7	-
Israel	11	-
Arab	-	16
Jordan	-	72
Palestine	-	61
America, U.S.A.	127	-
Mexico	6	-
England	34	-
Canada	21	-
boundaries, border	6	3
China	6	-
France	20	-
Germany	18	-
Italy	6	-
Russia, U.S.S.R.	22	-

UNITED, TOGETHERNESS	US	J
united	83	-
unity	19	6
one	15	-
togetherness	19	-

GOVERNMENT, POLITICS	US	J
government	49	8
sovereignty	9	-
leader	7	16
king	-	18
politics	14	-
rule	6	-
U.N.	14	-

POWER, STRENGTH	US	J
power, force	27	3
big	12	-
strong	23	-

CULTURE, HISTORY	US	J
culture	15	-
customs	5	-
history	7	4
tradition	4	-
language	5	-
views	6	-
society	5	16

FLAG, CAPITOL	US	J
anthem	6	-
flag	14	-
capitol	13	-
Washington	8	-

NATION

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Countries: U.S., Egypt	46	26
United, Togetherness	13	-
Government, Politics	10	3
Power, Strength	6	-
Culture, History	4	2
Flag, Capitol	4	-
War, Sacrifice	2	19
Love, Patriotism	2	14
People, Family	6	12
Freedom, Progress	2	11
Origin, Belonging	2	6
Miscellaneous?	3	6
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>1034</b>	<b>1167</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
MISCELLANEOUS	29	72
believer	-	9
principle	-	4
accomplish	-	5
citation	-	7
many	13	-
separate	6	-
division	10	-
knowledge	-	10
life	-	9
existence	-	12
dust	-	16

Main Components and Responses US J

WAR, SACRIFICE	US	J
war	13	5
Army	9	15
weapon	-	6
stolen	-	4
sacrifice	-	43
occupied	-	32
ransom	-	34
stability	-	14
security	-	14
protection	-	22
defending it	-	23
struggle	-	15
enemy	-	10

LOVE, PATRIOTISM	US	J
love	-	69
affection	-	18
duty	-	9
faith,fulness	-	22
patriot	9	-
importance	-	8
nationalism	13	-
respectful	-	8
service	-	6
attachment	-	3
happiness	-	11
dear	-	10
courage	-	5
noble	-	7

PEOPLE, FAMILY	US	J
people	65	58
fellow	-	8
friends	-	10
mother	-	13
relatives	-	44
relation	-	16
group	-	9

FREEDOM, PROGRESS	US	J
freedom	-	25
independent,ce	8	11
liberation	-	16
hope	-	6
progress	-	13
goal	6	-
development	-	16
economy	7	-
work	-	19
cooperation	-	11
help	-	5
benefit	-	4
right	-	11
peace	-	6

ORIGIN, BELONGING	US	J
origin, descent	17	77
ours	17	-
return	-	13
residence,t	-	37

Main Components  
Main Components  
and Responses US J

<b>ELECTIONS, CAMPAIGNS</b>	<b>203</b>	
elections	51	
campaign,ing	18	
candidate	10	
vote,ing	8	
re-election	6	
convention	6	
competition	8	
debates	6	
Democrats	26	
Republican	32	
party	16	
promises	8	
deals	8	

<b>PRESIDENTS, POLITICIANS</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>28</b>
president	44	
politicians	37	
governor		17
senators	9	
Jimmy Carter	39	5
Kennedy	10	
Nixon	8	
Anderson	5	
Reagan	16	
King Hussein		6

<b>CORRUPTION, DECEIT</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>28</b>
corruption	46	
cheat,ing	27	
dishonest,y	10	
lies,lying	9	
dirty	5	
pay offs	5	
scandal	6	
Watergate	14	
Abscam	6	
bull	6	
crooked	12	
greedy	6	
deceiving		23
failure		5

<b>GOVERNMENT, DEMOCRACY</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>82</b>
DEMOCRACY	86	29
government		31
order	20	
democracy,tic	20	
Congress,men	6	
Senate	8	
House		10
politics		12
party,- system		

<b>LEADERSHIP, POWER</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>35</b>
leader,ship	6	
power,ful	30	
rule,ing	10	
responsibility		8
duties		9
great,powers,		8
strong		10

<b>Main Components and Responses</b>	<b>US</b>	<b>J</b>
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>23</b>
boring	7	
fun	6	
ideology	6	
money	20	
ground		6
general		13
weak		4

POLITICS

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY  
U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Elections, Campaign	24	-
Presidents, Politicians	20	4
Corruption, Deceit	18	4
Government, Democracy	18	11
Leadership, Power	5	4
Countries, U.S., Israel	4	36
Goals, Development, Economy		11
Problems, War, Colonization		12
Political Science, Diplomacy, Plans	4	11
Rights, Freedom, Laws	3	4
Miscellaneous	4	3
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>853</b>	<b>762</b>

Main Components  
and Responses US J

<b>COUNTRIES, U.S., ISRAEL</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>277</b>
country,s		34
nation,al	12	
Washington, D.C.	9	
world	10	21
U.S.		55
Egypt		8
Iran		5
Arab countries		9
U.S.S.R.		18
Israel		23
international		32
social		14
people	6	11
internal		14
external		16
class		6
culture		5
individual		6

<b>GOALS, DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMY</b>	<b>83</b>
goals	19
education	5
mutual hlep	10
development	5
useful	7
economy,ig	26
advancement	11

<b>PROBLEMS, WAR, COLONIZATION</b>	<b>92</b>
war	19
battle	6
prison	9
oppression	16
colonization	24
Zionism	11
taking advantage	7

<b>POLITICAL SCIENCE, DIPLOMACY, PLANS</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>81</b>
relations		5
diplomacy		11
art,		12
game	33	
plan,ing		24
goal determines		
means		5
wise		9
experience		8
intelligence		7

<b>LAWS, RIGHTS</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>33</b>
rights		5
freedom		9
justice		5
laws	9	6
lawyers	10	
issues	6	
interests		8



Main Components and Responses US J

ECONOMY, MONEY, PROFIT	US	J
economy,-system	32	-
econ.advancement	-	6
money	94	42
wealth	12	22
profit	22	-
capitals	-	16
profiting from	-	14
property	-	16
material life	-	9

BUSINESS, INDUSTRY	US	J
business	45	-
big business	21	-
monopolies	5	19
corporations	6	-
oil companies	5	-
industrial	20	-
stocks,-market	5	-
market,-econ.	14	-
production	9	-
workers	18	9
factories	-	9

COMMUNISM, SOCIALISM	US	J
communism	46	11
socialism	43	9
anti-communism	-	7
democracy	20	27
capitalism	-	12

GOVERNMENT, POLITICS	US	J
government	36	-
system	9	-
political	19	-
influence	-	5
power,ful	16	-
governing	-	6
state interference	-	6

CORRUPTION, LACK OF EQUALITY	US	J
enemy-like	-	8
selfishness	-	6
bad	7	-
corruption	8	6
greedy	13	-
suppression	5	-
control	5	-
lack of equality	-	17
atheism	-	9

## CAPITALISM

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Economy, Money, Profit	21	14
Business, Industry	18	4
Communism, Socialism	14	7
Government, Politics	11	2
Corruption, Lack of Equality	5	5
U.S., Western Camp	16	22
Freedom, Rights	3	14
Society, Classes	1	13
Imperialism; Oppression	4	10
Free Enterprise, Ownership	4	8
Miscellaneous	1	2
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>752</b>	<b>925</b>

Main Components and Responses US J

U.S., WESTERN CAMP	US	J
U.S., America	103	133
Russia, n	13	-
country, s	6	-
Europe	-	22
international	-	6
Western, -camp	-	41

FREEDOM, RIGHTS	US	J
free, dom	14	96
right	-	13
principle	-	16
good,-idea	11	-
beautiful	-	5

SOCIETY, CLASSES	US	J
individuality	5	-
social	-	11
classes	-	20
Bourgeoisie	-	10
individualism	-	14
culture	-	5
humanity	-	13
man	-	10
social level	-	8
society	-	9
life	-	23

IMPERIALISM, OPPRESSION	US	J
imperialism, etc	22	-
colonization	-	12
domination	-	4
oppression	-	34
exploitation	8	-
terrorism	-	6
killing	-	6
revolution	-	11
overpowering	-	15

FREE ENTERPRISE, OWNERSHIP	US	J
free enterprise	28	-
competition	6	6
opportunism	-	9
ownership	-	20
free economy	-	14
free importation	-	6
interests	-	15

MISCELLANEOUS	US	J
security	-	6
Milton Freidman	5	-
Adam Smith	6	-
nature	-	9
science	-	6

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>RUSSIA, CHINA</b>	267	167
Russia, USSR	187	134
China, ese	46	6
Red China	8	-
Cuba	12	-
Germany, E.	6	-
Vietnam	8	-
Eastern	-	10
International	-	10
Iraq	-	7
<b>MARXISM, SOCIALISM</b>	148	59
capitalism	18	-
democracy	10	-
Marx,ism	80	25
Socialism,t	33	34
theoretical	7	-
<b>GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, POWER</b>	103	65
government	18	-
state	8	-
kingship,rule	-	8
political	24	-
representative	-	7
authority	25	-
power,ful	15	-
control,ing	13	-
party	6	14
does not believe in government	-	28
no government	-	8
<b>RED, PINKO</b>	73	-
red,s	60	-
pinko	6	-
red peril	7	-
<b>STALIN, LENIN</b>	54	19
Stalin	20	-
Lenin	22	19
Mao	6	-
Hitler	6	-
<b>PEOPLE, COMMUNES</b>	30	7
classes	-	7
people	5	-
communes,al	8	-
share,ing	12	-
way of life	5	-

## COMMUNISM

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Russia, China	32	25
Marxism, Socialism	18	9
Government, Politics, Power	12	9
Red, Pinko	9	-
Stalin, Lenin	6	3
People, Communes	4	1
Atheism, Enemy of Islam	-	17
Corruption, Oppression	9	14
War, Destruction	5	8
Equality, Freedom	4	5
Economy	2	5
Miscellaneous	-	5
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>846</b>	<b>675</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>ATHEISM, ENEMY OF ISLAM</b>	-	115
atheism	-	61
killng Islam	-	10
keeping away from religion	-	9
enemy of Islam	-	16
enemy of Moslem countries	-	12
Zionism	-	7
<b>CORRUPTION, OPPRESSION</b>	76	95
wrong	6	-
untrue	5	-
evil	10	-
fear	7	-
hate,red	8	-
corruption,moral	-	27
no freedom	12	8
oppression	9	31
unfair	11	-
threat	8	-
backwardness	-	7
lack of equality	-	7
prison	-	4
going against law	-	11
<b>WAR, DESTRUCTION</b>	44	51
wars	16	7
revolt,ion	8	-
killng	-	10
death	-	8
destruction,ive	20	18
blood	-	8
<b>EQUALITY, FREEDOM</b>	31	33
equal,ty	18	22
freedom,lin-justice	13	-
<b>ECONOMY</b>	14	32
economy,ics	5	6
work,-class	9	8
taking profit	-	4
wealth	-	8
lack of ownership	-	6
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	-	32
reactionary	-	8
ephemeros	-	9
material	-	6
general	-	9

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>COMMUNISM, MARXISM</b>	215	64
communism,t	104	27
Marx,ism	38	9
fascism,t	8	-
imperialism	6	-
capitalism	36	-
democracy,tfc	23	19
socialism	-	9

<b>COUNTRIES, RUSSIA, SWEDEN</b>	160	67
country,s	11	-
nation	6	-
Russia, USSR	50	59
Cuba	8	-
Britain	6	-
England	18	-
France	6	-
Germany, E-	10	-
Italy	7	-
Sweden	26	-
Scandinavia	6	-
US	6	-
Romania	-	8

<b>GOVERNMENT, POLITICS</b>	79	62
government	50	-
state	6	-
politics,al	18	24
parties	-	8
power	5	-
strength	-	6
reactionary	-	16
planning	-	8

<b>ECONOMICS, MONEY</b>	41	35
economy, system	16	-
taxes, high-	6	-
welfare,-state	10	-
medicine	9	-
building,housing	-	6
distributing	-	5
profits	-	7
money	-	5
production	-	7
development	-	5
advancement	-	5

SOCIALISM

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Communism, Marxism	32	13
Countries, Russia, Sweden	24	13
Government, Politics	12	12
Economics, Money	6	7
Equality, Freedom	6	17
Work, Help, Share	6	14
Society, People	7	11
Problems, Bad	4	7
Miscellaneous	2	6
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>672</b>	<b>503</b>

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>EQUALITY, FREEDOM</b>	43	84
equal,ity	13	41
freedom	6	21
justice	-	22
good,-system	16	-
idealism,tfc	8	-

<b>WORK, HELP, SHARE</b>	43	70
work,ers,ing	8	-
participation	-	12
sharing	12	-
together,ness	7	-
unity,ed	8	-
help,mutual-	8	51
brotherhood	-	7

<b>SOCIETY, PEOPLE</b>	48	57
society,al	10	-
people	19	10
classes	6	12
no classes	-	5
friends	7	-
interactions	6	-
international	-	12
organization	-	6
groups	-	12

<b>PROBLEMS, BAD</b>	29	36
problems	8	-
permissive	-	9
no equality	-	3
atheism	-	12
colonization	-	6
against it	-	6
creeping	6	-
bad	10	-
wrong	5	-

<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	14	28
idea	6	-
theory	8	-
principle	-	15
universal	-	13



Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>PEOPLE, BLACKS, WOMEN</b>	131	5
people	20	-
Blacks	22	-
women	12	-
women's rights	6	-
Andrew Young	6	-
Carter	48	-
everyone	11	-
for all	6	-
personality	-	5
<b>EQUALITY</b>	92	35
equality	62	35
equal rights	6	-
ERA	24	-
<b>FREEDOM</b>	89	12
freedom	72	-
liberty	17	-
liberation	-	6
not being tied	-	6
<b>LIFE, PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS</b>	69	51
decency	6	-
dignity	14	12
happiness, pursuit of	16	-
life	26	-
respect	7	-
mutual help	-	6
mutual understanding	-	6
food	-	12
economic level	-	15
<b>US, RUSSIA, PALESTINE</b>	27	20
US	8	-
Iran	6	-
Russia	13	-
international	-	6
Palestine	-	14
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	-	30
observation	-	7
wealth	-	6
don't know about it	-	8
fate	-	9

HUMAN RIGHTS  
PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY  
U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
People, Blacks, Women	21	1
Equality	15	7
Freedom	14	2
Life, Pursuit of Happiness	11	10
U.S., Russia, Palestine	4	4
Justice, Religion	17	28
Oppression, Restraint	-	21
Laws, Constitution	8	9
Important, Necessary	5	7
Politics, Activism	5	6
Miscellaneous	-	6
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>630</b>	<b>524</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>JUSTICE, RELIGION</b>	110	148
justice	16	61
peace	12	15
civil rights	13	-
civil	12	-
basic	16	-
fairness	18	-
abortion	12	-
education	5	-
speech	6	-
point of view	-	17
Islam	-	21
Koran	-	9
religious	-	9
nationalism	-	9
the press	-	7
<b>OPPRESSION, RESTRAINT</b>	-	110
oppression	-	21
pushing oppression	-	12
restrained	-	10
colonization	-	7
abused	-	42
persecuted	-	12
racism	-	6
<b>LAWS, CONSTITUTION</b>	48	48
laws	23	21
constitution	5	-
amendment	15	-
protection	5	-
maintained	-	8
duty	-	19
<b>IMPORTANT, NECESSARY</b>	34	36
good	8	-
important	6	15
needs	6	-
necessary	14	10
wanted	-	11
<b>POLITICS, ACTIVISM</b>	30	29
activism	5	-
protest	6	-
politics	6	13
power	5	-
democracy	8	-
election	-	8
organization	-	8

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>PEOPLE, BLACKS, WOMEN, THE WEAK</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>136</b>
Blacks	34	-
Jews	13	-
minorities	24	-
people	22	33
racial	6	-
racism	12	6
slaves	8	-
women	16	-
poor, poverty	25	-
man	-	27
humanity	-	16
the others	-	7
self	-	9
social	-	14
the weak	-	24

HELD BACK, SUPPRESSED DEPRESSED	128	62
discrimination	8	-
prejudice	6	-
against	10	-
held back	11	-
oppression	8	15
put down	8	-
repression	12	-
suppression	22	-
slavery	16	-
depression	27	-
against religion	-	14
prison	-	6
enslaving	-	11
restraint	-	9
taking the proceeds	-	7

BAD, CRIME, CORRUPTION	43	55
bad	8	-
sad	6	-
unfair	10	-
spite	-	9
anger	6	-
fear	7	-
unhappiness	-	7
ignorance	6	-
crime	-	22
corruption	-	17

CAPITALISM, COMMUNISM	24	-
capitalism	6	-
communism	18	-

## OPPRESSION

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
People, Blacks, Women, the Weak	32	19
Held Back, Suppressed, Depressed	26	9
Bad, Crime, Corruption	9	8
Capitalism, Communism	5	-
Government, Power, Dictatorship	13	14
Colonization, Domination	-	14
Rights, Justice	2	13
Russia, Palestine, Israel	6	7
War, Killing, Cruelty	7	17
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>495</b>	<b>720</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>GOVERNMENT, POWER, DICTATORSHIP</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>103</b>
government	12	-
governing	-	8
governors	-	12
rule	8	-
reigning	-	6
control	7	-
dictator, ship	17	27
force	6	-
power	9	-
strong	-	26
strength	-	15
political	7	9

COLONIZATION, DOMINATION	-	99
colonization	-	25
Zionism	-	10
domination	-	14
overpowering	-	10
vanquishing	-	14
aggression/ transgression	-	26

RIGHTS, JUSTICE	9	95
rights	-	51
freedom	9	-
no equality	-	10
justice	-	21
Lack of justice	-	13

RUSSIA, PALESTINE, ISRAEL	31	48
Russia	20	-
China	6	-
Cuba	5	-
US	-	10
Palestine	-	17
Israel	-	21

WAR, KILLING, CRUELTY	34	122
war	10	12
fight	6	-
revolution	-	13
terrorism	-	9
wrestling	-	6
killing	-	21
death	-	14
take by violence	-	8
savagery	-	9
cruelty	-	21
hurt	8	-
excessive	-	9
hunger	10	-



Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>US, DEMOCRACY</b>	130	32
US, America	84	-
country	14	10
democracy	32	22
<b>LIBERTY, LIBERATION</b>	80	54
Independent, ce	13	-
free	20	-
liberty	47	-
liberation	-	30
departing	-	24
<b>SLAVERY, JAIL</b>	53	55
jail	8	-
bondage	9	-
oppression	6	-
slavery	30	14
prison	-	9
restrained	-	9
nonexistent	-	23
<b>WAR, REVOLUTION</b>	44	8
war	-	8
revolution	8	-
rider	6	-
movement	8	-
faight, er	16	-
death	6	-
<b>BELL, FLAG</b>	29	-
ideal	9	-
bell	5	-
flag	10	-
wind	5	-
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	17	49
duty	-	13
politics	-	12
education	-	6
racism	-	6
necessary	5	-
word	-	6
changes	-	6
at last	6	-
forever	6	-

## FREEDOM

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
U.S., Democracy	21	4
Liberty, Liberation	13	8
Slavery, Jail	8	8
War, Revolution	7	1
Bell, Flag	5	-
Rights, Justice, Equality, Religion	20	24
People, Women, Individual	6	18
Press, Speech, Opinion	9	15
Love, Happiness, Peace	7	9
Work, Production	2	6
Miscellaneous	3	7
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>628</b>	<b>710</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>RIGHTS, JUSTICE, EQUALITY, RELIGION</b>	128	169
constitution	12	-
Bill of Rights	6	-
rights	35	74
justice	14	38
equality	-	37
religion	30	9
Islam, Moslem	-	11
human rights	8	-
choice	23	-
<b>PEOPLE, WOMEN, INDIVIDUAL</b>	35	126
society	-	9
people	-	15
man	-	19
humanity	-	8
women	-	20
individual	8	10
personal	6	-
for all	10	-
life	11	37
living	-	8
<b>PRESS, SPEECH, OPINION</b>	58	109
press, of-	20	11
speech, of-	38	6
opinion	-	48
thought, of-	-	21
expression	-	14
mind	-	9
<b>LOVE, HAPPINESS, PEACE</b>	42	64
brotherhood	-	7
love	14	7
happy, ness	6	14
pride	-	6
enjoying	-	6
peace	22	-
security	-	7
rest	-	9
tranquility	-	8
<b>WORK, PRODUCTION</b>	12	44
work	-	20
production	-	10
mutual help	-	10
free enterprise	6	-
advancement	-	4
money	6	-

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>IRAN, ISRAEL, PEOPLE</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>86</b>
Iran,ians	74	-
Ireland	8	-
Irish	6	-
IRA	8	-
Italy	8	-
Israel	12	16
groups	10	-
gangs	-	25
Arab,s	12	-
Patty Hearst	6	-
communists	6	-
inhabitants	-	5
Jews	-	14
people	-	8
children	-	14
students	-	4
<b>WAR, FIGHTING, DESTRUCTION</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>72</b>
fight,ing	18	7
hitting	-	14
attack	8	9
guerrilla,s	11	-
militants	5	-
war	24	21
revolution	8	-
destruction	13	21
destroy	8	-
<b>HOSTAGES, VICTIMS</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>-</b>
hostages	51	-
victims	6	-
<b>BOMBING, GUNS</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>9</b>
bombs,ing	30	-
guns	19	9
weapons	6	-
<b>PLO, PALESTINIANS</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-</b>
PLO	43	-
Palestinians	7	-
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>49</b>
law	-	7
political	12	5
parties	-	8
Olympics	8	-
freedom	-	12
religion	-	9
intelligence	-	8

## TERRORISM

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Iran, Israel, People	23	10
War, Fighting, Destruction	14	7
Hostages, Victims	9	-
Bombing, Guns	8	1
PLO, Palestinians	8	-
Colonization, Oppression	1	26
Violence, Torture, Killing	19	24
Enemy, Crime	4	14
Fear, Hate, Lack of Security	10	12
Miscellaneous	3	5
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>657</b>	<b>974</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>COLONIZATION, OPPRESSION</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>256</b>
domination	-	9
colonization	-	29
Zionism	-	36
oppression	-	74
subduction	-	8
take by violence	-	9
taking freedom	-	5
slavery	-	9
restrained	-	12
prison,imprison	-	19
power	6	-
force	-	32
overpowering	-	14
<b>VIOLENCE, TORTURE, KILLING</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>237</b>
torture,ing	6	14
pain	6	-
violence	33	81
blood	8	-
murder	16	-
kill,ing,ers	33	105
death	24	11
harsh	-	26
<b>ENEMY, CRIME</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>138</b>
bad	18	-
evil	6	-
trouble	6	-
crime	-	44
criminal	-	10
enemy	-	32
corruption	-	7
contradicting	-	-
laws	-	9
stealing	-	11
hold up	-	8
bestliness	-	8
inhumanity	-	9
<b>FEAR, HATE LACK OF SECURITY</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>117</b>
fear	22	54
frightening,-away	8	11
horror	8	-
terror	6	-
scared	12	-
anxiety	-	17
hate	12	-
lack of security	-	15
lack of stability	-	12
weakness	-	8

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>WAR, FIGHTING</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>154</b>
war	96	53
fight	44	-
battle	11	-
ying with	-	12
weapons	-	25
defend	8	-
conflict,ing	6	16
rival,ry	-	13
attack	6	-
shoot	6	-
dispute	-	35
Army	5	-
watch	5	-

**HATRED, JEALOUSY, FEAR** 166 110

hate,d,ful	88	68
dislike	17	-
distrust	10	-
jealous,y	10	-
fear,ful	18	-
terror	-	15
despise	6	-
mistrust	5	-
anger	6	-
revenge	6	-
spite	-	17
coward	-	4
lack of pity	-	6

**FRIEND, ALLY** 82 9

friend	70	9
ally,ance	12	-

**BAD, EVIL** 86 38

bad	20	23
wrong	7	-
evil	12	-
against	16	-
corruption	-	9
hostile	8	-
danger,ous	12	-
savage, beastly	-	6
unfriendly	5	-

**NATIONS, RUSSIA, IRAN** 81 75

Russia, USSR	56	13
Iran,ians	25	-
US Americans	-	33
land	-	23
Palestine	-	6

**FOE, TRAITOR** 63 60

foe	30	-
bad guys	8	-
opponent	12	-
opposition	13	-
traitor	-	24
betrayal	-	20
violator	-	16

ENEMY

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
War, Fighting	24	15
Hatred, Fear, Jealousy	21	11
Friend, Ally	10	1
Bad, Evil	10	4
Nations, Russia, Iran	10	7
Foe, Traitor	8	6
Oppression, Colonization	2	18
Killing, Destruction	9	13
Israel	-	10
Sickness, Instability, Dislocation	1	8
Miscellaneous	5	8
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>788</b>	<b>1010</b>

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>OPPRESSION, COLONIZATION</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>177</b>
subduing	-	6
dominating	-	17
power	5	-
strength	-	6
oppression	8	43
colonizer	-	14
colonization	-	23
imperialism	-	8
holding freedom	-	5
violating freedom	-	4
overpowering	-	15
prisons	-	8
stealing	-	12
Zionism	-	16

**KILLING, DESTRUCTION** 71 135

killing,er	31	74
death	8	6
destroy,tion	11	16
torturing	-	4
murder	8	-
violence	-	-
ruin,ing	-	-
terrorism	-	10
violation	-	19
harmful	7	-

**ISRAEL** - 99

Israel	-	99
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**SICKNESS, INSTABILITY, DISLOCATION** 7 76

problems	-	4
sickness	-	15
hunger	-	6
poverty	7	-
unemployment	-	5
lack of stability	-	9
lack of security	-	6
ignorance	-	7
backwardness	-	8
homeless	-	12
unrest	-	4

**MISCELLANEOUS** 38 77

communism,t	15	-
news	-	22
animal	-	6
Cheryl	6	-
Sharon	5	-
myself	6	-
unknown	6	-
rights	-	5
interests	-	9
pride	-	5
peace	-	5
against Islams	-	4
atheism	-	9
split	-	6
party-spirited	-	6

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>DEATH, KILLING</b>	186	177
death, dead	85	91
die	6	-
kill,ing	48	61
pain	12	-
blood,-shed	24	19
death of humanity	-	6
hurt	5	-
murder	6	-

WEAPONS, NUCLEAR BOMBS	US	J
<b>WEAPONS, NUCLEAR BOMBS</b>	133	118
weapons	20	47
guns	26	-
bombs	22	17
nuclear	31	-
tanks	12	10
nuclear weapon	6	-
planes	6	17
strength	-	17
power,-play	10	-
atomic weapons	-	4
cannons	-	6

NATIONS, PEOPLE	US	J
<b>NATIONS, PEOPLE</b>	124	70
Vietnam	32	-
US, America	6	8
Korean	10	-
Israel	-	30
Palestine	-	8
Russia, USSR	18	4
world	11	-
government	7	-
men	11	-
souls	-	8
Iran	6	-
Arabs	6	-
children	6	-
Carter	6	-
earth	5	-
internat'l world	-	12

PEACE, FREEDOM	US	J
<b>PEACE, FREEDOM</b>	113	22
peace	113	-
free'om	-	12
liberation	-	10

HATE, ENEMY	US	J
<b>HATE, ENEMY</b>	59	28
hate,red	47	-
enemy, emity	12	28

WORLD WAR, CIVIL WAR	US	J
<b>WORLD WAR, CIVIL WAR</b>	62	-
WW I	11	-
WW II	18	-
WW III	6	-
revolution	9	-
Civil war	10	-
cold	8	-

SOLDIERS, ARMY	US	J
<b>SOLDIERS, ARMY</b>	56	8
soldiers	14	8
Army	22	-
draft	15	-
MASH	5	-

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>BAD, STUPID</b>	50	-
bad	12	-
evil	9	-
wrong	6	-
stupid	12	-
needless	6	-
senseless	5	-

WAR  
PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY  
U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Death, Killing	19	16
Weapons, Nuclear Bombs	13	11
Nations, People	12	6
Peace, Freedom	11	2
Hate, Enemy	6	2
World Wars, Civil War	6	-
Soldiers, Army	6	1
Bad, Stupid	5	-
Terror, Hunger, Displacement	2	19
Fighting, Battle	10	14
Destruction, Ruin	7	12
Domination, Oppression	-	8
Miscellaneous	2	8
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>993</b>	<b>1100</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>TERROR, HUNGER, DISPLACEMENT</b>	23	211
lack stability	-	4
defeat	-	8
sickness,es	-	12
loss	5	7
hunger	-	33
famine	6	-
fear	6	-
terror	-	49
sadness	6	-
inhumanity	-	10
lack of security	-	6
social problems	-	6
ignorance	-	16
crime	-	6
backwardness	-	19
homeless	-	32
poverty	-	3

FIGHTING, BATTLE	US	J
<b>FIGHTING, BATTLE</b>	98	153
fighting	49	37
battle	8	-
conflict	8	-
terrorism	-	5
rivalry	-	17
aggression	-	9
violence	24	6
games	9	-
wrestling	-	27
dispute	-	46
persecution	-	6

DESTRUCTION, RUIN	US	J
<b>DESTRUCTION, RUIN</b>	66	139
destruction	48	110
ruin	-	29
hell	11	-
end	7	-

DOMINATION, OPPRESSION	US	J
<b>DOMINATION, OPPRESSION</b>	-	123
overpowering	-	9
victory	-	12
domination	-	20
weakness	-	6
colonization	-	20
interests	-	17
spreading	-	7
continuation	-	6

MISCELLANEOUS	US	J
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	23	48
movies	6	-
animals	-	8
help	-	11
Islam	-	12
politics	12	3
belief	-	8
pride	-	6
economics	5	-

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>GUNS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS</b>		
	143	-
guns	43	-
weapons,ry	35	-
bombs	14	-
missile	12	-
nuclear	22	-
power	6	-
arms race	11	-

<b>TREATY, POLITICS, SALT</b>		
	124	53
leader	-	8
SALT, I, II, III	44	-
conference	5	-
talks	19	-
treaty	24	9
agreement	14	9
negotiate, idn	5	-
politics	13	18
interests	-	9

<b>WAR, MILITARY</b>		
	111	90
war, world-	63	33
dangerous	8	-
fighting	12	3
attack	-	4
Army	8	7
military	14	-
defense	6	-
surrendering	-	8
dispute	-	6
corruption	-	6
oppression	-	6
terror	-	12
colonization	-	5

<b>US, RUSSIA</b>		
	80	37
countries	6	-
US	24	7
Russia	33	-
USSR	11	12
world	6	-
great countries	-	9
Arabs	-	9

<b>IMPOSSIBLE, NOT APPLIED</b>		
	34	6
unrealistic	9	-
impossible	17	-
never	8	-
not applied	-	6

<b>GOOD, NEEDED</b>		
	33	21
good	13	12
needed	11	-
necessary	9	9

DISARMAMENT

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Guns, Nuclear Weapons	22	-
Treaty, Politics, SALT	19	6
War, Military	17	11
U.S., Russia	12	4
Impossible, Not Applied	5	1
Good, Needed	5	2
Peace, Security	14	38
End War, Limit Arms	4	10
Love, Happiness, Comfort	1	12
Freedom, Justice, Equality	-	11
Miscellaneous	2	4
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>659</b>	<b>823</b>

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>PEACE, SECURITY</b>		
	90	312
quietude	-	10
tranquility	-	42
peace	80	187
safety	10	54
security	-	6
stability	-	13

<b>END WAR, LIMIT ARMS</b>		
	29	85
end war, no war	5	53
no fighting	-	9
no dispute	-	7
take away	9	-
removal	15	-
limitation of arms	-	10
non ownership of weapons	-	6

<b>LOVE, HAPPINESS, COMFORT</b>		
	5	101
reconciliation	-	8
cooperation	-	9
love	-	29
trust	5	-
mutual	-	-
understanding	-	13
better life	-	5
no terror	-	6
happiness	-	8
comfort, ease	-	-
in life	-	10
flourishing	-	13

<b>FREEDOM, JUSTICE, EQUALITY</b>		
	-	89
freedom	-	49
justice	-	23
equality	-	17

<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>		
	10	29
now	10	-
if this happens	-	7
social	-	3
technology	-	3
industrial	-	-
revival	-	7
weakness	-	9

- 20

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Main Components and Responses US J

U.S., RUSSIA	197	133
US, America	65	57
Russia	82	43
Soviet Union	5	-
USSR	20	-
US/USSR	12	-
China	7	-
Iran	6	-
great powers	-	12
country	-	6
Israel	-	6
people	-	9

WEAPONS, POWER	134	70
weapons	38	31
bombs	20	11
missiles	12	-
guns	29	-
tanks	6	-
modern weapons	-	6
armament	6	-
planes	-	8
power	23	-
strength	-	14

SALT, NEGOTIATIONS	78	17
SALT	26	-
negotiations	6	-
disarmament	6	-
peace	7	8
politics	22	9
treaties	5	-
necessary	6	-

NUCLEAR, ATOMIC WEAPONS	72	20
nuclear	36	-
nuclear weapons	12	-
nukes	10	-
nuclear war	6	-
atomic, -weapons	-	10
atom bombs	8	10

BAD, FOOLISH	51	63
bad	6	-
waste,ful	6	-
unnecessary	7	-
silly	8	-
ridiculous	6	-
foolish	10	-
inhumanity	-	9
hate	-	4
problems	8	-
criminal	-	8
against society	-	4
backwardness	-	12
against Islam	-	6
against agreement	-	3
corruption	-	7
anarchy	-	10

ARMS RACE

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
U.S., Russia	25	15
Weapons, Power	17	8
SALT, Negotiations	10	2
Nuclear, Atomic Weapons	9	2
Bad, Foolish	6	7
War, Fighting	17	26
Death, Destruction	11	19
Domination, Oppression	-	12
Development, Technology	-	6
Miscellaneous	3	3
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>778</b>	<b>900</b>

Main Components and Responses US J

WAR, FIGHTING	136	236
war, world-warfare	70	56
battle	10	-
competition	8	-
fight,ing	15	57
run,ing	-	26
wrestling	6	-
Army	-	18
military	9	7
defense	12	-
dispute	6	-
enemy,-ty	-	36
military advancement	-	28

DEATH, DESTRUCTION	89	171
death	18	28
destruction	32	56
danger,ous	21	-
kill,ing	6	27
suicide,1	6	-
blood	-	16
anxiety	-	7
terror	-	21
scary	6	-
against security	-	6
ruin,ing	-	10

DOMINATION, OPPRESSION	-	109
domination	-	22
colonization	-	12
oppression	-	22
dictatorship	-	14
overpowering	-	9
Zionist	-	8
wandering	-	16
emigration	-	6

DEVELOPMENT, TECHNOLOGY	-	52
development, advancement	-	22
technology	-	13
advancement	-	8
scientific advancement	-	4
space	-	5

MISCELLANEOUS	21	29
money	16	18
freedom	-	5
win,ing	5	-
poverty	-	6

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>DESTRUCTION, END</b>	156	205
destruction	72	148
destroy	17	-
annihilation	8	-
end-of world	19	-
holocaust	8	-
destruction of societies	-	7
destruction of world	-	13
dangerous ruin	32	-
	-	37
<b>TERROR, INSTABILITY</b>	6	108
threatening	-	8
anxiety	-	6
terror	-	40
fear	6	-
no security	-	14
no stability	-	6
homeless	-	12
hunger	-	5
disfiguration	-	17
<b>DEATH, KILLING</b>	72	110
death	48	57
kill.ing	10	25
deadly	14	-
kill.ing humanity	-	10
ending humanity blood	-	11
	-	7
<b>DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN INVENTIONS</b>	-	91
development	-	17
scientific devel.	-	22
technology	-	10
discovery	-	11
advancement	-	25
satellites	-	6
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	23	20
problems	6	4
accident	5	-
3 mile Island	6	-
proliferation	6	-
knowledge	-	4
thinking mind	-	4
colonization	-	8

**NUCLEAR WEAPONS**  
PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY  
U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Bombs, Missiles	16	8
U.S., Russia, Japan	15	13
War, Fighting	13	13
Radiation	8	3
Power, Domination	6	4
SALT, Disarmament	5	1
Bad, Unnecessary	4	3
Destruction, End	19	21
Terror, Instability	1	11
Death, Killing	9	11
Development, Human Inventions	-	9
Miscellaneous	3	2
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>800</b>	<b>958</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>BOMBS, MISSILES</b>	132	76
Bombs,ing	68	22
atom bomb	19	7
war heads	7	-
missiles	32	-
arms race	-	13
guns	6	-
weapons, destructive	-	23
atomic weapons	-	11
<b>US, RUSSIA, JAPAN</b>	120	127
U.S.	22	48
China	9	-
Russia, Sov. U.	53	-
USSR	10	36
Japan	10	-
Hiroshima	16	4
Communist countries	-	11
great powers	-	10
Europe	-	4
humanity	-	14
<b>WAR, FIGHTING</b>	109	122
war	78	65
WW III	10	-
fighting	10	25
military	5	-
attack	6	-
terrorism	-	15
rivalry	-	9
against peace	-	8
<b>RADIATION</b>	65	27
radiation	22	-
atomic	12	27
plutonium	7	-
fall out	12	-
radioactive	6	-
explosion	6	-
<b>POWER, DOMINATION</b>	46	37
power,ful	46	-
energy	-	16
force	-	5
domination	-	16
<b>SALT, DISARMAMENT</b>	39	7
SALT I, II	20	-
detente	8	-
disarmament	11	-
peace	-	7
<b>BAD, UNNECESSARY</b>	32	28
bad	14	-
evil	7	-
ignorance	-	6
unnecessary	11	-
spite	-	6
enemy,enemy	-	10
hate	-	6

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>TALKS, TREATY</b>	290	54
talks	38	-
negotiations	8	-
SALT I	16	-
SALT III	8	-
SALT 4,5,100...	18	-
peace talks,	-	-
treaty	12	-
communication	6	-
cooperation	-	11
agreement	28	12
pact	5	-
politics	34	-
treaty	84	-
mutual	-	-
understanding	-	8
disarmament	12	-
limitations	21	-
limiting arms race	-	12
determination	-	11

NATIONS: US,		
<b>RUSSIA</b>	160	91
US, America	44	27
Russia, USSR	82	27
Europe	5	-
Iran	6	-
countries	-	8
nations	6	-
government	10	-
world	7	-
great countries	-	12
developed	-	7
countries	-	-
developing	-	10
countries	-	-

ARMS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS		
<b>WEAPONS</b>	102	51
nuclear	10	-
nuclear arms,	-	-
weapons	14	-
arms	14	-
armaments	5	-
arms race	13	-
arms limitations	8	-
bombs, nuclear-	5	6
weapons,	-	-
developed-	8	16
guns	6	-
missiles	14	-
atom	-	20
power,ful	6	-
energy	-	9

LEADERS:		
<b>CARTER, BREZHNEV</b>	79	-
Carter	43	-
Nixon	8	-
Kissinger	10	-
Congress	6	-
Breschnev	12	-

## SALT II

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Talks, Treaty	40	8
Nations: U.S., Russia	22	12
Arms, Nuclear Weapons	14	8
Leaders: Carter, Brezhnev	11	-
Useless, Unsuccessful	5	1
Peace, Safety	3	48
Development, Production	-	8
War, Destruction	2	8
Miscellaneous	4	6
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>733</b>	<b>673</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>PEACE, SAFETY</b>	24	327
freedom	-	12
equality	-	10
justice	-	12
peace	8	114
detente	16	-
love	-	12
stability	-	15
tranquility	-	28
safety	-	61
conservation of	-	-
life	-	15
happiness	-	6
no fighting	-	10
stopping world	-	-
disputes	-	7
stop fighting	-	6
lack of terror	-	19
<b>DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION</b>	-	51
development	-	17
flourishment	-	13
production	-	9
construction	-	6
industry	-	6
<b>WAR, DESTRUCTION</b>	12	51
war,-fare	12	13
destruction	-	15
enemy,ty	-	8
terror	-	15
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	28	42
thinking mind	-	5
dirty	-	11
morals	-	5
necessary	-	15
interests	-	6
help,ful	8	-
pepper-1-11	20	-
<b>USELESS, UNSUCCESSFUL</b>	37	6
failure	9	-
farce	6	-
useless	11	-
inequitable	6	-
never,-ending	5	-
will not be	-	-
applied completely-	-	6



Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>US, RUSSIA</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>38</b>
US	30	-
USSR	12	-
Russia	60	-
Soviet,-Union	12	-
China	6	-
US/USSR	5	-
Europe	11	-
Israel	-	9
nations	7	-
countries	7	6
French	14	-
world	5	-
civilization	-	7
culture	-	7
Arabs	-	9
government	11	-
<b>TALKS, NEGOTIATIONS</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>56</b>
talks	16	6
communication	8	-
negotiations	8	-
SALT	12	-
NATO	7	-
politics,-al	24	-
treaty	6	-
exchange	-	11
internat'l	-	-
relations	-	20
dealing,ease in-	-	12
cutting relations	-	7
<b>COLD WAR, WEAPONS</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>74</b>
cold war	22	-
war	17	11
arms	6	-
military	7	-
nuclear,-war	11	-
weapons	6	-
fear	5	-
provocation	-	7
dispute	-	19
lack of peace	-	9
armament race	-	9
enemy	-	9
bad relations	-	10
<b>LEADERS</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>-</b>
Carter	10	-
Nixon	19	-
Kissinger	19	-
Breschnev	10	-

## DETENTE

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
U.S., Russia	32	5
Talks, Negotiations	14	8
Cold War, Weapons	13	10
Leaders	10	-
Cooperation, Understanding	9	25
Peace, Security	13	18
Openness, Freedom	-	12
Economy, Development	-	12
Problems, Failure	3	5
Miscellaneous	4	4
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>558</b>	<b>722</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>COOPERATION</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>183</b>
cooperation	6	61
good relations	-	20
understanding,mvt.	16	31
agree,ment	18	13
friend,ship	9	-
love	-	22
lack of	-	-
selfishness	-	9
help	-	9
unity, world	-	5
end of dispute	-	13
<b>PEACE, SECURITY</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>134</b>
peace	72	88
tranquility	-	11
order	-	7
security	-	28
<b>OPENNESS, FREEDOM</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>90</b>
openness	-	38
freedom	-	10
equality	-	5
justice	-	17
good	-	20
<b>ECONOMY, DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>87</b>
economy	-	8
interests	-	30
production	-	6
advancement,	-	-
development	-	15
industrial revival	-	5
exportation	-	9
flourishing	-	14
<b>PROBLEMS, FAILURE</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>34</b>
problems	-	9
failure	9	-
useless	5	-
farce	5	-
lying	-	11
difference	-	14
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>26</b>
meaning	7	-
word	6	-
unknown	12	-
reaching reality	-	2
result	-	10
goal	-	9
domination	-	5

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Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>GROWTH, SPREAD</b>	103	153
grow, th	17	-
multiply	14	-
increase	10	-
spread, ing	17	120
many	10	-
distribution	-	12
expand, sion	8	-
proliferate	9	-
dividing	-	7
combining	-	14
abundant	6	-
infiltrate	6	-
too many	6	-
<b>WEAPONS, NUCLEAR</b>	90	18
weapons, ry	12	18
nuclear, -weapons	54	-
arms	24	-
<b>SEX, REPRODUCTION</b>	43	-
sex	6	-
reproduce, tion	6	-
birth	5	-
birth control	6	-
rabbits	14	-
life	6	-
<b>WHAT, UNKNOWN</b>	36	-
word	10	-
what	14	-
dictionary	6	-
unknown	6	-
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	-	34
bad morals	-	11
arriving	-	8
bread	-	15

## PROLIFERATION

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Growth, Spread	31	25
Weapons, Nuclear	27	3
Sex, Reproduction	13	14
What, Unknown	11	-
War, Domination	4	14
Science, Knowledge	5	14
Politics, International Relations	4	13
Society, Country	-	11
Freedom, Security, Peace	2	10
Sickness, Hunger	2	5
Miscellaneous	-	6
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>331</b>	<b>613</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>WAR, DOMINATION</b>	14	84
war	6	11
destroy, ction	8	-
domination	-	22
colonization	-	25
military force	-	6
anarchy	-	12
betrayal	-	8
<b>SCIENCE, KNOWLEDGE</b>	16	84
science	-	28
advancement	-	21
education	-	11
knowledge	-	16
beliefs	-	8
communism	10	-
ideas	6	-
<b>POLITICS, INTERNAT'L RELATIONS</b>	15	82
politics, -power	-	17
talk, ing	8	-
treaty	7	18
propaganda	-	8
relations	-	12
interests	-	9
goals	-	8
settling, ment	-	10
<b>SOCIETY, COUNTRY</b>	-	68
society	-	27
culture	-	12
inhabitants	-	13
environment	-	5
country, advanced-	-	11
<b>FREEDOM, SECURITY, PEACE</b>	6	61
freedom	-	15
security	-	13
love	-	6
peace	-	19
Islam	-	8
good	6	-
<b>SICKNESS, HUNGER</b>	8	29
sickness	-	25
poverty	-	4
overpopulation	8	-

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>RECESSION, DEPRESSION</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>10</b>
depression	30	-
inflation	64	10
recession	62	-
balance	7	-
tight	8	-
high	6	-
sound	6	-

<b>MONEY, WEALTH</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>116</b>
capital	-	5
money	100	27
budget	18	-
prices	7	-
taxes	10	-
thrift	5	-
gold	5	-
save	5	-
wealth	-	23
richness	5	35
poverty	-	26

<b>BAD, POOR, FAILING</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>16</b>
bad	23	-
downhill	7	-
problems	12	-
unemployment	10	-
falling	6	-
falling	5	-
poor	24	-
complex	5	-
tumbling down	-	10
exploitation	-	6

<b>COUNTRIES, GOV'T</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>62</b>
country	5	9
civilization	-	14
developing countries	-	8
Europe	-	6
advanced countries	-	6
U.S.	5	-
Carter	18	-
government	18	-
policy	6	-
politics	19	19
system	11	-

<b>TRADE, CONSUMPTION</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>78</b>
economics	15	-
supply	8	-
demand	8	5
exchange	5	14
trade	-	27
buying	-	3
consumption	-	29
stock market	6	-
Wall Street	8	-
graphs	5	-
GNP	8	-

ECONOMY

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Recession, Depression	28	1
Money, Wealth	23	16
Bad, Poor, Failing	14	2
Countries, Government	12	8
Trade, Consumption	10	10
Development, Advancement	2	22
Agriculture, Resources	1	13
Business, Industry	6	11
Export, Import	2	9
Social Goals, Necessities	-	5
Miscellaneous	3	2
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>663</b>	<b>744</b>

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>DEVELOPMENT, ADVANCEMENT</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>161</b>
advancement	-	32
development, ing	-	30
building	-	7
growth	5	-
spreading	-	11
sufficiency	-	22
flourishing	-	21
organizing	-	10
help, mutual-	5	16
counseling	-	12

<b>AGRICULTURE, RESOURCES</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>99</b>
agriculture, l	-	46
resources	-	28
oil	8	25

<b>BUSINESS, INDUSTRY</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>84</b>
business	22	-
industry	-	24
production	-	32
factories	-	17
jobs	12	-
workers	-	11
employment	5	-

<b>EXPORT, IMPORT</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>64</b>
exports	7	15
exportation	-	19
imports	6	9
importation	-	21

<b>SOCIAL GOALS, NECESSITIES</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>35</b>
necessary	-	8
justice	-	5
freedom	-	7
security	-	5
living	-	10

<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>19</b>
future	-	8
ours	6	-
car	6	-
news	6	-
arms	-	5
disease	-	6

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>PEOPLE, BLACKS, WOMEN</b>	110	67
Blacks	16	-
children	9	-
men	6	6
minorities	11	-
people	12	10
slaves, ry	6	14
women	50	-
humankind	-	10
mind	-	6
Arabs	-	9
Moslems	-	6
classes	-	6
<b>WRONG, UNFAIR, DESTRUCTIVE</b>	105	30
wrong	14	-
evil	6	-
bad	9	-
abuse	16	-
cheat	5	-
stealing	-	12
crime	9	-
destroy	5	-
harm	6	-
hurt	8	-
misuse	9	-
unfair	9	-
advantage	9	-
hate	-	14
inhumanity	-	4
<b>SEX</b>	37	-
sexual	31	-
pornography	6	-
<b>POOR, IGNORANT</b>	20	24
poor	11	-
lack of food	-	9
ignorant, ce	9	5
weakness	-	10
<b>GOVERNMENT, SYSTEMS</b>	19	21
capitalism	6	-
communism	8	-
imperialism	5	-
government	-	14
politics	-	7

## EXPLOITATION

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
People, Blacks, Women	26	9
Wrong, Unfair, Destructive	25	4
Sex	9	-
Poor, Ignorant	5	3
Government, Systems	4	3
Oppression, Domination	9	21
Resources, Wealth	8	19
Advancement, Work, Production	-	14
Countries, U.S., Israel	9	12
Interests, Goal	-	8
Miscellaneous	4	6
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>417</b>	<b>717</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>OPPRESSION, DOMINATION</b>	37	150
oppression	6	49
exploitation	-	14
colonization	-	10
rights stifled	-	9
taking	-	15
used, using	19	-
domination	-	24
control	6	-
power	6	-
strength	-	29
<b>RESOURCES, WEALTH</b>	32	135
resources	8	46
natural resources	5	-
oil	7	8
minerals	-	10
land	-	6
water	-	6
Sahara	-	12
gold	-	5
money	12	9
riches	-	12
profits	-	6
currency	-	4
expensiveness	-	11
<b>ADVANCEMENT, WORK, PRODUCTION</b>	-	98
advancement	-	17
monopoly	-	21
workers	-	28
production	-	11
technology	-	9
science	-	6
building	-	6
<b>COUNTRIES, U.S., ISRAEL</b>	39	90
country, s	5	30
foreign	5	-
U S	29	29
great powers	-	10
Israel	-	21
<b>INTERESTS, GOAL</b>	-	55
interests	-	20
goal	-	18
egocentricity	-	17
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	18	47
war	-	19
show	6	-
time	-	6
dental	-	8
media	5	-
TV	7	-
freedom	-	7
help	-	7

Main Components and Responses		
	US	J
<b>3RD WORLD COUNTRIES</b>		
	150	112
nations	12	-
countries	43	-
Africa, -countries	17	24
Asia, -countries	9	11
India	18	7
3rd world, -countries	40	36
world backward countries	5	-
people lots of inhabitants	6	-
	-	11
	23	-
<b>POVERTY</b>		
	112	41
poverty	60	41
poor	52	-
<b>BODY, IMMATURE, SMALL</b>		
	96	-
body	5	-
baby	6	-
brain	5	-
breasts	13	-
bust	10	-
children	8	-
immature	8	-
premature	5	-
skinny	9	-
small	27	-
<b>HUNGER, DISEASE</b>		
	45	34
sickness	11	-
disease	9	7
hunger	17	16
starvation	8	-
sleeping	-	11
<b>RESOURCES, LAND, OIL</b>		
	34	19
resources	9	-
agriculture, rural	9	-
land	10	-
oil	6	-
oil	-	8
lack of resources	-	11

## UNDERDEVELOPMENT

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Countries, 3rd World	28	15
Poverty	21	6
Body, Immature, Small	18	-
Hunger, Disease	8	4
Resources, Land, Oil	6	2
Arab Countries, Middle East	-	26
Technology, Economy	2	14
Backwardness, Ignorance	8	13
Colonization, Oppression	-	8
Low Thinking, No Principles	-	6
Miscellaneous	7	5
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>530</b>	<b>740</b>

Main Components and Responses		
	US	J
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>		
	38	35
overdevelopment	12	-
speech	-	6
education	-	7
housing	6	-
government	5	-
politics	-	8
help	9	14
welfare	6	-

Main Components and Responses		
	US	J
<b>ARAB COUNTRIES, MIDDLE EAST</b>		
	-	192
Arabs, -countries	-	81
Arab countries	-	46
Jordan	-	49
Middle East	-	16

TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMY		
	12	108
technology	6	13
industries	-	18
industrial backwardness	-	15
worker	-	5
technology backwardness	-	8
science	-	8
production	-	6
planning	-	12
unemployment	-	8
not developed economically	-	9
imported	-	6
money	6	-

BACKWARDNESS, IGNORANCE		
	43	98
lacking	7	-
waste	5	-
backwardness	-	36
slow, backward	5	13
weak	7	21
counting on others	-	6
reactionary	-	6
ignorance	6	16
illiteracy,	13	-

COLONIZATION, OPPRESSION		
	-	60
colonization	-	27
colonized	-	12
countries	-	8
oppression	-	7
exploitation	-	6
overpowering	-	6

LOW THINKING, NO PRINCIPLES		
	-	41
cultural	-	11
backwardness	-	5
low thinking	-	9
undeveloped	-	6
social level	-	5
laziness	-	5
no principles	-	5
corruption	-	5

Main Components and Responses.	US	J
<b>MONEY, FOOD</b>	156	138
financial aid	-	6
money	83	20
billions	7	-
expensive	6	-
loan	-	7
rich	-	15
from rich	-	6
food	40	23
wheat	5	6
clothes	-	9
medicine	10	-
tools	-	11
oil	5	12
cars	-	7
experts	-	16
<b>HELP, ASSIST</b>	118	36
help,ful,ing	96	19
assist,ance	11	-
care	5	-
ally	6	-
mutual help	-	17
<b>U.S. GOV'T, POLITICS</b>	85	74
U.S.	37	65
Carter	10	-
Congress	6	-
government	6	-
policy	7	-
politics	11	9
taxes	8	-
<b>MILITARY, WAR</b>	41	25
military	13	-
arms	7	15
weapons	10	-
war	11	10
<b>NEEDED, GOOD</b>	28	-
needed	10	-
necessary	11	-
good	7	-
<b>TOO MUCH, NO</b>	23	-
too much	7	-
unappreciated	5	-
no	5	-
waste	6	-

## FOREIGN AID

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Money, Food	28	22
Help, Assist	22	6
U.S. Government, Politics	16	12
Military, War	8	4
Needed, Good	5	-
Too Much, No	4	-
Countries, Great and Developing	12	20
Domination, Colonization	-	15
Needy, Poor	5	12
Development, Interests	-	8
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>546</b>	<b>613</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>COUNTRIES, GREAT AND DEVELOPING</b>	67	126
Africa	7	-
Cambodia	13	-
Cubans	6	-
India	5	-
Iran	5	-
Israel	10	9
Russia, USSR	6	22
3rd world countries	7	-
great countries	8	17
developing countries	-	9
Saudi Arabia	-	28
Palestine	-	25
gulf countries	-	5
<b>DOMINATION, COLONIZATION</b>	-	92
domination	-	18
ownership	-	6
colonization	-	27
slavery	-	17
exploitation	-	12
colonizers' 1st step	-	12
<b>NEEDY, POOR</b>	28	72
needs	-	11
poor	9	-
poverty	9	32
starvation	5	-
hunger	5	15
overpopulation	-	7
refugees	-	7
<b>DEVELOPMENT, INTERESTS</b>	-	50
interest	-	29
development workers	-	15
	-	6

Main Components  
and Responses US J

POVERTY, UNEMPLOYMENT, WELFARE		
poverty	119	125
poor,ness	14	-
money	23	-
rich	5	-
economy,ic	10	-
inflation	11	-
recession	6	-
necessity	-	9
jobs	10	-
unemployment	16	15
putting wrong man	-	-
in wrong place	-	6
begging	-	7
gambling	-	10
transportation	-	6
housing	-	10
social work	6	-
welfare	18	-
HEALTH, DISEASE, HUNGER		
health	88	20
disease	6	-
VD	38	-
hunger	26	-
malnutrition	18	14
	-	6
DRUGS, ALCOHOL, CIGARETTES		
alcoholism	78	90
drinking	24	14
drugs	9	-
smoking	31	8
cigarettes	-	68
pollution	14	-
SOCIETY, CLASS, RACE		
society	80	22
classes	18	-
people	-	16
blacks	15	-
race,ism	9	-
women	30	-
friends	-	6
	8	-
SEX, OVERPOPULATION		
sexual	57	36
abortion	24	15
rape	7	-
overpopulation	8	-
running after	8	16
girls	-	5
prostitution	10	-

## SOCIAL PROBLEMS

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Poverty, Unemployment, Welfare	16	13
Health, Disease, Hunger	12	2
Drugs, Alcohol, Cigarettes	11	9
Society, Class, Race	11	2
Sex, Overpopulation	8	4
City, Country, World	7	-
Inequality, Oppression	6	4
Marriage, Divorce	3	20
Low Morals, Bad Customs	3	16
Crime, Theft	7	10
War, Violence, Killing	5	7
Education, Schooling	4	6
Miscellaneous	7	7
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>726</b>	<b>973</b>

CITY, COUNTRY, WORLD		
city,s	54	-
slums	8	-
ghetto	10	-
world	12	-
everywhere	16	-
	8	-
INEQUALITY, OPPRESSION		
equality	41	37
unequal,ty	8	-
discrimination	6	-
freedom,lack of	13	-
slavery	-	9
oppression	-	6
influence	-	12
prejudice	-	10
	14	-

MISCELLANEOUS		
introspection	50	63
communication	-	8
sociology	5	-
of individuals	16	-
immigration	-	16
government	-	4
politics	6	-
overcoming	6	-
cure,able	8	8
many	8	-
a lot	9	-
connections	-	5
rule	-	8
	-	5

Main Components and Responses US J		
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE		
marriage	19	197
unstability of	-	46
family	-	15
problems in family	-	10
adultery	-	20
divorce	-	67
dowry	-	5
family	6	-
children	5	9
women going out	-	-
of home	-	6
love	8	9
kindness	-	10
LOW MORALS, BAD CUSTOMS		
morals,ty	20	160
low morals	8	-
bad morals	-	23
lack of	-	15
responsibility	-	8
bad customs	-	26
lying	-	14
hate,red	6	11
envy	-	13
against religion	-	11
country falling	-	-
apart	-	33
ills	6	-
tumbling down	-	6
CRIME, THEFT		
crime	54	99
deviation	54	23
offense	-	20
theft	-	35
ill doing	-	12
WAR, VIOLENCE, KILLING		
war	39	68
violence	10	6
riots	8	-
conflict	7	-
attack	8	-
invasion	-	8
killing	-	11
suicide	-	26
wrestling	-	10
enemy	-	7
	6	-
EDUCATION, SCHOOLING		
schools,ing	27	56
education	14	9
ignorance	13	7
coeducation	-	12
mixing	-	16
lack of awareness	-	6
backwardness	-	6

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>COURTS, JUDGE, LAWYERS</b>	<b>236</b>	<b>30</b>
judicial	8	-
Court,s,-room	92	-
Supreme Court	27	-
judges	12	-
chief	5	-
lawyers	32	-
trials	14	-
defendant	5	-
criminal	12	-
police	10	-
of the peace	19	-
treatment,-of children	-	16
treating with justice	-	14
<b>INJUSTICE, CRIME</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>50</b>
injustice	12	14
crime	15	-
jail	11	-
prison	5	-
punishment	8	11
unreal	5	-
none	6	-
no justice	-	5
slavery	-	6
imaginary, nonexistent	-	14
<b>LAW</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>36</b>
law,s ful	114	27
constitution	6	-
legal	14	-
in introducing laws	-	9
<b>BALANCE, SCALES</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>-</b>
balance	6	-
even,ness	6	-
scales	5	-
blind,-fold	12	-

## JUSTICE

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Courts, Judge, Lawyers	30	3
Injustice, Crime	8	6
Law	17	4
Balance, Scales	4	-
Rights: Equality, Fairness, Freedom	30	37
Love, Brotherhood	1	12
Peace, Security	4	10
Nation, Government	4	9
God, Islam	1	7
People, Society	1	7
Advancement	-	4
Miscellaneous	-	2
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>782</b>	<b>878</b>

Main Components and Responses	US	J
<b>RIGHTS: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, FREEDOM</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>323</b>
rights	18	79
right	28	-
equality	55	139
fair,ness,-play	69	-
justice	-	15
freedom	30	56
liberty	17	-
good	7	7
truth	10	-
gives right to whoever has right	-	9
responsibility	-	11
necessary	-	7
<b>LOVE, BROTHERHOOD</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>101</b>
brotherhood	-	13
love	-	38
liked	-	5
honesty	5	-
firmness, resolution	-	6
working toward	-	9
mutual help	-	30
<b>PEACE, SECURITY</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>91</b>
peace	24	33
tranquility	-	17
order	5	7
security	-	28
quietude	-	6
<b>NATION, GOVERNMENT</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>77</b>
nation	-	8
government	12	-
department	14	-
democracy	6	6
betwn. governm/ government	-	55
UN	-	8
<b>GOD, ISLAM</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>60</b>
God,-fear	10	6
religion	-	9
Islam	-	45
<b>PEOPLE, SOCIETY</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>60</b>
all	6	-
people	5	-
humanity	-	9
society	-	29
classes	-	6
life,living	-	7
Palestine,ians	-	9
<b>ADVANCEMENT</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>34</b>
advancement	-	21
rising	-	7
production	-	6
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>16</b>
distributed land	-	6
strength	-	10



Main Components and Responses US J

<b>RIGHTS, JUSTICE, FREEDOM</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>297</b>
free, dom	30	65
fairness	29	-
justice	28	106
laws	15	17
ERA	50	-
right, s, human-constitution, al	47	79
principle	-	5
duty	-	25
<b>LOVE, SECURITY</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>115</b>
friendship	5	-
share, ing	11	-
brotherhood	-	8
love	-	31
security	-	27
contentment	-	6
mercy	-	6
peace	-	4
tranquility	-	8
mutual help	-	13
order	-	12
<b>MONEY, JOBS</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>80</b>
jobs	20	-
work	-	16
opportunity	7	6
workers	-	8
pay	6	-
employment	5	-
wealth	-	5
wealthy and poor	-	11
economic	6	-
development, advancement	-	23
industrial state	-	4
production	-	7
<b>RELIGION, ISLAM</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>76</b>
religion	9	6
God	-	6
morals	-	8
of Islam	-	56
<b>PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>53</b>
prejudice	6	-
discrimination	15	-
oppression	-	17
racism	-	24
cheating	-	6
nonexistent	-	6
<b>DEMOCRACY, SOCIALISM</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>44</b>
rule, govt-	-	7
vote, ng	6	-
democracy, tic	9	15
overcoming	-	6
authority	-	6
socialism	-	16

EQUALITY

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
People, Men and Women, Blacks	36	17
Equal, Same	12	1
Good, Ideal	7	1
Rights, Justice, Freedom	28	33
Love, Security	2	13
Money, Jobs	6	9
Religion, Islam	1	8
Prejudice, Discrimination	3	6
Democracy, Socialism	2	5
Miscellaneous	3	8
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>757</b>	<b>909</b>

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>PEOPLE, MEN AND WOMEN, BLACKS</b>	<b>274</b>	<b>158</b>
people	18	20
children	5	-
brother	5	-
blacks	45	-
everyone	6	-
men	24	-
women	90	23
men and women	5	56
whites	12	-
race, fal	30	-
minorities	12	-
sex, ua	22	-
classes	-	10
individuals	-	41
country men	-	8
<b>EQUAL, SAME</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>9</b>
equal, -rights	34	-
even, -chances	17	-
same, ness	32	-
balance, d	10	-
equality	-	9
<b>GOOD, IDEAL</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>8</b>
goal	5	-
good	11	-
ideal, istic	15	-
necessary	8	-
needed	13	-
bettering	-	8
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>69</b>
strength	-	6
mathematics	8	-
sports	7	-
word	6	-
life	-	11
master	-	6
not asking for it	-	9
knowledge, higher ed.	-	13
treatment	-	6
setting down	-	10
means, connection	-	8

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Main Components and Responses US J

<b>LOVE, HAPPINESS</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>61</b>
love	106	13
cooperation	12	16
help	-	6
understanding	10	-
together,ness	8	-
united	5	-
joy	16	-
harmony	16	-
happiness	38	3
honor,ing	7	9
sharing	2	5
relationship	-	9
content,ment	8	-

<b>WAR, DISARMAMENT</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>96</b>
war	120	28
cold war	4	-
fight,-for	6	-
armament	-	7
disarmament	6	-
no war,s	18	20
no attack	-	9
no killing	-	8
betrayal	-	10
colonization	-	6
Zionism	-	8

<b>SYMBOLS, DOVE</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>-</b>
sign	22	-
symbol	6	-
dove	62	-
flowers	10	-
pipe	6	-

<b>TRANQUIL, QUIET</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>68</b>
tranquil,ty	20	28
calm,ness	8	-
serene,ty	10	-
peaceful	7	-
quiet,ude	30	27
relax,ation	9	-
rest,ful	9	6
confort	-	7

<b>DESIRE, HOPE</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>-</b>
necessary	6	-
needed	9	-
desire,able	10	-
dream	8	-
hope,ful	18	-
faith	6	-
ideal	7	-
good	13	-
goal	6	-
possible	5	-

<b>RELIGION</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>9</b>
religion,s	6	-
Christmas	10	-
God	6	-
no peace without	-	-
Islam,Koran	-	-

PEACE

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	US	J
Love, Happiness	26	8
War, Disarmament	18	12
Symbols, Dove	12	-
Tranquil, Quiet	11	8
Desire, Hope	10	-
Religion	4	1
World, Nations	7	18
Rights, Freedom	2	17
Safety, Stability	1	16
Development, Advancement	-	8
Politics, Negotiations	4	-5
Miscellaneous	5	6
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>845</b>	<b>791</b>

Main Components and Responses US J

<b>WORLD, NATIONS</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>142</b>
Egypt	-	21
Israel	-	36
Vietnam	12	-
earth	8	-
world	29	-
US	-	16
Palestine	-	13
land	-	9
hippies	14	-
Begin	-	6
Arabs,-people	-	10
Sadat	-	31

<b>RIGHTS, FREEDOM</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>136</b>
rights	-	21
free,dm	18	48
loss of rights	-	4
equality	-	23
just,ice	-	40

<b>SAFETY, STABILITY</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>124</b>
safety	-	85
security	9	-
stability	-	39

<b>DEVELOPMENT, ADVANCEMENT</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>61</b>
development	-	15
advancement	-	31
flourishment	-	9
production	-	6

<b>POLITICS, NEGOTIATIONS</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>43</b>
Camp David	-	21
political	6	-
treaty	14	-
UN	10	-
talk	-	11
agreement	-	11

<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>51</b>
problem	-	9
Corps	8	-
time,-for things	12	-
inher	6	-
sixties	8	-
life	-	11
external	-	10
no hunger	-	6
work	-	6
strength	-	9
nonexistent	9	-

Main Components and Responses 1977 1980

POWER, CONTROL	1977	1980
great power,s	-	47
military power	-	5
big	-	8
great	37	-
strong, strength	-	71
control	9	-
rich	15	13
dollar	4	-
greatest country	-	16
large, st country	-	10
overpowering	-	20
influence	-	41
power	43	-
self sufficient	6	-

TECHNOLOGY, PROGRESS 191 215

technology	-	32
factories	-	6
advancement, development	63	74
help	-	7
cooperation	9	-
exports	-	3
oil	7	-
industries	24	20
advance in science	-	23
space	-	-
investigation	-	9
educated	-	6
high level of education	-	6
thought	-	-
advancement	-	11
civilized	-	5
buildings, skyscrapers	-	7
moon	20	-
resources	-	6
science	35	-
progress	12	-
invention	8	-
activity	7	-
establishment	6	-

COLONIZATION, OPRESSION 56 163

colonization, colonialism	50	61
imperialism	-	7
racial	-	-
discrimination	6	-
destruction of Islam	-	12
Zionism	-	12
oppression	-	71

UNITED STATES  
PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY  
JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS TESTED IN 1977 AND 1980

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	1977	1980
Power, Control	11	23
Technology, Progress	18	22
Colonization, Oppression	5	17
Immoral, Unjust	5	12
Weapons, Killing	6	10
Government, Politics	19	7
Israel, Russia	14	3
America, States	10	-
Country, People	4	2
Freedom, Justice	4	1
Miscellaneous	3	2
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>1047</b>	<b>985</b>

Main Components and Responses 1977 1980

IMMORAL, UNJUST	1977	1980
taking advant. of world	-	17
corruption	28	6
injustice	-	8
bias	-	13
racism	-	9
crimes	7	9
betrayal	-	17
bad morals	-	20
unfair	8	-
tumbling down	-	10
overpopulation	-	10
drugs	7	-

Main Components and Responses 1977 1980

WEAPONS, KILLING	1977	1980
weapons	24	35
killing	-	24
violence	-	13
attacker	7	-
enemy-like	-	19
supporting terrorism	-	9
war	27	-

Main Components and Responses 1977 1980

GOVERNMENT, POLITICS	1977	1980
politics	8	10
Jimmy Carter	50	-
democracy	11	17
capitalism, tic	61	33
Nixon	12	-
Washington	13	-
Watergate	11	-
organization	-	8
veto right	-	4
Kissinger	10	-
CIA	5	-
UN	20	-

ISRAEL, RUSSIA	1977	1980
Israel	57	29
Palestine	11	-
Russia, n	20	-
France	9	-
West	16	-
Mexico	9	-
Saudi Arabia	6	-
Arab	4	-
British	17	-

AMERICA, STATES	1977	1980
America, n	66	-
States	25	-
New York	11	-

COUNTRY, PEOPLE	1977	1980
country	20	24
world	4	-
civilization	9	-
Black	13	-
Black	13	-

FREEDOM, PEACE	1977	1980
freedom	32	9
peace	6	-

MISCELLANEOUS	1977	1980
supply	10	-
imitation	6	-
fly	15	-
life	-	9
interest	-	6
playing around	-	8
anatomy	11	-

Main Components and Responses 1977 1980

COUNTRIES, US, ISRAEL	182	277
country,s	84	34
nation,al	6	-
world	-	21
US, America	25	55
Egypt	-	8
Iran	-	5
Middle East	7	-
Arab countries	5	9
Palestine	9	-
USSR	7	18
Israel	10	23
international	-	32
social	6	14
people	15	11
internal	-	14
external	-	16
class	8	6
culture	-	5
individual	-	6
<b>GOALS, DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMY</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>83</b>
goals	5	19
education	-	5
mutual help	-	10
development	-	5
useful	-	7
economy,ic	11	26
advancement	-	11
equality	5	-
peace	4	-
progress	15	-
change	7	-
<b>PROBLEMS, WAR, COLONIZATION</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>92</b>
problems	20	-
conflict	7	-
fighting	8	-
war	27	19
battle	-	6
Army	7	-
prison	25	9
oppression	-	16
colonization	9	24
Zionism	-	11
taking advantage	-	7
ruined	10	-
enemy	8	-
<b>PRESIDENTS, POLITICIANS</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>28</b>
Kings	11	-
consul	7	-
ambassador	11	-
governor	-	17
Jimmy Carter	-	5
King Hussein	-	6

POLITICS

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS TESTED IN 1977 AND 1980

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	1977	1980
Countries, U.S., Israel	15	36
Goals, Development, Economy	4	11
Problems, War, Colonization	10	12
Presidents, Politicians	2	4
Political Science, Diplomacy, Plans	28	11
Leadership, Power	13	4
Government, Democracy	12	9
Laws, Constitution	6	4
Corruption, Deceit	5	4
Miscellaneous	4	3
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>1197</b>	<b>762</b>

Main Components and Responses 1977 1980

MISCELLANEOUS	52	23
fear	9	-
parts	9	-
character	5	-
base	12	-
wish	6	-
surviving	3	-
life	8	-
ground	-	6
general	-	13
weak	-	4

Main Components and Responses 1977 1980

POLITICAL SCIENCE, DIPLOMACY, PLANS	337	81
relations,ships	18	5
diplomacy	32	11
skill	10	-
art	-	12
negotiation	28	-
deal,ing	14	-
behavior	7	-
participation	17	-
ambitious	2	-
plan,ing	-	24
goal determines means	-	5
flexibility	9	-
wise	-	9
experience	23	8
thought	13	-
intelligence	23	7
publicity	9	-
science of	26	-
profession	34	-
ways, means	52	-
work	14	-
effort	6	-
<b>LEADERSHIP; POWER</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>35</b>
leader,ship	49	-
power,ful	22	-
rule,ing	41	-
responsibility	7	8
duties	-	9
great powers	-	8
strong	-	10
influence	33	-
<b>GOVERNMENT, DEMOCRACY</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>82</b>
government	35	29
democracy,tic	7	-
system, order	65	31
politics	26	10
party,-system	-	12
embassy	9	-
<b>LAW, CONSTITUTION</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>33</b>
laws	24	6
constitution	22	-
rights	6	5
freedom	11	9
justice	15	5
interests	-	8
<b>CORRUPTION, DECEIT</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>28</b>
cheat,ing	14	-
unfair	5	-
slyness	18	-
decey,ing	-	23
failure	-	5
race hatred	10	-
dangerous	10	-

35

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Main Components and Responses	1977	1980
<b>US, WESTERN CAMP</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>202</b>
US, America	91	133
country,s	17	-
Europe	20	22
international	-	6
Western,-camp	11	41
national	9	-
land	9	-
Arab	7	-
<b>FREEDOM, RIGHTS</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>130</b>
free,dm	-	96
right	14	13
principle	-	16
beautiful	-	5
<b>SOCIETY, CLASSES</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>123</b>
social	-	11
classes	51	20
bourgeoisie	-	10
individualism	13	14
culture	-	5
humanity	-	13
man	-	10
social level	-	8
society	-	9
life	-	23
people	12	-
group	5	-
<b>FREE ENTERPRISE, OWNERSHIP</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>70</b>
competition	13	6
opportunism	-	9
ownership	-	20
free economy	-	14
free importation	-	6
interests	-	15
<b>CORRUPTION, LACK OF EQUALITY</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>46</b>
corrupt,ion	7	6
greedy	11	-
sneaky	6	-
selfishness	-	6
enemy-like	-	8
lack of equality	-	17
atheism	-	9
race hatred	6	-

## CAPITALISM

### PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS TESTED IN 1977 AND 1980

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	1977	1980
U.S., Western Camp	16	21
Freedom, Rights	1	14
Society, Classes	8	13
Free Enterprise, Ownership	1	7
Corruption, Lack of Equality	3	5
Economy, Money, Profit	23	13
Imperialism, Oppression	22	9
Business, Industry	8	4
Communism, Socialism	8	7
Government, Politics	4	2
Miscellaneous	4	4
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>1020</b>	<b>940</b>

### Main Components and Responses 1977 1980

<b>ECONOMY, MONEY, PROFIT</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>125</b>
economy,-system	17	-
econ. advancement	-	6
money	95	42
rich	52	-
wealth	-	22
profit	5	-
capital	17	16
profiting from	-	14
property	15	16
material life	15	9
development	11	-
progress	5	-
<b>IMPERIALISM, OPPRESSION</b>	<b>227</b>	<b>88</b>
colonization	6	12
domination	51	4
oppression	57	34
exploitation	45	-
terrorism	-	6
killing	-	6
revolution	-	11
overpowering	-	15
stealing	7	-
torture	17	-
war	12	-
empire	24	-
dictatorship	8	-
<b>BUSINESS, INDUSTRY</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>37</b>
factories	19	9
monopolies	25	19
work,ers	19	9
companies	21	-
<b>COMMUNISM, SOCIALISM</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>66</b>
communism	30	11
socialism	51	9
democracy	6	27
anti-communism	-	7
capitalism	-	12
<b>GOVERNMENT, POLITICS</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>17</b>
system	33	-
political	11	-
influence	-	5
governing	-	6
state interference	-	6
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>36</b>
word	7	-
capacity	13	-
security	-	6
religion	8	-
belief	6	-
court,	-	15
comfort	6	-
nature	-	9
science	4	6

Math Components  
and Responses 1977 1980

<b>KILLING, DESTRUCTION</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>135</b>
killing,er	27	74
death	6	6
destroy,-tion	26	16
torturing	5	4
defeat	14	-
ruin,ing	-	6
terrorism	-	10
violation	-	19

<b>SICKNESS, INSTABILITY, DISLOCATION</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>76</b>
problems	-	4
sickness	-	15
disease	6	-
hunger	-	6
unemployment	-	5
lack of stability	-	9
lack of security	-	6
ignorance	-	7
backwardness	-	8
homeless	-	12
unrest	-	4

<b>TRAITOR</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>60</b>
traitor	-	24
betrayal	-	20
violation	-	16
spies	4	-
against	7	-

<b>WAR, FIGHTING</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>154</b>
war	69	53
battle	40	-
ying with	-	12
weapons	17	25
competition	18	-
guns	7	-
airplane	7	-
conflict,ing.	10	16
rival,ry	-	13
dispute	-	35

<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>77</b>
news	-	22
children	3	-
future	7	-
animal	-	6
liberation	5	-
unity	6	-
rights	-	5
interests	-	9
pride	-	5
peace	3	5
against Islam	-	4
atheism	-	9
split	-	6
party-spirited	-	6

ENEMY

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY  
JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS TESTED IN 1977 AND 1980

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	1977	1980
Killing, Destruction	7	13
Sickness, Instability, Dislocation	1	8
Traitor	1	6
War, Fighting	15	15
Oppression, Colonization	23	18
Israel, Jews	14	10
Hatred, Fear, Jealousy	13	11
Bad, Despicable, Deceitful	13	4
Nations, Russia, U.S.	10	7
Friend, Brother	2	1
Miscellaneous	2	8
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>1141</b>	<b>1010</b>

Main Components  
and Responses 1977 1980

<b>OPPRESSION, COLONIZATION</b>	<b>263</b>	<b>177</b>
tyranny	23	-
dominating	-	17
subduing	-	6
power	19	-
strength	-	6
oppression	-	43
colonizer	-	14
colonization	32	23
imperialism	-	8
holding freedom	-	5
violating freedom	-	4
overpowering	-	15
theft	8	-
stealing	-	12
prisons	8	8
banishment	56	-
Zionism	52	16
Occupation of land	41	-
usurpation	24	-

<b>ISRAEL, JEWS</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>99</b>
Israel	110	99
Jews	51	-

<b>HATRED, FEAR, JEALOUSY</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>110</b>
hate,d,ful	98	68
animosity	31	-
fear,ful	9	-
terror	-	15
spite	-	17
coward	-	4
lack of pity	-	6
humiliation	9	-

<b>BAD, DESPICABLE, DECEITFUL</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>38</b>
bad	-	23
corruption	-	9
despicable	45	-
deceit	99	-
savage	-	6

<b>NATIONS, RUSSIA, US</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>75</b>
nations	51	-
land	14	23
Arabs	9	-
border	7	-
Russia,USSR	6	13
US, America	6	33
Palestine	19	6

<b>FRIEND, BROTHER</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>9</b>
friend	22	9
brother	5	-

Main Components and Responses 1977 1980

<b>TERROR, HUNGER, DISPLACEMENT</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>211</b>
terror	-	49
fear	31	-
sorrow	5	-
lack of security	-	6
lack of stability	-	4
hunger	7	33
sicknesses	-	12
defeat	31	8
loss	5	7
inhumanity	-	10
social problems	-	6
ignorance	-	16
crime	9	6
backwardness	-	29
banishment	30	-
homeless	-	32
poverty	-	3
<b>DEATH, KILLING</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>177</b>
death, dead	43	91
kill, ing	59	61
blood, -shed	34	19
death of humanity	-	6
martyrdom	12	-
sacrifice	9	-
dangerous	16	-
<b>DESTRUCTION, RUIN</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>139</b>
destruction	131	110
ruin	-	29
explosion	12	-
<b>DOMINATION, OPPRESSION</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>123</b>
domination	-	20
overpowering	-	9
victory	-	12
oppression	21	26
weakness	-	6
colonization	7	20
occupation	16	-
interests	-	17
spread, ing	-	7
continuation	-	6
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>48</b>
toll	6	-
disturbance	7	-
animals	-	8
night	4	-
help	-	11
Islam	-	12
politics	-	3
belief	-	8
pride	-	6
stealing	6	-

WAR.

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS TESTED IN 1977 AND 1980

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	1977	1980
Terror, Hunger, Displacement	10	19
Death, Killing	14	16
Destruction, Ruin	12	13
Domination, Oppression	4	11
Fighting, Battle	18	14
Weapons, Nuclear Bombs	14	11
Nations, People	13	6
Peace, Freedom	6	1
Enemy	5	2
Soldiers, Army	3	1
Miscellaneous	2	5
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>1193</b>	<b>1102</b>

Main Components and Responses 1977 1980

<b>FIGHTING, BATTLE</b>	<b>213</b>	<b>153</b>
fight, ing	-	37
battle	84	-
confrontation	20	-
revolution	13	-
terrorism	-	5
rivalry	-	17
aggression	14	9
violence	-	6
wrestling	-	27
dispute	-	46
persecution	-	6
training	6	-
captives	7	-
camps	6	-
guerillas	6	-
noble	5	-
courage	3	-
victory	40	-
alliance	9	-
<b>WEAPONS, NUCLEAR BOMBS</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>118</b>
weapons	54	47
bombs	12	17
nuclear	9	-
atomic weapons	-	4
jets	26	-
tanks	20	10
cannons	24	6
planes	-	17
strength	21	17
<b>NATIONS, PEOPLE</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>70</b>
Israel	34	30
Jewish	10	-
Arabs	35	-
Palestine	14	8
nation	11	-
land	2	-
US, America	8	8
people	3	-
leader	10	-
children	5	-
Russia, USSR	-	4
souls	-	8
internat'l world	-	12
originat'ion	12	-
orphan	7	-
<b>PEACE, FREEDOM</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>22</b>
peace	12	-
freedom	3	12
liberation	15	10
independence	5	-
right	10	-
justice	9	-
security	12	-
<b>ENEMY</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>28</b>
enemy, enmity	45	28
revengeful	10	-
<b>SOLDIERS, ARMY</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>8</b>
soldiers	-	8
Army	41	-

Main Components and Responses 1977 1980

	1977	1980
<b>WORLD, NATIONS</b>	123	142
Egypt	-	21
Israel	20	36
people name	6	-
Jewish	4	-
Palestine	14	13
US	13	16
land	-	9
Begin	-	6
Arabs, -people	25	10
Sadat	-	31
Middle East nations	15	-
	14	-
<b>RIGHTS, FREEDOM</b>	103	136
rights	-	21
freedom	33	48
independence	12	-
equality	7	23
justice	45	40
truth	6	-
loss of rights	-	4
<b>WAR, DISARMAMENT</b>	102	96
war	66	28
armament	-	7
weapons	7	-
disarmament	-	-
no wars	-	20
no attack	-	9
no killing	-	8
struggle	4	-
loss	8	-
defeat	6	-
victory	11	-
colonization	-	6
Zionism	-	8
betrayal	-	10
<b>DEVELOPMENT, ADVANCEMENT</b>	65	61
development	12	15
advancement	-	31
flourishment	-	9
production	-	6
progress	35	-
solution	18	-

PEACE

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS BY JORDANIAN STUDENT GROUPS TESTED IN 1977 AND 1980

Main Perceptual Components	Percentage of Total Score	
	1977	1980
World, Nations	11	18
Rights, Freedom	9	17
War, Disarmament	9	12
Development, Advancement	6	8
Safety, Stability	19	16
Love, Happiness	13	8
Religion	11	1
Tranquil, Quiet	10	9
Desire, Hope	3	-
Politics, Negotiations	5	5
Miscellaneous	3	6
<b>Total Dominance Score</b>	<b>1109</b>	<b>791</b>

Main Components and Responses 1977 1980

<b>SAFETY, STABILITY</b>	212	124
safety	-	85
security	163	-
stability	49	39
<b>LOVE, HAPPINESS</b>	149	61
love	66	13
cooperation	22	16
help	-	6
harmony	6	-
happiness	18	3
honoring	-	9
kindness	5	-
sharing	-	5
relationships	-	9
brotherhood	10	-
humanism	7	-
reconciliation	15	-
<b>RELIGION</b>	122	9
religions	15	-
God	15	-
believer	25	-
no peace without Islam	4	9
Prophet Mohammed	17	-
mosque	14	-
prayer	12	-
fasting	12	-
pilgrimage	8	-
<b>TRANQUIL, QUIET</b>	111	68
tranquility	-	28
calmness	58	-
peaceful	35	-
quietness	10	27
restful	-	6
comfort	8	7
<b>DESIRE, HOPE</b>	35	-
necessary, need	19	-
hopeful	16	-
<b>POLITICS, NEGOTIATIONS</b>	59	43
Camp David	-	21
UN	17	-
talk	12	11
agreement	-	11
Geneva	15	-
negotiations	15	-
<b>MISCELLANEOUS</b>	28	51
problem	-	9
life	16	11
external	-	10
no hunger	-	6
work	12	6
strength	-	9

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Word associations to the eighty themes listed in the table below were elicited from U.S., Jordanian, and Egyptian student groups in 1977 and from the Israeli students in 1979. The themes were presented in the native language of each group. Their responses provided the basis for the comparative analysis of major perceptual trends. The technical procedure is described in Appendix II, page 8.

THEMES USED IN PERCEPTUAL TREND ANALYSIS FOR COMPARISON OF AMERICAN, JORDANIAN, EGYPTIAN, AND ISRAELI STUDENT GROUPS

<b>LIFE</b> life death strength happiness energy existence troubles beauty	<b>RELIGION</b> religion God church faith Muslim Islam Jew Christian	<b>HUMAN VALUES</b> human values morality frankness honesty courage respect truth sincerity	<b>SELF</b> self me important goals we youth others ambition
<b>SOCIETY</b> society people race status social class authority socialism equality	<b>POLITICS</b> election president politics peace war revolution government nation	<b>COUNTRY</b> country United States American Egypt Egyptian Arabs Israel Palestine	<b>TRADITION</b> tradition past old pride customs history unity law
<b>ECONOMY</b> economy progress profit competition development capitalism stability unemployment	<b>FREEDOM</b> freedom rights independence democracy responsibility justice choice dictatorship		

## APPENDIX II

### THE ASSOCIATIVE GROUP ANALYSIS (AGA) METHOD

#### DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND MAIN CATEGORIES OF INFERENCES

- Data Collection, Test Administration
- Data Organization: Scoring Responses, Compiling Group Response Lists
- Main Categories of Inferences, Their Reliability and Validity
  - Group Perceptions, Images, Meanings
  - Subjective Priorities or Importance
  - Overall Similarity in Perceptions
  - Attitudes and Evaluations
  - Relatedness of Themes, Concepts
- Publications of Research Using the AGA Method

## ASSOCIATIVE GROUP ANALYSIS

Associative Group Analysis (AGA) is a research method which measures the perceptions, attitudes, meanings, and beliefs of selected social or cultural groups. Rather than using direct questions or scales, AGA draws inferences from the spontaneously emerging word associations of the groups studied. This "continued association" technique, in which the subjects give as many responses as they can think of in one minute per stimulus, produces response material with sufficiently broad foundation without having to use extremely large samples--a requirement that frequently makes socially relevant studies unfeasible and impractical. Generally, samples of 50 to 100 subjects are used to represent each particular group. The samples include preferably equal numbers of males and females. The requirements for representative sampling are fundamentally the same as in any other data collection aiming at generalizable results.

Through careful, systematic selection of stimulus themes, investigations can be focused on any desired problem areas or domains. Several related themes are selected in the representation of each domain in order to observe consistent trends on a broader data base and thus produce more generalizable findings. A strategy has been developed for selecting themes that are representative of the domains for each culture group (Szalay and Maday, 1974).

## DATA COLLECTION, TEST ADMINISTRATION

The standard AGA testing conditions of group testing, written form of administration, and working with little time pressure help promote more spontaneous, meaning-mediated responses. Individual subjects remain anonymous (demographic data being obtained by a brief questionnaire that carries the same code number as the subject's test slips); assurance of this helps to reduce the likelihood of bias in the form of acquiescence, considerations of social desirability, etc.; it also opens up a variety of emotion-laden issues to objective inquiry.

The subjects are asked to write free verbal associations to each of the stimulus words presented on randomly sequenced cards. They receive the following instructions, as well as the test material, in their native language.

This experiment is part of a study in verbal behavior, and this particular task involves word associations. These are group experiments, and your responses will not be evaluated individually but collectively for your group. Your responses are completely anonymous, and you are free to give your associations concerning any subject. There are no bad or wrong answers, so do not select your responses but put them down spontaneously in the order that they occur to you.

The task is easy and simple. You will find a word printed on each slip of paper. Reading this stimulus word will make you think of other associated words (objects, ideas, issues, etc.). You are asked to write as many separate responses as you can think of in the time allotted. Try to think of one-word responses and avoid long phrases or sentences.

It is important that in giving your responses you always take the given stimulus word into consideration. For example, if the stimulus word was *table* and your answer was *writing*, in giving the subsequent responses you must refer back to *table* and avoid "chain" responses (*writing, pen, ink, blue, ocean, sail...*).


Please work without hurrying, but do your best to give us as many answers as possible. One minute will be given for each word. At the end of each minute I will ask you to go on to the next word. Do not work longer than one minute on any word and do not read ahead or return to others later.

## DATA ORGANIZATION: SCORING RESPONSES, COMPILING GROUP RESPONSE LISTS

A logical assumption is that earlier responses are more meaningful than later ones, that the first response has more salience to the subject than the last. This assumption is supported by empirical evidence. The stability of responses obtained at different rank places was studied by comparing the responses obtained from the same group in two separate sessions one month apart (Szalay and Brent, 1967). The responses obtained at higher rank places in the first test showed higher stability in the second test than did the responses first obtained at lower rank places. The coefficients of stability obtained in this comparative study provide the weights for the various rank places. The response scores consist of frequency within 50-member groups weighted by the order of occurrence. The weights beginning with the first response are: 6,5,4,3,3,3,3,2,2,1,1...

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The cards are organized by stimulus words, and the individual responses from all the subjects are tallied into group response lists. Certain responses (e.g., *school* to *educated*) will occur to many members of the group; other responses may be given by only one or two members. In order to focus on the shared meaning for a particular group, the responses given by only one person are excluded from analysis.



Cards from each group are sorted according to stimulus word...

and the responses to each word are then organized into "group response lists."

The group response lists are used as the basis for analysis and comparisons.

ANCESTOR  
U.S. Group Response List

Response	Response Count
relatives, blood	254
grandfather	125
past	37
dead, death	31
old	21
family, life	20
grandparent	18
people, person	15
forefather	5

If we look at associations produced by members of our own culture group, they appear to be just plain common sense. We tend to feel that everybody would produce similar responses and that the responses do not tell us anything new. This impression is probably the major reason that the potential information value of associative response distributions has not been clearly recognized in the past. The systematic exploitation of associations as an important information source is the central objective of the AGA method. The feeling that everybody would produce similar responses is a culture-bound impression. This becomes apparent if we compare associations obtained from groups with different cultural backgrounds. A comparison of U.S. and Korean responses to the stimulus *ancestors*, for instance, shows that the most frequent U.S. response *relative* occurs only down around the middle of the Korean response list. Of the five most frequent Korean responses, only two, *grandfather* and *forefather*, occur

to the Americans. Both lists contain numerous responses which have high scores or salience for one culture group and low or no salience at all for the other group. A quick glance at the most frequent responses readily reveals that they are not accidental, but deeply rooted in the cultural background, religious-moral philosophy, life conditions, and contemporary experiences of the respective groups.

### U.S. AND KOREAN GROUP RESPONSES TO ANCESTORS

U.S. GROUP		KOREAN GROUP	
Response	Response Score	Response	Response Score
relatives, blood	216	grandfather	420
grandfather	126	rite	198
past	97	forefather	125
dead, death	91	grave, visit	106
old	91	veneration	84
family, life	90	elders	82
grandparent	88	Tau gun	81
people, person	85	burial ground	77
forefather	75	great grandfather	77
history	69	father	58
before, -me, -us	56	genealogy	58
ancient	54	generation	55
descendant	52	day gone by	49
family tree	48	primitive man	35
grandmother	47	respect	34
predecessor	45	human being	33
father	34	founder	31
long ago	32	relatives, blood	31
heritage	31	history	30
Indians	26	family, life	28
Ireland, ish	24	tradition	28
tradition	23	ties	25
caveman	18	serve	24
great	17	other	23
forebearers	16	deceased	19
German, y	15	home	19
great grandfather	15	lineage	18
foreign, er	14	hill	17
generation	13	I	14
Neanderthal	13	dead, death	14
early, ier	11	habit	12
Java man	11	senior	11
Adam	10	vanity	11
Europe	10	country side	10
other	10	posterity	10
worship	10	clan	9
American	8	Lee Dynasty	9
year	7	Lee Sun -sin	9
unknown	6	Park Hgokkose	8
genealogy	6	King Sejong	7
respect	6		
man	5		

Each group response list represents a rich information source reflecting the group's characteristic understanding of the stimulus word, including perceptual and affective details which are frequently unverbalizable and below their level of awareness. Actually, a systematic examination of such response lists has shown that every response contains a piece of valid information about the group's characteristic understanding and evaluation of the stimulus word. Responses with a sizable score value (10-15) are rarely accidental. Using conservative estimates, score differences of 18 can be considered significant at the .05 level, score differences of 24 at the .01 level. The wealth of information provided by the group response list is impressive, since even small score differences can have significant implications for communication and choice behavior (Szalay et al., 1972).

# MAIN CATEGORIES OF INFERENCES, THEIR RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

For the identification of various psychocultural characteristics, several analytical procedures have been developed, relying on the group response lists as the main data base.

## GROUP PERCEPTIONS, IMAGES, MEANINGS

One procedure relies on content analysis and provides for the identification of the main meaning components and their characteristic saliences. The meaning components are obtained by asking judges with backgrounds comparable to those of the groups from which the responses were obtained to group the responses into clusters.

Each category is described by a score and by a label to indicate its content. The category score is the sum of the scores of each subsumed response and expresses the importance of the category for a particular group. If a category yields a high score for a group, it may be said that the category constitutes an important meaning component of that theme for that group.

Using this procedure to analyze the stimulus theme *ancestor*, for example, we find a sizable group of responses dealing with "rites, veneration, and worship." The overwhelming majority of these responses come from the Koreans while only a few of the American responses fall in this category. A modest familiarity with the cultural background of the Koreans makes it obvious that this component reflects the traditional ancestor worship and shows how salient this cultural element is in the minds of contemporary Korean citizens. Another group of responses identified by the judges concerns the past and other time references, indicating that ancestors belong very much to past, ancient times in the minds of our American respondents. This is less the case with the Koreans, probably because active veneration and worship is still part of contemporary religious practices. Another cluster of related responses involve references to foreign, predominantly European countries. These responses come practically exclusively from Americans and show their awareness of their foreign ancestry. Naturally this component of cultural meaning is essentially missing from the Korean image of ancestors. Through this process of content analysis, the judges assign all responses to main response categories of U.S. and Korean cultural meanings.

### CATEGORIZATION OF U.S. AND KOREAN RESPONSES TO ANCESTORS

RITES, VENERATION, WORSHIP	score		TIME: PAST, OLD	score		PEOPLE, FOREIGNERS	score	
	US	K		US	K		US	K
worship	10	-	past	97	-	American	8	-
respect	6	34	old	91	-	Europe	10	-
veneration	-	84	before, -me, -us	56	-	German, -y	15	-
serve	-	24	ancient	54	-	Ireland, -ish	24	-
great	17	-	long ago	32	-	Indians	26	-
rite	-	198	early, -ter	11	-	foreign, -er	14	-
other	6	44	unknown	6	-	human being	-	33
			days gone by	-	49	man	5	-
			year	7	-	people, person	85	-
			posterity	-	10			
	39	384		354	59		187	33

In the case of the responses to ancestors the judges have used ten categories to identify the most salient components of the groups' contemporary meanings of Ancestors. The scores the various components accumulated in this process reflect the subjective salience of each component for the cultural groups compared. The main content categories obtained by this analysis describe the total subjective meaning of the theme in terms of the main components characteristic of each group's understanding. Because there is usually a difference between the two groups in their level of responding, the category scores are converted to percentages of the respective total scores in order to make them directly comparable.

#### PERCEPTION AND EVALUATION OF ANCESTORS BY AMERICANS AND KOREANS

Meaning Components	U.S. Group		Korean Group	
	Score	%	Score	%
Time: Past, Old	354	20	59	3
Relationship, Family Tree	335	19	196	9
People, Foreigners	187	10	33	2
History, Tradition	152	8	84	4
Prehistoric Man, Ape	73	4	35	2
Forefathers, Grandparents, Relatives	546	30	824	39
Rites, Veneration, Worship	39	2	384	18
Grave, Dead	91	5	233	11
Legendary Figures	-	0	52	7
Miscellaneous	25	1	108	5
Total Scores (Dominance)	1,802		2,100	

The reliability of the content analytic method was tested by comparing the performance of five judges working independently from each other. The interjudge reliability measured by product-moment correlation across 76 categories was .7. The validity of such inferences on particular single meaning-components cannot be directly assessed because simple criterion measures are not available. There are, however, findings which show, for instance, that the salience of these meaning components provides valid predictions on the meaningfulness of messages in intercultural communications. Communication material that capitalized on salient components of cultural meanings was judged by members of this culture as relatively more meaningful than comparable communication material produced by cultural experts (Szalay, Lysne, and Bryson, 1972).




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Another way to present the results of content analysis is the semantograph. It shows the main categories of group meaning by using radially arranged bars. The dotted bars represent the main components of Korean interpretation and the striped bars the main components of U.S. interpretation. Where the bars are similar in length, substantial agreement exists between U.S. and Korean responses. The bars are arbitrarily arranged so that those on the left of the semantograph show meaning components especially strong (salient) for the U.S. group and those on the right show meaning components especially strong for the Korean group. This presentation is designed to help the reader to recognize components on which his own group and the other culture group are in agreement or disagreement.

## ANCESTOR

Main Meaning Components  
for U.S. and Korean Groups



U.S. and Korean Groups' Main Meaning Components in Combined Presentation

## IDENTIFICATION OF DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE TRENDS

The strategy of this method goes beyond a comparative presentation of single words or pictures. Actually, we use clusters of word samples in the representation of larger domains for which there may be several hundred words in the vocabulary. The main trends of cultural conceptualization and priorities emerge then from consistent response trends which are observable across several themes used in the representation of the domains.

A computer-based matrix evaluation of responses produced to selected stimuli provides a more global picture of the general response trends differentiating two groups. In this analysis we use a stimulus-response matrix in which the individual stimuli represent the heads of the columns and the responses, the rows. The response scores constitute the cell values and the row totals represent the total score a particular response accumulated across all the stimuli included in the analysis. These row totals show the salience of a particular response in the context of all the stimuli used in the representation of a given semantic domain. A comparison of the row totals in the matrix of each group offers a simple method for the identification of different perceptual trends. The analysis is limited to responses whose score goes beyond a certain magnitude (e.g., 30 or more). The matrices contain several thousand responses and are too lengthy for presentation, but the example below may help to visualize the data matrix.

Responses	Theme 1	Theme 2	Theme 3	. . . . .	Row Totals
abacus	0	6	0	. . . . .	6
abandon	6	0	12	. . . . .	18
advise	8	21	0	. . . . .	440
.	.	.	.	. . . . .	.
.	.	.	.	. . . . .	.
zenith	0	10	0	. . . . .	25
Column Totals	892	1012	752	. . . . .	11,793

To facilitate the review of response trends, we again use the content analysis approach to group the related responses together. These matrices have been used to compare ethnic-racial groups, pictorial versus verbal stimuli, and before-after reactions. The responses of different racial or cultural groups can be compared to identify response trends which differentiate the two groups. A comparison of reactions produced before and after a specific event (e.g., a film presentation) can be used to identify which perceptual and attitudinal trends were strengthened and which lost salience.

## SUBJECTIVE PRIORITIES OR IMPORTANCE

How important a certain subject, theme, idea, or issue is to a particular group can be inferred from the number of responses they give to it as a stimulus word. The dominance score, simply the sum of the scores of all responses elicited by a particular theme or domain, is used to measure the subjective importance. This measure is analogous to Noble's *m* measure of meaningfulness. The priorities of different social or cultural groups can be compared by looking at their dominance scores on the same concepts. Dominance scores reveal group-specific priorities not only on single issues but also for larger domains, as shown in the example below.

DOMINANCE SCORES OF BLACK AND WHITE GROUPS

Domain and Themes	White	Black	Domain and Themes	White	Black
<b>ISMS</b>			<b>SOCIAL PROB.</b>		
democracy	636	449	society (U.S.)	316	342
socialism	396	280	social class	402	475
capitalism	362	298	social justice	376	378
communism	733	502	social progress	260	334
mean	532	382	mean	338	382
<b>NATION</b>			<b>NEEDS</b>		
nation	661	591	goal	514	581
United States	877	765	expectation	236	298
patriotism	508	222	desire	621	701
Americans	605	648	valuable	832	876
mean	663	556	mean	551	614

The results in this table come from a more inclusive study in which samples of Black and White blue-collar workers were compared on the relative importance they assigned to 60 selected themes in 15 major domains. The table includes domains on which the groups showed the greatest differences. The Black group shows more concern with social problems and needs, while the White group places more emphasis on political isms and nationalism.

The group-based dominance scores have been found to be highly culture-specific (Szalay, Moon, Lysne, and Bryson, 1971) and have a reliability of .93 calculated from a test-retest comparison of 40 themes.

More information on the dominance scores can be found in Communication Lexicon on Three South Korean Audiences (L.B. Szalay, W.T. Moon, and J. Bryson, American Institutes for Research, Kensington, Md., 1971).

## OVERALL SIMILARITY IN PERCEPTIONS

To measure the extent to which two groups, cultural or social, agree in their perception and understanding of a particular theme, idea, or issue like birth control or socialism, the coefficient of similarity is used. Similarity in subjective meaning is inferred from the similarity of response distributions measured by Pearson's product-moment correlation. Close similarity (high coefficient) means that the high frequency responses produced by one group are also high frequency responses for the other group; similarly, the low frequency responses produced by one group will generally be the same as those produced by the other group.

### INTERGROUP SIMILARITY BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE GROUPS

Domain and Themes	r	Domain and Themes	r
<b>EDUCATION</b>		<b>NEEDS</b>	
school	.90	goal	.38
knowledge	.88	expectation	-.47
educated	.92	desire	.76
to learn	.79	valuable	.90
mean	.88	mean	.53
<b>FAMILY</b>		<b>SOCIAL PROBLEMS</b>	
father	.80	society (U.S.)	.38
mother	.92	social class	.50
family	.84	social justice	.15
home	.79	social progress	-.04
mean	.84	mean	.25

In the example above, the problem areas or domains are presented in descending order of agreement. The reactions of the Black and White groups were most similar in the areas of education and family. The problem areas showing least agreement, social problems and needs, are the same areas in which the dominance scores reflected more concern among the Black group.

The reliability of the coefficient of similarity measure was tested by comparing two groups obtained by splitting a larger group randomly into two halves; the coefficients produced on a sample of themes was then averaged. In a comparison of two split-half groups on 26 themes, a correlation of .173 was obtained recently. In an earlier comparison an  $r$  of .82 was obtained calculated over 40 themes. A closer examination reveals that the coefficient depends a great deal on the particular theme under consideration. Themes that are specific and concrete produce steep response distributions characterized by a few widely shared responses, or meaning elements. The theme *family*, for example, is specific and concrete

and for everybody to a certain extent it involves father and mother. The themes *concern* and *anxiety* are less definite, and instead of everybody agreeing on a few particularly salient responses, people produce a broad diversity of responses. In this situation, low correlation does not necessarily indicate low reliability of the measure but may be a consequence of the indeterminate nature of the theme. In such a situation the stability of the measure may be better estimated by considering how stable a coefficient is within particular themes rather than across all themes. To assess this stability, the coefficients obtained on the same themes for the two split-half groups were correlated over the 26 themes and produced an  $r$  of .89.

The similarity measure is described in more detail in Priorities, Meanings and Psychocultural Distance of Black, White, and Spanish American Groups (L. B. Szalay, R.E. Williams, J. A. Bryson, and G. West, American Institutes for Research, Washington, D. C., 1976) and in "Psychological Meaning: Comparative Analyses and Theoretical Implications" (L.B. Szalay and J.A. Bryson in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 30:6, 860-870).

### Intragroup Homogeneity

A comparison of split-half groups shows how much agreement exists within a particular group on a particular stimulus theme. As previously mentioned this intragroup agreement depends to a certain degree on the determinate or indeterminate nature of the stimulus.

A second factor influencing the value of the coefficient is the size of the group. Based on 32 themes in the domains of family and health, mean coefficients were calculated using sample sizes of 13, 26, 52, 78, 104, and 156. They showed a distinct increase with the size of the groups compared. The rate of the increase is fast if we increase the size of small samples. For instance, an increase in sample size from 13 to 26 produced an increase of 27 points in the coefficient, while an increase from 52 to 104 produced an increase of only 9 points. Thus, there is a distinct decline in the growth rate in the case of large samples, and the coefficients come close to their plateau with a sample size of 200. Correlations do not generally increase just because the base of their calculation is extended. An explanation is likely to be found in the nature of mechanics of the calculation; the relatively large number of 0 scores obtained with a small sample decreases the correlation value.

Another interesting and important characteristic of the homogeneity coefficient is that it varies with the characteristics of individual themes. The variations are apparently explicable by the fact that some themes and domains are more concrete, definite, tangible (e.g., car, money), while others are more indeterminate, unobservable, abstract (equality, expectation). These variations may be illustrated by calculating coefficients of homogeneity on 16 themes in the family domain (family, mother, father, home, etc.) using three different sample sizes: 13, 52, and 156. In contrast to the wide range of variation (.12 to .70) observed at the level of smallest sample, in the case of the largest sample the range was narrower (.72 to .96). As a tentative explanation we are inclined to suggest the phenomenon of "cultural sharing" (D'Andrade, 1959). It follows from the rationale of this sharing phenomenon that larger groups, which provide a broader basis for observations, can be more completely described than smaller ones. These data underscore the importance of working with a sample size of at least 50.

## ATTITUDES AND EVALUATIONS

How people evaluate ideas and events---ERA, arms embargo, human rights, legalization of marijuana--- can be assessed without asking them directly. The evaluative content of specific themes is inferred from the relative dominance of positive or negative responses. Two judges working independently assign the responses to positive, negative, or neutral categories. An index of evaluative dominance (EDI) is then calculated by the following formula:

$$EDI = \frac{\Sigma \text{scores of positive responses} - \Sigma \text{scores of negative responses}}{\Sigma \text{scores of all responses}} \times 100$$

### EVALUATIVE DOMINANCE INDICES FOR U.S. AND KOREAN GROUPS

Theme	U.S. Group	Korean Group
family	25	22
proud	12	28
educated	51	51
knowledge	50	44
offense	-27	-53
capitalism	10	-4
communism	-14	-32
equality	19	20
poor	-58	-28
beggar	-63	-42

A higher index implies more intense group evaluation, in either a positive or negative direction. The above example shows that Koreans are more negative in their evaluation of political systems, particularly communism. Their less negative evaluation of poverty and beggars may indicate more familiarity with or tolerance of these problems.

The EDI measure is described in A Study of American and Korean Attitudes and Values Through Associative Group Analysis (L.B. Szalay, D. A. Lysne, and J. E. Brent, American Institutes for Research, Kensington, Md., 1970) and in "Attitude Measurement by Free Verbal Associations" (L. B. Szalay, C. Windle, and D.A. Lysne, Journal of Social Psychology, 1970, 82, 43-55).

A direct method of assessing attitudes can also be used. It involves asking the respondents to give a general evaluation of each stimulus word after performing the verbal association task. To express whether the words mean something positive, negative, or neutral, they use the following scale:

- |  |                                    |
|--|------------------------------------|
| 3 - strongly positive, favorable connotation | -1 - slightly negative connotation |
| 2 - quite positive, favorable connotation    | -2 - quite negative connotation    |
| 1 - slightly positive, favorable connotation | -3 - strongly negative connotation |
| 0 - neutral or ambivalent feeling tones      |                                    |

A mean group attitude score is obtained for each stimulus word. Distance in evaluations is then measured by Pearson's  $r$  coefficient comparing two groups across stimulus words.

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## RELATEDNESS OF THEMES, CONCEPTS

How people relate things---e.g., birth control to imperialism or peace---is highly characteristic of their way of thinking, of their world view. The index of interword affinity (IIA) measures the relationship of one theme (A) to another (B) for a particular group. It is based on the relative weight of responses in common for the two themes under consideration. The formula for the affinity of theme A to B is as follows:

$$IIA_{A \rightarrow B} = \frac{\text{score for responses in common to A and B} + \text{score for direct elicitation (A-B)}}{\text{total score for theme A}} \times 1,000$$

### AFFINITY RELATIONSHIP OF MOTIVATIONAL AND ECONOMIC THEMES FOR BLACK (B) AND WHITE (W) GROUPS

STIMULUS WORD A	Group	STIMULUS WORD B AND DIRECTION OF RELATIONSHIP													
		Goal	Expectation	Desire	Valuable	The rich	The poor	Unemployment	Prosperity						
		A-B B-A	A-B B-A	A-B B-A	A-B B-A	A-B B-A	A-B B-A	A-B B-A	A-B B-A						
Prosperity	W	163	216	182	111	134	214	167	358	259	531	131	252	96	162
	B	190	361	243	237	151	346	139	378	202	521	137	365	131	263
Unemployment	W	27	21	0	0	53	50	40	76	158	160	156	204		
	B	117	110	181	85	82	94	87	124	179	210	227	313		
The poor	W	66	46	25	8	146	123	97	110	307	291				
	B	128	103	319	97	156	134	122	151	270	253				
The rich	W	82	61	39	23	103	96	237	323						
	B	134	108	193	80	200	194	308	373						
Valuable	W	136	84	76	27	211	137								
	B	198	131	158	34	234	203								
Desire	W	220	182	310	113										
	B	132	110	205	87										
Expectation	W	89	237												
	B	97	224												

The matrix shows the relationship of eight themes from the motivational and economic domains. The generally higher indices for the Black group suggest a stronger relationship between motivational themes and economic matters. On the relationship of single themes, the table shows that the Black group sees a relationship between expectation and unemployment, which does not emerge from the White group.

The associative affinity index, a modified relatedness measure similar to those reviewed by Marshall and Cofer (1963), was developed for use with continued associations. The reliability of this index in split-half comparisons was in the range of .90 (Szalay and Windle, 1968). In a recent comparative study (Szalay and Bryson, 1972), the validity of this measure was estimated based on the correlations of this measure with other independent measures: similarity judgment .73; judgment of relationship .77; grouping task .84. The calculations were based on 66 index pairs.

More information on the affinity measure can be obtained in Communication Lexicon on Three South Korean Audiences (L.B. Szalay, W.T. Moon, and J.A. Bryson, American Institutes for Research, Kensington, Md., 1971) and in "Psychological Meaning: Comparative Analyses and Theoretical Implications" (L.B. Szalay and J.A. Bryson, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 30:6, 860-870).

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